The glocal governance of sustainability in West Africa

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This working paper is designed to present my research, my agenda, my specific focus points at large, to look for possible collaborations, and to gather ideas.

Participation and empowerment are central in development discourses since the 1990s and the emergence of good governance impulse by the World Bank. In West Africa, from a legitimacy based on public governance, we arrived to a more important community governance, based on local hierarchies and the anteriority of certain populations. The management of natural resources is a source of tension between several categories of actors, some of whom are excluded from decision-making. To realize a development project on a specific population implies to understand the local power dynamics, the cultural diversity, the organization of the society, which is very hierarchical and gender centered. Even when promoting this understanding in the reports and discourses, too many development projects are still very ‘one-size fits all’, but it also comes from this lack of understanding of a very complex local governance. Public policies developed in African countries are part of international standards that are adapted to local contexts. But States retain some flexibility in the development of these policies. An approach in terms of governance allows to account for this flexibility through the identification of the initiatives taken by a plurality of actors (public, private, associative), of their modes of coordination and conflict resolution, of their power of action, and at different scales. From there, my principal question is: what could be the role of local non-State actors in the glocal governance of natural resources? And how and why people participate in non-State organizations? I want with that to understand how people coordinate in this glocal governance, but also the actual possibilities for people to participate and express their voice.

What governance am I talking about? Following heterodox approaches, I analyze governance from the concept of procedural rationality, in terms of institutional dynamics and modes of coordination (Baron, 2003; Blundo & Le Meur, 2009; Boesen, 2007). Governance, in this sense, is defined as any organized form of delivery of public or collective goods and services according to specific norms and logic. Each organized form of this delivery (each institutional arrangement), operating according to standards, and implementing specific logics, can then be considered as a mode of governance (Olivier de Sardan, 2011). In 1998, Gerry Stoker proposed a conceptual framework for the study of governance: intervention of institutions and actors outside the governmental sphere and interdependence between these actors are the basis. A mode of governance can then be defined as the result of a compromise between the actors and the instruments of public, market and community regulation. The term compromise underlines the conflict between the logic underlying the different types of instruments mobilized by the actors who carry them (Bied-Charreton et al., 2006). Contractual relationships are considered as power issues, and the various forms of delegated management (including public-private partnerships at different scales) can be considered as "power technologies" in Foucault's sense (Blanc & Hibou, 2007).
1. A history of governance in sub-Saharan Africa

1.1. From ‘bad’ to ‘good’ governance

Since decolonization began in the 1950s, several modes of development have punctuated the evolution of African countries, shaping the power relations between the various actors. This story is fundamental to understanding the focus on governance modes today, and mainly on ‘good’ governance. From the 1950s onwards, the first so-called catch-up approaches developed, such as Lewis’ theory of putting surplus labor to work by transferring it from the traditional subsistence sector to the modern capitalist sector (Lewis, 1954). These catch-up theories ultimately consisted in seeking to finance the transition from a traditional economy in barely decolonized countries to the achievement of Western modernity. Several theories subsequently emerged, seeking to understand how developing countries could catch up, through external financing, internal financing or both (Baran, 1957; Chenery & Strout, 1966).

The tremendous increase in public debt in these countries in this catch-up perspective began at the end of the 1960s and led to a repayment crisis in 1982. The public debt of Third World and Eastern European countries increased twelvefold between 1968 and 1980 (Toussaint, 2017). The crisis that broke out in 1982 was the result of the combined effect of the fall in the prices of products exported by peripheral countries to the world market, and the explosion in interest rates. The 1980s saw the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) for these countries by the IMF and the World Bank. To restore macroeconomic balances in African countries, structural adjustment has been affirmed through various plans in the 1980s. The measures concern the diversification of the economy, the stabilization and consolidation of the State’s financial situation, the reduction of its intervention in the economy, and the increase in savings (Diouf, 1992). In the mid-1980s, the external debt contracted with Western banks shifted to international financial institutions, which became the leading lenders in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the failure of the various plans in relation to the country’s human development, the measures are sustained, with donors believing that SAPs are working well and that social costs would have been worse if they had not been put in place (World Bank, 1994). In the sphere of environmental governance, this has taken the form of corporate codes of conduct, buyer-driven moratoria, and multi-stakeholder certification programs which seek to mitigate the negative externalities of transnational production by “governing through markets” (Cashore et al., 2004).

However, in the 1990s, development policies evolve. Gradually, in the speeches of the United Nations but also of the international financial institutions, redistribution and community solidarity mechanisms become important. The programs begin to consider the macroeconomic level, through the continuity of entry into international trade, the mesoeconomic level, linked to economic and social infrastructure, and the microeconomic level, i.e. the entrepreneurial households. The fight against poverty is becoming a moral imperative (Lautier, 2001). Brenner and Théodore (2002) distinguish these two phases: the “roll-back of the 1980s” refers to the withdrawal of the State, while the roll-out from the 1990s corresponds to the implementation of regulatory mechanisms by the State in response to the dysfunctions observed in the previous period. Participation is a new principle of development (Baron & Bonnassieux, 2013). In this perspective, ‘good’ governance comes into play, in relation to economic
development. The Bank's experts have come to recommend upstream action to provide an appropriate political-institutional framework for development (Osmont, 1998). The Bank's President himself (Barber B. Conable) introduced good governance in a report on sub-Saharan Africa: "A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance - a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public" (World Bank, 1989, p xii).

