Lecture: Concepts & Conceptual clarity in Behavioural Science
Abstract Fabian Hutmacher:
The social sciences – and in particular psychology – are currently facing a multilayered crisis stemming from the fact that the results of many studies cannot be replicated (replication crisis), that research has neglected cross-cultural and cross-temporal variation (universality crisis), and that many theories are ill-developed and underspecified (theory crisis). Sometimes, these crisis diagnoses are thought to be tightly connected in the sense that one can only expect to find stable results when the applied theories and concepts have been clearly defined and operationalized.
From this perspective, the vagueness of theoretical concepts is often considered a bug that needs to be fixed. The importance of conceptual clarification and theory specification notwithstanding, the talk will claim that conceptual vagueness in the social sciences is not simply a bug, but a feature. In addition to arguing for the somewhat provocative claim that hoping to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient criteria that define concepts in the social sciences once and for all is an illusion, the talk will elaborate why this does not imply that these concepts are ineffable or lack meaning. Ultimately, the talk will also discuss what the vagueness of theoretical concepts means for conducting research and for undertaking replication studies.
Bio Fabian Hutmacher
Fabian Hutmacher is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Würzburg, Germany. His academic background is in psychology (B.Sc., M.Sc.) as well as philosophy and German literature (B.A.). In his research, he focuses on individual and collective processes of remembering and identity construction (in the digital age) as well as motivated reasoning and motivated science reception. He also holds a strong interest in the theory and history of psychology. Recent publications include an article on autobiographical remembering in the digital age (published in Psychological Inquiry) and an article on the vagueness of psychological concepts (published in the American Psychologist). Currently, he is preparing the publication of a collected volume with contributors from different schools of thought entitled “Theory- and model-building in psychology” (Palgrave Macmillan, expected for 2025).
Abstract Freek Oude Maatman
Recently, several authors have expressed concerns about a lack of ‘conceptual clarity’ in psychology. According to these authors (i.e., Bringmann, Elmer & Eronen, 2024; Peters & Crutzen, 2024; Tafreshi & Slaney, 2024), this lack is causing a myriad of problems by causing us to ‘compare apples with oranges’; jingle-jangle fallacies, replication failures, mistaken interpretations of analyses, wrongly set-up meta-analyses, and miscommunication of results to laypeople. Throughout this work, it however remains unclear what conceptual clarity is, as well as what type of conceptual clarity we need to prevent these issues. In this talk, I will use these analyses to clarify conceptual clarity, and outline what type of conceptual clarity we need for reliable and generalizable psychological research.
Bio Freek Oude Maatman
Freek Oude Maatman is a theoretical psychologist working as a junior lecturer at the Radboud University, and currently engaged in a joint PhD at the Radboud University Nijmegen and University of Groningen. His work concerns the conditions under which psychological research is evidence, with a particular focus on how ontological assumptions about human cognition can inform and constrain experimental design. Besides this foundational research line, he applies these foundational insights in collaborations with clinical and social psychologists. His background is split between psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science.
Lecture: Becoming a self and losing one’s self: ecological and enactive perspectives
Abstract
The self is a key psychological notion - and a highly contested one. Ecological psychology and enactivism share the view that perceiving, feeling and thinking are embodied activities of an organism engaging their environment. Both notably avoid postulating inner mental states to account for experience. How can they make sense of the self? In this talk, we will argue that ecological and enactive views can shed a different a light on the notion of the self compared to more traditional approaches within psychology. We explore what insights from both views imply with regard to (a) our understanding of how selves develop and (b) what it means to ‘be yourself’ or to not be yourself.
Bio Sanneke de Haan
Sanneke de Haan is Socrates Professor of Psychiatry and Philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Assistant Professor Clinical Bioethics at the Ethics Institute of Utrecht University. She works on topics at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry. Her current research project focuses on so-called self-illness ambiguity for patients with recurrent depressions, and the development of a notion of relational authenticity. Her book on Enactive Psychiatry was published in 2020 by Cambridge University Press.
Bio Ludger van Dijk
Ludger van Dijk is an empirical philosopher interested in how material practices make minds. He received a PhD degree in the Philosophy of Psychology from the University of Antwerp and a PhD degree in Human Movement Sciences from the University of Groningen. As a postdoc in Amsterdam Ludger combined ethnography with philosophy as he theorized the situated nature of imagination by observing architects in action. Combining philosophical analysis with observational methods, Ludger’s research continues to develop at the intersection of pragmatism, ecological psychology and practice theory. He was awarded a FWO personal grant in 2017 and publishes regularly in both multi-disciplinary as well as specialized journals, including Synthese, Perspectives on Psychological Science, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, and the Psychological Review. Ludger is currently lecturing with the philosophy group at Wageningen University & Research.
