The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World

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Introduction: The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World

Roel Meijer and Nils Butenschøn

Introduction

The root causes of political instability and authoritarianism in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been debated for a long time, long before the current crisis unleashed by the Arab Uprisings in 2011. The most infamous – and pernicious – angle, Orientalism, focused on Islam, and its perceived incompatibility with democracy and modernity, as the explanation for the lack of democratisation in the Middle East. But there have been optimistic assessments that have alternated with negative views. In the 1950s researchers believed that military regimes would be able to “modernise” and build modern states that would lead to the creation of a “new middle class” and achieve “development.” During the 1960s and 1970s this trend gradually became more pessimistic. Michael Hudson, for instance, highlighted the lack of legitimacy that regimes had and the crisis of relations between those regimes and the people, while the most well-known studies of the 1990s focused primarily on the lack of a civil society and placed greater emphasis on a “vibrant” civil society as the first step towards democracy.

Once this transition from authoritarian regime to democracy proved to be elusive and civil society less independent, a pessimism again set in, leading to a new trend that argued that authoritarian regimes were “resilient” and capable of “managing,” “containing,” and “controlling” the various challenges.

1 In this book the Middle East and North Africa refers to the Arab states in the region if not otherwise stated.
opposition groups posed. Yet the Arab Uprisings proved that these regimes were not indestructible; they could be threatened, transformed, and toppled. It was clear that resilience theories had focused too much on the state itself and too little on agency and means of resistance amongst the population. As a result, the “stability” of authoritarian regimes was less well rooted than many had believed, and social movement theory, which had been applied for the first time in the 1990s, experienced a resurgence. Five years after the Arab Uprisings, the pendulum has returned to the state of pessimistic gloom that produced resilience theories. However, whatever the state of the new authoritarian regimes and their ability to re-assert themselves, it is clear that the stability that was often ascribed to them has been thoroughly undermined. The sources of the deep political, social, and cultural crisis that had been simmering beneath the surface for some time are not temporary and not easily solvable. The research on the Arab Uprisings has come up with numerous explanations, none of which are fully convincing. These include demography and the youth bulge; the spread of new media and the effect of Twitter and the Internet; the introduction of a neoliberal economy in the 1980s and rising unemployment, with the related destruction of the middle classes, mounting division between rich and poor, and unprecedented corruption; privatisation and mounting grievances among the working class; the interference by external powers and the instability and misery created by regional wars; the “deep state” or the “robustness” of the state and its greater capacity for repression than elsewhere; gender inequality and exclusion; or a combination of some or all of these elements.

6 Steven Heydemann, _Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World_ (Analysis Paper No. 13, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, October 2007).
8 In the 2000s numerous books appeared on the political system in the Middle East and North Africa with the term “stability” in their title.
10 To mention only a few: Marc Lynch (ed.), _The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Mehran Kamrava (ed.), _Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East_ (London: Hurst, 2014); Rex Brynen et al., (eds), _Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World_ (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2012).
This book does not present a unified explanation for the deep political, economic, and cultural crisis in the MENA region; we recognise that the crisis as an empirical phenomenon is too complex and multifaceted to be caught in a single explanatory model. Instead, the book brings together contributions from different academic traditions and disciplines, sharing a new approach to the crisis as an analytical challenge. We approach the current crisis as a crisis of citizenship, as a fundamental crisis in the relationship between citizens and the state in its different aspects and dimensions. Thereby – we believe – a broader and deeper, and yet more coherent, analysis emerges. Whereas the state should be the source of services, protection, upholding the rule of law, emancipation, and inclusion of its citizens, it has instead become the centre of iniquity, corruption, marginalisation, and repression, working to the benefit of the elite and the exclusion of the vast majority. In the MENA region citizens have almost no influence on the state, and in the rare cases they do it is through patronage, clientelism, and informal relations, all of which undermine or severely damage the notion of citizenship. On the other hand, citizenship also represents a relationship between citizens themselves. Citizens constitute a civil, social, and political community, but in the MENA region these communities have come under severe pressure for religious, economic, and political reasons, often leading to sectarian strife, class struggle, and ethnic exclusion. In many ways the authoritarian bargain that has been the foundation of society has collapsed, and people are searching for a new social contract with the state and between themselves. The Arab Uprisings can be regarded as an attempt to achieve such a social pact, one that is founded on a more inclusive and equitable basis, entailing new notions of citizenship.