The political criteria (effectiveness, capacity for reform, assistance to local NGOs) are from then in addition to the economic conditions of World Bank loans. However, the World Bank's good governance is not presented as a political position but as a technical one. It involves management standards (such as performance-based financing) but, unlike bilateral loans conditional on the democratization of assisted countries, does not directly advocate a specific form of government that would need to be put in place to achieve good governance (Castel, 2006). However, although presented as neutral, good governance becomes a performative indicator, based on New Public Management (Eboko et al., 2015). For the World Bank, it is a prerequisite for economic growth and poverty reduction, through three axes: a hierarchical relationship with the State; the negotiation of public policy decisions by all stakeholders; transparency and accountability of public authorities. Thus, good governance postulates that the participation of civil society, transparency of information and democracy are enough conditions to improve governance quickly (Cartier-Bresson, 2010). In this context, poverty reduction requires a reallocation of aid according to the poverty of countries but also the quality of their institutions and policies (Collier, Dollar, 2001). Good governance is thus equated with the disengagement of the central State, both to the private sphere and to local authorities which, in the context of decentralization, are given new powers of control. As part of a broader shift in global environmental politics, these new modes of governance see non-state actors in a prominent role (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Cutler et al., 1999). Development Impact Bonds are a good example of good governance, the importance of the glocal scale, and of the dilution of power relations (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2019).

1.2. **Glocal governance, sustainability and power relations**

Because of the importance of development income and the economic weight of development agencies, the latter play a key role in the formulation, implementation and financing of public policies: developmental governance has thus taken place alongside state governance (the two are often intertwined). And, while the links between liberal economic reforms, good governance, democracy and civil society are clearly highlighted in the speeches of international creditor institutions, the nature of these links varies from one institution to another, depending on whether it is the Bretton Woods institutions or the bilateral institutions of the OECD countries (Alenda-demoutiez, 2016; Assogba, 2000). On the other hand, as mentioned above, an increasing number of non-state actors are now delivering public or collective goods and services, due to the processes of subsidiarization, privatization and associationism. There is no longer any public service in Africa whose deliverance does not include the greater or lesser involvement of the four following instances: the state administrative services, the
development administration (NGOs and international agencies), the ‘community-type’ organizations (from associations to the municipal council), and private operators (Blundo & Le Meur, 2009).

In 2015, Eboko developed a matrix of transnational public action in Africa, which only countries enjoying relative economic prosperity, or at least a certain economic and political capacity to impose national priorities on international cooperation actors, can escape (Eboko, 2015). This is based on relationships, statutes and the regularity of the presence of diversified actors in several development sectors. This matrix illustrates the importance of the international level in governance in developing countries. Indeed, we can find:

- One or more UN multilateral or international organizations. These are the standardization agencies.
- One or more bilateral cooperation agencies. It was the adjustment agencies that repositioned themselves following the fall of the Berlin Wall. They formally accept the new world order and international guidelines while trying to redeploy spheres of influence, in parallel and in respect of multilaterally imposed standards agencies. These "adjustment agencies" support, advise and (re)orient the social and political actors of the countries concerned in the implementation of international guidelines.
- A platform for the coordination of national and international actors present on the territory of the African States concerned, generally consultation agencies that act on administrative and technical procedures, with the mission is to organize the bureaucratic implementation of the public action in question.
- A State structure, officially responsible for the implementation of public action in the sector concerned. These are the national regulatory agencies. They are made up of national actors, appointed by presidential decree or ministerial order, in line with the logic of national and international political games.
- Public-private partnerships between States and international structures on the one hand and companies or foundations involved in the promotion, management and sustainability of the sector in question.
- African national associations - or regional in some cases - representing individuals and groups directly concerned by public action in a specific sector. They are implementing agencies that emerged from structures initially created by international or national actors to become "civil society". Some of them have evolved and constitute counter-proposal forces. They are the national stakeholders and are part of transnational networks of collective action/mobilization by maintaining links with international NGOs.
- A multilateral donor and private donors, including Western international foundations or public interest groups. They accompany and support the work of adjustment agencies and/or executive agencies.
- Networks of international public or private experts (academics, consultants, etc.).

It is therefore necessary to analyze and consider, in terms of governance, the complex struggles and compromises found between international, national and multiple local actors, especially in setting where customary and formal laws may have very specific relationships (Alenda & Robert, 2019). Sustainable development and governance both fully integrate the role of institutions. To define integrated natural resource management as a principle of sustainability requires institutions to coordinate all actions and policies at all spatial levels. These coordination processes must be based on
an original representation of power. In the context of authority and hierarchical power, it is important to highlight the modes of coordination based on trust, cooperation, participation, negotiation and consensus-building in these complex situations. We are moving away from a hierarchical vision where the State imposes almost immutable rules to tend towards a hybrid vision of different power structures, specific to governance.

However, this conception of power raises the question of legitimacy. Moreover, having the objective of guaranteeing access to resources for all leads to a perspective of inter-generational and intra-generational equity. The sustainability of development requires, when making decisions, an ethical responsibility towards future generations and the distribution of resources between different societies. This normative content is laid down from the outset in the definition of sustainable development. It refers to the search for a necessary social cohesion based on the sharing of common norms and values, facilitating cooperation between the different actors. At this level, sustainable development is in line with certain approaches to governance. Indeed, cooperation between actors is possible "through the coherence, always partial and provisional, of different compromises between actors and through a common system of collective representations that constitutes the relatively stable core of values, knowledge, specific rules of collective identity and the capacity to reproduce the local space" (Gilly & Wallet, 2001). In this logic, modes of governance are not defined a priori, but they are social constructions that emerge from concrete interactions specific to each local situation, both in their form and in their stability. I belong to this perspective. Using the grid of the economics of conventions, Isla and Baron (2004) establish four evaluation models. Evaluation models serve as a reference for the interpretation of the rules developed by the actors and coordinate the representations of behaviors. They make it possible to prioritize the aims of the strategies implemented, and thus provide a relevant interpretation tool. Since there are different models, the trade-off between them requires a political choice both at the level of rules and valuation models. Consequently, there is no neutrality, naturalness or inevitability of any model. The model of accessibility to certain natural resources that will be chosen is not neutral; it is not the only one possible. It reflects the values that the system embodies. It provides a framework to ensure that the rules do not contradict the objectives. These four evaluation models are as follows:

- **The human right model**: the natural resource is a right inherent to the human person, i.e. there are no criteria for granting it. A human right transcends the sovereignty of States and submits the very purpose of the right to the preservation of human dignity. It is intended to prevail over other rules of international law.