Lecture: Complexity & Process-ontological approaches to Behavioural Science
Abstract Naomi de Ruiter
In this talk I will unpack and critique the philosophical underpinnings of the common assumptions held by psychologists, and for illustrative purposes, particularly in the field of self and identity. I will argue that psychologists tend to assume a substance-ontology approach, in which phenomena are regarded as fixed and isolable ‘things’ (i.e. 'substance'). I will contrast this approach with a process-ontology approach, in which phenomena are regarded as fundamentally processual, and cannot be reduced to ever-smaller components or isolated from other processes or contexts. I will argue that this approach is more appropriate for the study of human phenomena, and outline what the opportunities are for research. Once again, I will illustrate my arguments by drawing from research in the field of self and identity. In particular, Complex Dynamic Systems is ideal to make aspects of a process-ontology approach concrete from both a theoretical and empirical perspective – although this alignment is by no means a given and also requires critical attention. Finally, I will shortly discuss what a conceptual shift might mean for our lived experiences of self and identity by moving away from reified notions of self. The talk is largely based on my co-authored book 'Toward a Process Approach in Psychology: Stepping into Heraclitus' River' (2022), and draws from much of my recent work on identity, such as the manuscript 'Practices in state self-esteem research: An analysis of enacted antologies (2023).
Bio Naomi de Ruiter
Naomi De Ruiter is an assistant professor (UD1) of developmental psychology at the University of Groningen, where she works at the University College Groningen. Much of her work is conceptual, and addresses the field of psychology at large by working toward a larger paradigm shift that prioritizes the study of individual dynamics and complexity of human phenomena.
Examples of this work are her co-authored book Toward a Process Approach in Psychology: Stepping into Heraclitus' River (2022) published by Cambridge University Press, and her co-edited book Psychosocial Development in Adolescence: Insights from the Dynamic Systems Approach (2019) published by Routledge. Alongside from this broader scope of research, she also does conceptual and empirical work on the dynamic enactment and developmental processes of self, identity, and mindsets of ability. Some of her recent work on this includes her 2022 publication in Psychological Review entitled ‘A process model of mindsets: Conceptualizing mindsets of ability as dynamic and socially situated’. She was recently awarded the 2023 Early Career Award for Contributions in Developmental Science, from the international and multidisciplinary Jean Piaget Society.
Dr. de Ruiter is a member of the Jean Piaget Board of Directors and the editorial board of the Human Development journal. She is also a board member of the Young Academy Groningen, where she works to facilitate interdisciplinary research at the University of Groningen.
Abstract Merlijn Olthof
Psychological measurement: from latent to collective variables
While psychological measures have a prominent place in many societies, there is much debate about what it is that they are actually measuring. This debate lives in various research fields, leading to questions such as: What is intelligence/depression/stress? Is my intelligence/depression/stress similar to yours or can I be intelligent/depressed/stressed in a different way? And can I isolate intelligence/depression/stress from other attributes and context for measurement and intervention? All these questions point to the ontology of psychological concepts such as intelligence/depression/stress, which is enacted in their measurement.
In this talk, I compare a substance- vs. a complex systems process ontology as a basis for psychological measurement. First, I discuss some limitations of the dominant latent variable approach to psychological measurement which is grounded in substance ontology. Then, I present collective variable dynamics as an alternative approach to psychological measurement which is grounded in a complex systems ontology. I will argue that collective variable dynamics can resolve some key problems in psychological measurement and foster integration between psychology, physiology and context. But it’s not all fun and games: collective variable dynamics implies modesty about the claims that an empirical psychological science can make which urges us to review the role that psychological measurement should play in our society.
Bio Merlijn Olthof
In my work, I focus on the further development of a complex systems approach to psychopathology and clinical change. This approach starts from the assumption that mental ill-being is not caused by disease-like entities, but results from biopsychosocial interactions in a person-environment system. Following the slogan ‘nothing is as practical as a good theory’, I combine theoretical work with practice-based empirical studies that shed light on how practical a complexity theory is or could be.
In 2022 I obtained my PhD (cum laude) at the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University with the dissertation Dynamics of psychopathology and clinical change: a complex systems approach. A key publication in which I introduce this approach is Complexity Theory of Psychopathology published in the Journal of Psychopathology and Clinical Science (with Fred Hasselman, Freek Oude Maatman, Anna Bosman and Anna Lichtwarck-Aschoff). Currently, I work as a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Groningen and as a lecturer for the course ‘Complex systems: from theory to practice’ in the master Pedagogical Sciences at Radboud University.