The citizenship approach draws on sociology, political science, legal studies, anthropology, history, political philosophy, and other disciplines that analyse diverse aspects of the lives of citizens as they function in a web of relations that regulate their conduct and affect their attitudes, while at the same time giving them the tools to alter these relationships. In this dialectical relationship between subjection and contention, citizenship is constructed and reconstructed in a constantly changing legal, social, and political process in which power and culture play an important role.

Citizenship studies has a long history in North America and Europe, and the introduction of citizenship studies to the Middle East should be based on insights from these original areas, while also adapting them to the specific conditions of the MENA region. These insights are related to citizenship in

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11 New ground-breaking studies have appeared in the *Journal of Citizenship Studies*. 
general, comparative studies, minority studies, gender studies, political philosophy, and migration and globalisation, among others.

With the exception of a few pioneering examples, little has been published on citizenship in the Arab Middle East and North Africa, and these have usually only examined very specific topics, and even then rarely systematically. This book is a renewed attempt to introduce citizenship studies and the

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focus on citizenship as central themes in the MENA region by exploring what this approach can contribute to the debate on the current political crisis in the region. A problem of citizenship studies is that, similar to so many other disciplines developed in the West and introduced into the MENA region in the past, such as modernisation theory or, more recently, civil society theory and social movement theory, its overall assumptions are based on the specific liberal democratic European and/or North American political systems and societies. Some researchers regard this as a positive, inherent feature of citizenship studies. They argue that full citizenship can only exist in liberal democracies, where equal opportunities exist (at least in theory), the rule of law prevails, a political culture of mutual trust dominates, and people identify with the political community. Moreover, true citizenship presupposes the rise of an autonomous, free subject and the erosion of kinship and other primordial bonds. When people do not enjoy the same rights and do not share membership of a political community they should be regarded as “subjects” rather than citizens. Paradoxically, the same argument has come from the Global South, where citizenship is regarded as a typically Western concept that is inapplicable to non-Western environments.

This book argues otherwise. Citizenship studies has developed instruments to analyse politics and state-society relations wherever modern bureaucratic states that rule over a delineated territory have emerged. As a result, the state’s power over its subjects has increased to such an extent that they are made members of a political community, sometimes unwittingly and/or unwillingly, as state measures directly interfere in their daily lives, forcing these citizens to focus on the state and official political institutions in order to exert political influence. In this model of the modern nation-state the state’s monopoly of power is confirmed by a democratic mandate from the citizens. Consequently, the terms and conditions of citizenship are defined by a “contract” between citizens and the state in which the citizens’ civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights, as well as their duties, are laid out. However, as these forms of interaction differ from one country to another depending on state


policies, their implementation and range, as well as the varying responses of the citizens, have produced different forms of citizenship and citizenship regimes. As we will see, state policies have resulted in different degrees of inclusion and exclusion, leading to different combinations of rights and duties among citizens of any particular country. These variations in inclusion and exclusion of social classes, gender, ethnic, and religious groups have led to what has been called “graded” or “differentiated citizenship,” producing “second class citizens,” “child-citizens,” and even “non-citizens.” These trends are discernible both in Europe and the United States as well as in the Global South, but produce different citizen regimes, making comparisons possible and even fruitful. The focus on citizen-state relations therefore provides unique insights into the broader political systems, cultures, and social and economic structures of societies.

There is another reason why we consider a citizenship approach to the current crisis in the Middle East and North Africa to be important: people, political organisations, social movements, and professional organisations in the region itself employ the notion of citizenship (muwatana) and other related terms, something that has been particularly clear since the Arab Uprisings in 2011. In fact, many of the chapters in this volume do not directly engage with citizenship studies and theory as such but provide crucial insights into the concepts of citizenship in the Arab world and the way citizenship is formed. Dignity (karama), liberty (hurriyya), equality (masawa’), rights (huquq), and social justice (al-ʿadala al-ijtimaʿiyya) are all recognised as having been central concepts in the Arab Uprisings, and terms such as the people (al-shaʿb) and madaniyya (civility) played a central role in the huge demonstrations that were seen throughout the region, from Morocco to Bahrain.22 The slogan “the