- **The community model**: it integrates the sacred and symbolic aspects of the resource. This model is based on a natural right, derived from human nature, historical circumstances, basic needs or the notion of justice. This natural right over certain resources continues to exist in some societies, particularly in Africa, through the maintenance of customary law.

- **The general interest model** is the very purpose of State action. It therefore refers to a varied and changing use over time, and leads to a situation in which the State legitimizes itself through its definition of the general interest. The State may make access to a resource a necessity of national unity and identity. Property is public, managed by a body superior to individuals, whereas in the human rights model, there is no property, and in the community, property is collective, controlled by all.
- Finally, the market model assumes that the resource is considered a scarce economic good. One solution to the problem of resource depletion is the creation of a market (Coase, 1960). Coordination problems are solved by a market valuation, the price, which expresses the importance of converging desires. Because everyone is able to pay, we can estimate the value of the resource. The evaluation model is therefore the optimal allocation through market mechanisms; the rule is the search for maximum well-being in the sense of the Public Choice economy (Buchanan, 1975). The political dimension is excluded as there is no longer a choice between different evaluation models; the efficiency/equity debate is decided in favor of economic efficiency.

The institutional context in the Sahel is complex. Rural communities have a great diversity of cultures and livelihoods. There is a patchwork of formal and informal laws and authority structures. Some local actors will go as far as to explore the different options of customary law and written law to better serve their interests (Hilhorst, 2008). The number of actors delivering public or collective goods and services is increasing, and the modes of governance more and more diversified, which opens the analysis even more. The integration of local actors, both public and private, is illustrated in the notion of a "local arena", where institutions and actors linked by "multiplex" links are almost "physically" confronted (Gluckman, 1955), and this is particularly strong in Africa. The process of "stacking" types of power in local arenas is indeed widespread: the establishment of a new political body (by the State or development agencies) does not replace the bodies already in place but is added to them. "Long ago, the first occupants, land chiefs, warriors and conquerors of yesteryear, emirs or sultans; the day before yesterday, colonial administrative leaders; yesterday, postcolonial local authorities, presidents of cooperatives or groups, representatives of the single party; today, mayors: these are, in a non-exhaustive way, so many particular forms of authority, so many claims of legitimacy, coming from a more or less recent past, which can all coexist in the same socio-political space, in a complex mixture of mutual recognition and deaf competition, of displayed tolerance and masked rivalries" (Olivier de Sardan, 2011). The same author has been establishing modes of local governance in African countries since colonization:

- **Chiefly.** The recent consideration by development aid institutions of "cultural factors" or "local realities" often leads them to turn to chiefdoms and to want to make them partners in development.

- **Associational.** The multiplication of associations delivering services makes them essential, according to a participatory "model" promoted by development agencies that is in fact largely appropriate in their own way by local populations (or "diverted" by them).

- **Municipal:** municipalities are now the official bodies par excellence of local authorities, and some of them have become privileged partners of development institutions.

- **Project-based and bureaucratic:** If the project-based mode stimulates, feeds and finances the associative mode described above, which is in various respects an emanation or an extension of it, it also has its own autonomy and exists in the field in the form of enclaves or as an umbrella structure for animation, training or supervision. In a sense, the project mode of local governance is located in the same political and managerial space as the state mode of local governance and fulfills some of its functions, whether in its place, in competition with it or in complement.

- **Sponsorship-based:** the "logic of sponsorship" is at the heart of local (and national) political life. The same could be said for certain public or collective services, regularly provided through patronage: the construction or repair of infrastructure (religious buildings, village water supply, school or sanitary
buildings), the payment of taxes to the State or the municipality or of contributions required by projects, food aid in the event of a shortage, are the main forms.

- Religious: the delivery of public or collective goods and services by religious institutions may sometimes seem close to the patronage mode, and sometimes to the associative mode, but it takes specific forms.

- Merchant: While the privatization of certain national networks to multinational companies is part of international neo-liberal policies, the use of private operators at the local level to deliver public or collective goods and services is most often related to other types of logic. Just as patrons or the voluntary sector play a role of public action, so do some private operators play a similar role.

These modes of governance are themselves complicated by the types of natural resources. In addition, natural resource productivity in the Sahel varies between regions, seasons and years, mainly in response to rainfall fluctuations. This requires adaptive management systems. In addition, these resources are used by several groups that may have competing interests. Finally, the relationships between the actors will vary greatly depending on the weight and type of interlocutors considered at the local level. Let us take the example of Burkina Faso. The Mossi nobility, which controls cotton production in the Centre and East of the country, inherited the role it had been given during the colonization to support the administration in the management of the country. It contributed to the formation of the Burkinabe state. This state was thus built between old and new forms of government (Beucher, 2017). A state law that does not have the consent of the local chief has little chance of being respected (Bado, 2015). However, in the West, most cotton producers come from various acephalous or segmental societies, outside the influence of traditional leaders (Ouedraogo, 2006). The ruling regime cannot therefore use these leaders to obtain the support of the people, giving them de facto local political autonomy (Loada, 2012). The implications for local populations of how rules, regulations and rights of access and management of natural resources in the Sahel evolve depend on the extent to which the legitimacy of local governance bodies is recognized and integrated into official policy. The interaction between these informal and formal systems is influenced by changes in legislation and the capacity and willingness to enforce laws on various issues such as land policy, pastoral legislation, water codes and regulations on land use planning and zoning, as well as forest management. Trends that affect natural resource management are those that change rights or increase pressure on available resources, such as increasing demand for arable land due to population growth, new economic opportunities (biofuels, irrigation projects), conversion of agricultural land to residential plots, and land speculation. In addition, policies to modernize agriculture, promote economic growth and generate employment in rural areas are under way. Natural resource management thus raises questions of local governance, in the sense of coordination between heterogeneous powers at the local level, negotiated definition and implementation of regulations, definition of local citizenship (Hilhorst, 2008).
2. A focus on solidarity and popular economies

2.1. Associations and popular economy in Africa

The history of associationism is old in Western countries. The emerging democracies of the 18th century highlighted the need for equality among populations excluded from citizenship, mainly in America (African-American movements and women's movements in North America), but also among European workers seeking to integrate democracy into the workplace (a distortion is created between the status of citizen and that of worker without rights). In the first case, associations serve the emancipation of individuals through the organization of economic activities that provide access to civil rights. In the second, workers already integrated, considered as citizens, are confronted with the opposition between their status as citizens and employees, their rights being erased when they enter the workplace. These conflicting frameworks are at the origin of the birth of associationism. The economic crisis of the 1980s and the domination of the duality between State and Market contributed to a renewal of associations (Laville, 2010). The movement developing in the countries of the South overlaps with the various registers addressed by what can be called solidarity economy in Western countries. Solidarity organizations promote an alternative society project, showing that it is possible to create wealth, manage goods and services differently, to face economic imperatives, with a collective identity as a basis, shared and understood by members (Favreau, 2003). Assogba (2000) thus stated that the revitalization of solidarity economy in Africa was a response to the globalization of the market economy, the decline of the welfare state, the effects of SAPs and the promotion of local governance practices. For Célestin Monga, in the African context, the expression "civil society" refers to all these "places where the ambitions of social groups blossom, and where action modules for more freedom and justice are developed" (Monga, 1994). In a lapidary way, the author means that civil society in Black Africa is made up of all those who "manage collective anger" against authoritarianism and "underdevelopment". As in Western countries, a crisis of values is taking place. These various factors lead, in Africa, to economic, socio-cultural and socio-political imperatives.

Solidarity initiatives are numerous and long-standing in African societies, the example of the tontines being particularly well known. In sub-Saharan Africa, community-based solidarity organizations existed before European colonization. In response to social, material or cultural needs, their forms have evolved over time, during and after the colonial period (Latouche, 1998). But the development of initiatives combining these three imperatives is the result of SAPs, the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and the various policies implemented since then in these countries that emphasize the market and/or the State (Atim, 1999). The conditions established by Defourny and Develtere (1999), allowing the emergence of solidarity economy initiatives, are met here: a condition of necessity and a condition of social cohesion. Since the late 1980s, there has been a veritable explosion of mutualist and associative organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as a renewal and strengthening of cooperative organizations. All of them assume, more openly than in the past, functions of economic production, and of social and political mediation. Thus, surveys in rural observatories have made it possible to understand the realities of the African countryside in a new light: a trend towards the effervescence of micro-initiatives based on network logics that structure both villages and their relationship to cities, logics of accessibility to land, logics of peasant movements, village associations, national federations
of peasant organizations, unionization, regional confederations, organizations of cooperatives, mutuals in all fields and human rights associations (Assogba, 2000).

Research about these solidarity initiatives has crystallized in relation to two different frameworks of analysis, providing a very different vision of their capacity to constitute a social movement (Favreau, 2003). The first is that of "non-profit". In this perspective, these initiatives, called ‘third sector’, constitute an observable, quantifiable reality in terms of the number of organizations, employment, social utility, defined negatively in relation to the market and the State. This approach is mainly descriptive. Several characteristics are then allocated to this sector: the organizations are formal, private and independent, their goal is not lucrative and there is significant volunteer involvement. In this vision of a third sector, the duality between the state and the market is not called into question, and the use of such forms of organization may be more relevant than the market or the state (cf. Laville, 2010). It is rational, in this perspective, to apply non-profit-making instead of profitability, since these organizations are more suitable than the market in certain cases. On the opposite, solidarity initiatives make it possible to seek new ways of meeting social needs, emphasizing reciprocity in the Polanyi sense. Unlike the third sector approach, solidarity economy is part of a broader framework, drawing the outlines of an alternative economy (Defalvard, 2013). This approach is intended to understand the origin and evolution of the various organizations, the links created within the community, the relationship with politics. The organizations belonging to solidarity economy are based on several characteristics:

- **Economic plurality**: we observe different ways to manage goods and services, to create and share wealth. These alternative experiences allow an economic plurality, their goal is to humanize the economy.

- **Democratic plurality**: it is at the same time internal (members are both decision-makers, everyone can make their voice heard and count in decision-making) and external (organizations make the link with politics and public authorities). Coordination requires deliberation, which is at the heart of the democratic process. This deliberation consists in the construction of rules through the confrontation of various points of view in a relationship of equality. Collective deliberation is an economic principle, as is market or state regulation (Dacheux, Goujon, 2010).

- **A common identity**: this identity is created by establishing social links between members, as well as through the legitimacy of the association, its purpose and values. Values have a coordination dimension, they allow individuals to evaluate actions and forge community membership (Batifoulier, 2011).

It is thus on this aspect, between solidarity and popular economies, that I place my focus, and especially on the links between these different initiatives. The popular economy can be considered as a branch of the SSE, as it has similar intentions, with a collective project of an alternative economy to the capitalist economy and a common identity between workers. Some of these popular organizations hybridize, in the same way as solidarity economy, market, non-market and non-monetary resources (Castel, 2007). But, if sometimes the popular economy is based on reciprocity or redistribution, democracy is not necessarily a mode of functioning specific to this economy, it can be very hierarchical for example when it takes place in Senegalese society. A quote from an activist in Senegal marked me in this perspective: "When an association was set up at our instigation, with an office, a president, a
treasurer, an assembly, we had the feeling that a great step towards progress had been taken, when in reality we were ignorant of the natural spaces of participation and we unintentionally contributed to the disintegration of the relational fabric of popular society ".

The so-called "traditional" economies are based on community production, a certain conception of work and above all reciprocity, within a framework of obligations arising from the various affiliations (subsidiary, tribal, religious duties, etc.). The division of labor is such that everyone, male or female, is essential in the production process. Trade is based on reciprocity, which acted as a price regulator, and redistribution, not on the market (Tsafack Nanfosso, 2007). And the field of "informal", which roughly includes small market production, handicrafts, small businesses in urban centers, agro-pastoral or community organizations of African peasants, etc., occupies an important place in social and economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa (Ela, 1998; Peemans, 1997; Monga, 1997). The concept of the informal sector has been used to refer to whole areas of socio-economic activities that take place independently of the public authorities' production systems for goods and services, which are the 'modern' systems. For Peemans (1997), the informal economy in Africa is the secular popular economy that belongs to a "fabric of production" existing before colonization, but which was both marginalized and diversified by colonization and during much of the post-colony period. For Penouil (1992), informal activities or popular economy practices are forms of indigenization of the modern economy through a process of combining and reinterpreting cultural elements borrowed from indigenous and imported or Western modernity.