people demand the fall of the regime” expresses claims of popular sovereignty and the right to have rights, which is the foundation of citizenship. Protests were directed against infringement of civil rights by the emergency laws, demanding freedom of association, the right to establish political parties, the rule of law and accountability of authorities and transparency of money spent. On a deeper level, people entertain vaguer, less defined notions of rights and justice that feed into citizenship. A number of contributions to this volume demonstrate that citizenship and terms related to notions of citizenship re-emerged prior to and during the Arab Uprisings. For instance, certain currents within the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasatiyya trend in Egypt and Syria adopted the concept of the civil state (al-dawla al-madaniyya) and equal citizenship; the bidun (those without citizen documents) in Kuwait found new ways of expressing resistance against their marginalisation; youth in Egypt and Morocco reconnected with “the street” and demonstrated extraordinary forms of social responsibility by educating the general public who, for the first time, were considered to be sharing a common citizenship; while demonstrators in Tunisia and elsewhere demonstrated a new political awareness and made claims to rights, expressing these in various ways, including performances and “acts of citizenship.”

The chapters in this volume build on other studies that have identified a general politicisation of society reflecting an increasing sense of citizenship. They show that youth stood up against paternal authority; employees denounced petty office tyrants and corruption, demanding “cleansing” (tathir)

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of the workplace; university personnel, such as the March 9 Group in Egypt, protested against state control of universities; Egyptian judges marched against election fraud and state interference in the judiciary; Moroccan villagers felt emboldened to stand up against private companies, municipal governments, and corruption; special favours given to policemen were refused; minorities, such as the Copts in Egypt and the Amazigh in Morocco, demonstrated for equal legal and cultural rights; normal citizens protested against deteriorating housing conditions, rising food prices, break down of health care, insufficient supply of potable water, and daily injustices. Many of these actions produced new forms of expression and repertoires of contention: petitions, hunger strikes, occupations, strikes, sit-ins, public statements, sabotaging public facilities, Facebook group networks. Informal protests included blocking roads, burning tyres, blocking entrances to government entrances, and other performances such as waving flags in order to assert their loyalty to the nation while demanding change in the political order.

These works also point out that the Arab Uprisings had a long history and are often connected to the emergence of social movements. By nature new social movements are focused on citizenship, liberties and rights, and the recognition of identity and not on acquiring state power. The names of many of these organisations reflect the struggle for rights. In Egypt, rural protest against eviction was organised by the Land Centre for Human Rights; the Centre for Trade Union and Worker Services (CTUWS) and the Coordinating Committee for Trade Union and Workers Rights and Liberties were crucial for the formation of Egyptian independent trade unions; the Doctors Without Rights played an important role in defending the rights of

31 Abdelrahman, Egypt's Long Revolution, 52–72.
doctors against the political hijacking of the professional organisation of doctors by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s; Mohamed ElBaradei’s National Association for Change (NAC) of 2010 demanded political rights. In Morocco, over the previous decade the coordinating committees (tansiqiyat) organised protest against price rises. New organisations sprang up with characteristic names such as Alternative Movement for Individual Liberties (MALI) and the different organisations of the unemployed graduates (chômeurs-diplômés) demanding the right to work. Since their establishment in the Arab world in the 1970s human rights organisations played a significant role in promoting the language of rights in the region. Many human rights organisations were active in the Arab Uprisings such as the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) or the Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH). They linked civil society with social movements.

All these activities are reflected in new active, participatory citizenship. As Alexander and Bassiouney make clear the Egyptian strike committees had to organise meals, sleeping quarters, secure machinery from sabotage, negotiate with management, inform the strikers, and self-manage production, and ward off intimidation by state institutions. Their activities were democratically decided. The establishment of independent unions, starting in 2009, required similar skills. In her book on the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), Héla Yousfi shows lower cadre leaders of the trade union were able to play a crucial role in the organisation and dissemination across the country of the uprisings and respond to the demands of their members, in contrast to its co-opted elite leadership who had lost all contact with the normal members of the UGTT.

In Morocco, the February 20 Movement consisted of 100 different civil society organisations, trade unions and political parties which formed the national committee for support.