There are two main categories of activities in the popular economy: a first category includes individual initiatives and one-off assistance strategies; and a second category includes socio-economic initiatives carried out by groups larger than a single family, including even the extended family, and whose goods and services are intended for a relatively large number of individuals or a larger community. It is this second category of popular economy organizations in Africa that, all other things being equal, can be compared to the solidarity economy in its contemporary meaning and practices. The work of these authors and other surveys has shown that in Africa, popular economy activities are crossed by different logics: the subsistence economy can be combined with a production economy aimed at generating a surplus; these two forms of economy combine a social logic of reproducing social position and social relations of conviviality. Affectionate relationships tend to significantly affect informal activities. Most economic studies show that family and ethnic ties play an important role in the creation and functioning of small activities. This has led to the concentration and domination of certain ethnic groups in certain activities. In total, the term popular economy is used to refer to "the expansion of many small productive and commercial activities that develop according to a logic other than that of the capitalist world even if they are surrounded by the latter: independent work, family microenterprises, cooperatives, organized craftsmen, etc." (Peemans, 1997).

Within the current political framework of governance, it is interesting to analyze the solidarity and popular economies as a mechanism that can contribute to sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. The idea is to show that the effective implementation of governance in the countries of the subregion can, under certain conditions, promote the deployment of solidarity economy activities on a larger scale. Moreover, integrated into national policies and international cooperation programs,
solidarity and popular economies would allow the transition from survival practices to sustainable development practices. In this context, (sustainable) development is a process that is intrinsically linked to the ability to strengthen social ties in communities within a well-defined territory. It is also linked to the "capacity of populations to manage their natural environment in a sustainable manner, through the development of an appropriate institutional framework and a cultural identity that has its material basis in the very construction of the territory" (Peemans, 1995).

2.2. The importance of being nuanced when talking about associationism and communities

My idea is not to present solidarity and popular economies as universal solutions. For example, far from the image of neutrality put forward by donors, Lavigne Delville (2015) shows and recounts, through numerous interviews and the study of attempts to regulate the sector in Niger, that civil society is embedded both in the country's societal and political dynamics and in international aid logic. First, in the country's societal dynamics, as a response to structural adjustment, underemployment, lack of job opportunities and marginalization of peripheral societies. Respect for associative principles is not self-evident in a society where values are in crisis, where models of success highlight wealth, where inequalities are strong and where social relations are deeply clientelist, where big men must accumulate and redistribute. In addition, it is important to stress the difference between traditional solidarity and organized solidarity. From solidarity between relatives to organized solidarity, we move from a traditional legitimacy, a transcendental principle observed a priori, to a moral legitimacy that becomes the purpose of the action, solidarity presenting a utilitarian interest, observed a posteriori (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2016; Regnard & Rousseau, 2007). Democracy, through the General Assembly and elections, is not enough in itself to involve members. Without reciprocity, the holding of meetings is no longer a pivot of legitimacy, but a front democracy. Solidarity and popular organizations must coordinate various representations of the world, various registers of legitimation.

Secondly, the logic of international aid, based on call for proposals and competition, favors already well-established NGOs, which then transform themselves into subcontractors and must meet specific objectives. In addition to competition between national organizations, there is competition with international NGOs, which offer much better working conditions. The aid market will only benefit a certain type of civil society organization that has the capacity to respond to calls. Faced with the precariousness of the labor market on the one hand, and access to international funding on the other, civil society organizations find themselves in a situation of permanent instability (Lavigne Delville, 2015). The associative governance model has been implemented by northern development institutions for at least 20 years to ensure the functioning and management of the infrastructures they have financed. Cooperation agencies and NGOs have indeed demanded the establishment, as a condition for their local intervention, of an institutional architecture based on the Western associative model, widely disseminated in all African countries, and which has almost the same basic elements everywhere, regardless of the regions, sectors and donors. The system is pyramidal (village committees, cluster or zone committees, cantonal committees, etc.). In recent years, it has included local development funds, managed by grant committees linked to umbrella structures, to which village committees submit funding projects (with the help of "drafters"). Often, the interveners impose a certain quota of women in the various offices and committees, in the name of an empowerment policy.
Another feature of this institutional architecture is its abundant and ephemeral character. External interventions are not coordinated, and everyone sets up their own "committees" across the country as they see fit. Every major village has a good ten or so associative management structures, independent of each other. But the life of these structures depends on the resources and support provided by donors, which are fundamentally transitional in nature. When a development project closes its doors, and any project ends its activities after a few years, the associations it has set up also disappear (Olivier de Sardan, 2011).

It is equally important to move away from an idealized vision of the 'community', which often occurs in the Common Pool Resources stream that will be discussed later. Like associations, 'communities' are not homogeneous and are crossed by power relations. The issue of the politicization of natural resources (forest, water, etc.) by local communities also arises but is not really addressed by Ostrom (Baron et al., 2011). It follows from her monographs that social relations are not explicitly called upon to understand how collective rule systems are instituted (Harribey, 2011). It is therefore important not to ignore several questions: how are these communities created? How do they evolve? How can the management of these resources become the basis for political demands, particularly in the face of the State (clientelism, authoritarianism, etc.)? How are socio-political and environmental claims articulated? How are trade-offs made between different objectives, all of which are considered desirable (environmental protection/self-determination/poverty alleviation)? Community is not an objective data in the sense that all individuals with certain objectively perceptible characteristics could be grouped together in the same set. The community is above all subjective (Ballet, 2007).

Finally, neither is it a question of considering self-governance as the ultimate dogma. The aim is to consider the hybrid nature of modes of governance of common resources, which reconcile public intervention, market mechanisms and forms of community management in contexts where donors sometimes partly define the principles. Hence the importance of the "glocal" in this project. The analysis of local situations cannot be achieved without an understanding of policies promoted at the international level (structural adjustments, integrated management policies, global policies to combat climate change, injunctions to participation, etc.). The organization between the different scales is not simply geographical. It has implications for governance, and these scales are socially constructed. The organization is dynamic and is transformed by conflicts and domination relations among the scales involved and the discourses and ideologies they contain (Swyngedouw, 1992).

3. Institutional perspectives of associations in the local management of natural resources

3.1. Associations and commons

Since the dissemination of the concept of sustainable development at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, the emphasis has been placed, as in the case of governance, on the increasing complexity of interactions between actors, and on the necessary participation of civil society. The very vision that individuals have of the natural resource under
consideration in different territories and societies will have a major impact on the possibilities of governance. The debate is always open and virulent on the qualification of these resources, between economic, public, common goods, rights and universal heritage. E. Ostrom sees natural resource management problems primarily as a matter of collective action and individual incentives (Ostrom, 1990). Drawing on a vast original theoretical and methodological framework, she made the study of institutions one of the keys to understand these problems, which are now omnipresent in a context of climate change and biodiversity erosion. From this point of view, one of the essential contributions of E. Ostrom’s work has been to highlight the existence and relevance of a "third way": the governance of common resources. She establishes eight principles that must be respected to enable the protection of common goods by communities:

1. the resource and the rights holders must be clearly defined;
2. the rules for managing the resource must be consistent with the realities of the local environment and the objectives of the rights holders;
3. the rights holders must participate in the development and modification of the management rules;
4. the agents responsible for the implementation of these rules must be accountable to the rights holders;
5. there must be a graduated system of sanctions for violations of the rules;
6. the system must provide for rapid and easy access to local bodies to resolve potential conflicts;
7. higher authorities (States) must recognize the right of local authorities to self-manage resources, thus guaranteeing the principle of subsidiarity;
8. in the event of the existence of vast common resources, interlocking management systems can be designed.

The aim is therefore to demonstrate that forms of local organization, effective in terms of the sustainability of socio-ecological systems, exist in both North and South and can be maintained over time, in the absence of coordination by the market or intervention by public authorities. In addition, a crucial advance in the Common Pool Resources (CPR) movement compared to previous approaches stems from the distinction between the concepts of open access and common ownership. Indeed, community appropriation of a resource, when social control is efficient, does not mean free access. It is not the collective nature of resource management that causes their degradation, but rather, in some cases, a long process of social transformation marked by the decline of forms of community regulation. In addition, State ownership of resources is often accompanied by significant control costs in terms of access and use which, when not assumed, transform State or public resources into de facto open access. Lack of knowledge of "traditional" management methods and "customary" forms of social organization is often the cause of the failure of many development projects. For example, the gradual institutionalization of the CPR stream has led to a very wide dissemination of the idea of local community management or "Community-based natural resources management". This is particularly true for community forestry in the South as well as in the water sector (agricultural or urban) (Baron et al., 2011).

In line with this vision, individuals who participate in shaping institutions are also an integral part of these institutions. In this sense, there is a joint production of rules by individuals, within the framework of collective action mechanisms. I come back here to the foundations of development economics
proposed by Albert Otto Hirschman and François Perroux. They considered development to be multidimensional, within an uncertain framework. The economy, plural, was for them framed in social rules, in politics. The agents, the meaning they give to the development process, their values, and ethics are at the heart of the tradition inherited from these two authors (Hugon, 2003).

Going further, Polanyi’s rereading leads us to question the domination of the logic of the globalized and self-regulating financial market and the ways to escape it. This review also goes further by proposing to go beyond the duality of the State and markets, which neglects the principle of reciprocity. The principles of a plural economy and democracy are increasingly being defended in both developed and developing countries. Through the normative framework of solidarity economy, it is a question, to use Polanyi’s words, of reintegrating the economy into social relations through democratic means. Democratic change, according to Polanyi, passes through the strength of the collective, going beyond methodological individualism. Individual and collective learning is fundamental, as is the impact on public policies, the affirmation of redistribution and the defense of reciprocity (Caillé & Laville, 2007). For Marcel Mauss, democratic change can only happen through the creation of new institutions through collective processes (Mauss, 2010[1950]). Collective institutions would then help individuals to make their decisions, with values helping coordination. This approach to institutions is similar to that of North since its 2005 book, considering institutions as the result of a collective approach by men to better manage the uncertainties of their environment, while escaping men in part (Prévost, 2010). Although considering the role of institutions since the 1990s, after the review of SAPs, international cooperation is inspired by the New Institutional Economy and consider institutions as tools to reduce transaction and coordination costs (Dutraive, 2009). In this functionalist vision, improving the quality of institutions is synonymous with economic development, as the market needs institutions on which to build (Clévenot, 2010). This is the purpose of the second Washington consensus. Economic determinism has become institutional determinism through good governance, the vision that only one way of doing things is possible.

However, from an institutionalist perspective, the notion of institution is dynamic: institutions result from an arbitration between various representations of the world, various principles of justice, and maintain a circular causal relationship with individuals. Institutions produce rules, the rules being constantly revisable by individuals who can form a collective to change rules and institutions (Bessis, 2009). Institutions, which are based on underlying conventions (Favereau, 1999), thus present themselves as an articulation between incomplete rules, representations, both imported and local in our case, and the actions of individuals forming a collective, based on the register of legitimacy and/or power relations. We thus follow the approach of institutional complementarity: for Aoki (2000), institutions result from strategic interactions between agents that lead to a particular dynamic balance. The proper functioning of one institution depends on the others, with a view to complementarity. And any reflection on the governance of natural resources requires an analysis of the property regimes (private, public, common, open access) that apply to them. The qualification of ownership regime has clear implications for the way resources are allocated and/or managed (Bied-Charreton et al., 2006). How to describe these natural resources? How do the communities themselves describe them? Indeed, if governance refers to a hybrid of instruments regulated by public authorities,
the market and user communities, the legitimacy of these instruments rests on the distribution of property rights over natural resources.

The notion of commons becomes attached to a particular form of "governance": it is a question of creating, maintaining, preserving and renewing them, not in a museum of nature, but as resources that must remain available, which must not be exhausted. There are only commons with the communities that manage them, whether they are local, self-organized or have strong collective rules, including laws and court decisions. The commons are places of expression of society, and as such, places of conflict resolution (Le Crosnier, 2010). The principle of reciprocity in solidarity economy emphasizes cooperation against competitiveness, and reciprocity means that the exchange ceases to be anonymous and impersonal. The solidarity economy is part of a mode of production based on a pooling of wills and resources within partnerships and not capital: human groups, in response to their needs, develop economic solutions. Solidarity economy is therefore supposed to give a central place to each person and to collective action within the economic organizations it creates. These organizations are intended to control the distribution of added value, which goes far beyond the involvement of stakeholders in a project (Zamagni, 2010). Self-management, cooperation, collective learning, the links are therefore strong with the idea of the Ostrom commons. By communicating and interacting repeatedly to manage the resources on which they depend, collectives can act more effectively than the market or central government to manage the resources on which they depend.

### 3.2. Associations and local development

From a territorial perspective, fundamental to talk about local governance and natural resources management, theoretically and empirically, solidarity economy and local development echo each other. A fundamental distinction must be made between geographical proximity, which corresponds to the objective conditions for locating agents, on the one hand, and organized proximity, which reflects their respective positioning in terms of coordination potential, on the other. Coordination must therefore be organized with a view to local development. Local development theories have several characteristics:

- Local development is a "collective good" that extends far beyond the surface of the individual utilities of its beneficiaries.
- It is a global or integrated development project initiated from the bottom up, even if it can easily accommodate the assistance and interventions provided from the top down.
- The principles of territorial governance and local public action are closely linked to those of community participation.
- The three dimensions of the sustainable development model are at the heart of this approach: economically viable, socially equitable, and ecologically sustainable.
- It is therefore a reaction to the globalization strategy, the relocation of companies and the dismantling of production chains.
- The strategy chosen is clearly cooperative in nature; it relies on trust in the coordination of actors and the construction of networks.
- Local development is first and foremost a long-term process.
- It is also an approach characterized by the voluntarism of its actors, which is inspired by a "vision" of the development of the territory and is reflected in a local public policy.

- Finally, it is a method of action that finds its applications in the permanent observation of the territory and the play of its actors, and in the coordination of the actors (Parodi, 2005).

These modes of coordination located between actors (Pecqueur, 2009) produce heterogeneous local governance configurations. They are the result of history, the nature of social relations and the ability of economic, political and social actors to act together. The result is an original spatial construction in which the public authorities play a more or less active role, while other socio-economic actors report their possible capacity for self-organization and initiative (Demostier & Richez-Battesti, 2010). Thus, the territory is a lived, social space. The territory is steeped in cultural values, indicating that it belongs to a localized group. The relationship between society and the territory is thus fundamental (Samb, 2015). The dual dimension claimed by solidarity organizations, i.e. a socio-political and a socio-economic dimension, allows them to play an increasing role in the new territorial institutional compromises: actors in territorial governance, through their role in the defense of collective interests, the manifestation of social aspirations (such as participation, creativity, solidarity, etc.) ; as bearers of various ideologies and strategies (integration into social dynamics, transformation of lifestyles, etc.) ; and possibly as providers of a social movement.

4. My projects from here

4.1. In West Africa and Senegal

In the Sahel, more than in any other region of sub-Saharan Africa, natural resources management is of paramount importance due to climatic hazards, population growth and high pressure on increasingly scarce vital resources. It was severely tested by decades of State interventionism and the resulting deficiencies, and was decentralized in the early 1990s. However, the new local political elites are facing major challenges: plurality of referents and rights on land, difficult access to land, conflict regulation problems, deforestation, water scarcity, environmental problems, etc. These challenges contribute to the imbalance of rural production systems and explain, in many respects, the difficulties faced by elected officials in fulfilling their mission of promoting local development. Thus, most rural Sahelian communes, including Senegalese, wanted to experiment with an innovative participatory management system or, in the words of d’Aquino (2009), a "progressive autonomous management" approach. In Senegal, Mali, Uganda and Burundi, local planning includes citizen participation. However, citizens are not well informed about their rights and the functioning of communities on the one hand, and local authorities are sometimes themselves unaware of their responsibilities (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2016).

A first interesting case to study is that of local conventions. These approaches attempt to reconcile "customary" and "modern" authorities, while at the same time attempting to anchor the results in the legal authority given to new rural local authorities (Touré, 2011; Hilhorst, 2008). In Burkina Faso, village land management commissions were created in 2000. Local Agenda 21 is also an interesting original experience in terms of sustainable development (Savard, 2010). My idea is to start with two French-
speaking countries, Senegal and Burkina Faso, but also to open to English-speaking countries. The organization itself of decentralization is different between the two types of African countries, opening ways of comparing the relations between the solidarity and popular economy and local authorities. In French-speaking countries, local authorities are in fact more often subject to regulatory bodies at the central level when local authorities in English-speaking countries enjoy greater autonomy. In Senegal, governance has undergone significant changes. First, a political and administrative evolution, with decentralization and the need to create local communities led by local elected officials. Thus, for the country's administrators, local governance is necessary for the process of national and local evolution, it represents a policy that must move forward and improve with experience and time. Local governance is therefore the place where democracy and development are best articulated. Decentralization carried out so far in Africa does not always have this concern and has often been limited to the administrative and political aspect. This explains why many States are embarking on the implementation of several levels of decentralization. The enthusiasm observed for decentralization may also reflect a mistrust of the central State, which weakens both local authorities and the central state and its local representations (Gaye et al., 2010).

The difficulties of local taxation also express certain Senegalese specificities, such as the concentration of tax deposits in the Dakar region, or the weakness of the taxpayers' tax reflex. As for the latter, it refers to a long-standing mistrust of peasantry towards the State, compensated by reticular social ties (brotherhoods) that make it possible to protect oneself from its coercion. Membership of the network then works against the territory (of the State, of rural communities), the only beneficiary territory being the head of the network: the headquarters of the brotherhoods. As a result, almost all so-called local development processes are almost exclusively dependent on external funding, and it would be difficult to identify a local development process that is truly local and autonomous. This context is favorable to competition between associations and public actors for access to information, which conditions the control of exogenous resources (projects, aid). Even public institutions operate in this competitive mode: opportunistic behavior, institutional silos and asymmetries are favored (Magrin et al., 2006). Thus, several forms of governance coexist in Senegal. In rural areas, the weight of the traditional and the community is much stronger than in urban areas. Mourides are thus important in Senegal and brotherhoods play a very important role in local governance. These brotherhoods have learned to effectively juggle modern technologies, negotiations with central powers and traditional rites. In urban centers, communities are more fragmented, the weight of the administration and international organizations is greater. In the Saint Louis region, society is very hierarchical between social classes (Samb, 2015).

The question of the actual stacking of projects is important, how do the actors coordinate themselves throughout the territory (if they coordinate)? How to make so many micro-initiatives coherent? Initiatives capitalizing on a bottom-up approach and on the complementarities that may exist between customary and formal institutions have opened up avenues for action by external actors, in the field of development as well as in the field of security. The conflicts identified in the Sahel have highlighted the crucial role of local "formal" and customary institutions as vectors or mixers of violence. They thus legitimize the use of environmental issues as an entry point for partners. As Beeler explains, "the modern dispute resolution system aims to resolve conflicts by creating losers and winners, rather than
trying to find a consensus between the opposing parties, as provided for in customary law. This contributes to the fact that many conflicts are not resolved in a sustainable way and that relationships are often destroyed in the long term” (Hellendorff, 2011). In West Africa, many rural activities (agricultural, pastoral, forestry, etc.) use natural resources. A significant part of the land is used for several purposes, simultaneously or successively: harvested fields become accessible for grazing on crop residues; bushes are used for grazing, hunting and logging. Local schedules and rules then define the use of grazing areas by animals, the distribution of harvesting, fishing or salt exploitation, etc. Thus, access rights are often challenged, depending on the balance of power. The superposition of contradictory rules also weakens the stability of agreements, since some actors claim to be bound by customary norms and others by the law. Conflicts can also arise when the resource is overexploited and its renewal is no longer assured (Benkahla & Hochet, 2013).

4.2. Theoretically

Theoretically, I consider several avenues to delve deeper into certain areas of research. In terms of commons, I want to better understand how communities are formed, organized, include people, exclude others, why and how individuals participate in popular or solidarity-based forms of collective action. Important empirical work and Afrobarometer surveys will be valuable in this regard. Several experiences of local conventions have been the subject of case studies based mainly on the socio-anthropological approach. These studies were initiated in Mali, Senegal, Niger, Burkina Faso. The authors uncover a diversity of local convention practices, which focus on the management of bush, forests, land, water, etc. Often, they simply analyze the experiences by describing the process from their formulation to their monitoring and evaluation and their implementation. These experiences involve a plurality of actors and partners. They also express a place where new societal compromises are made between the State, local elected officials, technicians, donors and Sahelian populations (Touré, 2011).

In terms of local governance, I would like to focus on these actors, popular and solidarity-based organizations, to understand their role as intermediary institutions facilitating collective learning and local organization. As we said earlier, local governance can reflect dynamics of exclusion. For example, while many States have sought to recognize "traditional" local governance modalities such as chiefdoms, they may also have characteristics such as patrimonialism, predation, corruption, clientelism, and lack of accountability to populations. At the same time, although local elections are the most democratic way to try to establish inclusive local government, they do not guarantee that it will be; in fact, they can equally reinforce identity-based political choices, especially when the turnout is low. It is therefore necessary to ensure the accountability of local governance actors, through public participation beyond the elections. Local governance can serve as a laboratory for innovative ways of developing policies (Tschudin & Trithart, 2018).

My main theoretical framework is the economics of conventions. Conventions correspond to collective representations, shared references that solve problems of coordination in an uncertain environment. These representations are conventional in the sense that they are one of several possible solutions and can always be called into question. The aim is not so much to offer a better theory than to reopen
the language of economic theory which gives too much weight to rationality and not enough to institutions. We agree that the coordination of human actions is problematical and not the result of laws of nature or constraints, we can understand that human rationality is above all interpretative and not only or immediately calculative. Collective institutions would then help individuals make their decisions through a collective learning process.

4.3. Comparisons works, collaborations and further questions

A prolongation of my work would be its expansion to other contexts and to generalizations. Public-private governance, private governance, community governance, hybridations, many innovations take place in sub-Saharan Africa. Besides, globally, the field of transnational sustainability governance is undergoing a period of change. Important trends include the rise of meta-governance organizations, the proliferation of non-regulatory activities, the creation of company-owned standards, the rise of Southern standards in global commodity chains. So, here, I would focus on how different modes of local governance adapt around the world, how can we reflect on them to think about alternatives in our own countries. We see more and more initiatives at the municipalities level, an increase in the role of local urban governance, linked with transnational initiatives, and I think we can learn a lot in the North as in the South towards this kind of perspective. Besides, we have now several works on specific initiatives in Africa and elsewhere, with researches on water governance or wood governance for instance, and I would like to work on developing a big mapping of these initiatives and their institutional framework. The question of the link between modes of governance and the chosen modes of regulation also have an important part to play here, as the questions around indicators, to account for the evolution of local governance and progresses towards sustainability.

Many collaborations outside the University may also be important: with African academicians, the University of Dakar, of Saint Louis, with international NGOs and local networks in Africa, as the lobbying group ‘localization of Sustainable Development Goals’, but also with organizations working on solidarity economy (especially in France) and on commons (as the Commons Strategies Group in the US). And if you have any comment, idea, proposition, please do not hesitate!

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