Although it is clear from many accounts that the left played a crucial role in the uprisings, the pressure to unify and form coalitions, joint committees and “fronts” between highly diverse and often former opponents led to general slogans and common themes that supported inclusive programs and enhanced citizen rights. This was the case with many cross-ideological coalitions that were formed in Egypt between 2000 and 2011. For this to happen, both the left and the Islamic movements had to make important steps towards a centrist

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position that accepted political and social pluralism, the rule of law, freedom of speech and organization. This process took a generation to emerge. In Egypt, it depended on the rise of the liberal current within the Muslim Brotherhood and the centrist (Wasatiyya) trend to produce such groups as the Wasat Party.\textsuperscript{37} In Tunisia, it was not until 2005 that Ennahda had become acceptable for secularists enough to form a coalition in the \textit{Collectif}.\textsuperscript{38} In Morocco, the gradual inclusion of Party of Justice and Development (PJD) since 1992 into the political process encouraged more liberal trends around figures such as Ahmed Raysouni to emerge which embraced notions of citizenship and concepts based on the civil state (\textit{al-dawla al-madaniyya}) as opposed to the religious state (\textit{al-dawla al-diniiyya}) and Islam as a complete system (\textit{nizam kamil}). Notions such as “pious citizens” and the refocusing on politics instead of applying Islamic law were essential preliminary steps to form cross-ideological coalitions.\textsuperscript{39} By 2005, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had come to the same conclusions and accepted equal citizenship in its new program, regardless of one’s ethnic or religious background.\textsuperscript{40} Without these previous moves towards an Islamic humanism and acceptance of human agency and greater space for politics as an independent, indeterminate field for pragmatic solutions based on equality and inclusion these coalitions would not have been possible. Their influence was apparent during the Arab Uprisings. For instance, during the first five months of protest against the Asad regime in Syria the opposition stressed national unity and shared citizenship between Sunnis and Alawis in an attempt to create a broad coalition against the regime.\textsuperscript{41} In Morocco, February 20 Movement explicitly came up with slogans focusing on strengthening citizen rights and stated the right to accountability, work, and rule of law.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Salwa Ismail, “The Syrian Uprisings.”
\end{itemize}
Even in Saudi Arabia, a country not known for its strong participation in the Arab Uprisings, Islamic modernists were supportive of rights of citizens versus the privileges of the royal family, introducing a “language of rights.”\footnote{Madawi Al-Rasheed, \textit{Muted Modernists: The Struggle over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).} Especially during the initial stages of the revolution, highly different ideological groups found each other in a common struggle against police torture, arrests, emergency laws, and in favor of accountability, legalisation of political parties, the rule of law, and the guarantee of employment and social welfare.

This is not to say that the struggle for citizenship and the establishment of a new social contract in the Arab world was a success. In the end, the forces supporting a new citizenship regime were too weak. Tunisia was the only country where, after considerable problems, the dominant religious party Ennahda together with the secular parties were capable of signing a new social contract based on equal citizenship (but guaranteeing weak social rights) when a new constitution was inaugurated in January 2014. Elsewhere the coalitions between the secular and Islamist movements broke down, most significantly in Egypt. After the fall of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood quickly made a deal with the military and secular movements, paving the way for inclusive elections and the Muslim Brotherhood as the new dominating political force in the country. The less inclusive rule under President Muhammad Morsi in turn created a huge backlash among the secularists who were willing to work with the military to topple the Morsi government in a \textit{coup d'état} in June-July 2013. In Morocco, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) was already co-opted by the monarchy before the uprising led by the February 20 Movement, hoping to reform it from within; it never was part of the February 20 Movement. In Libya, the early forms of support for a new regime based on equal citizenship failed after a dramatic and violent sequence of events bringing in massive bombing by NATO countries and the killing of President Muammar al-Gaddafi by rebels October 20, 2011. Consequently, the country fell apart in regional and tribal divisions. In Syria, the regime succeeded in undermining any attempt to reform the political system and base it on inclusive, common and equal citizenship, setting in motion the most devastating civil war the Middle East has experienced in modern times. In Yemen, the uprising failed, bringing on another devastating civil war that involves old as well as new contenders for power, while Algeria remained aloof from the turmoil after its own traumatic experience with uprisings in the 1990s. Among the Gulf monarchies Bahrain was the most affected. Massive demonstrations with demands for democratisation,
accountability and equal rights led by Shiʿa majority groups was violently suppressed by the Sunni monarch with the support by troops from Saudi Arabia.

What these experiences demonstrate, apart from the political dimension of changing ideologies, coalition formations, and political struggle, is that the establishment of citizenship regimes based on equality and the rule of law is severely hampered by multifaceted web of structural and systemic factors discussed throughout this volume. One of the most damaging and most ingrained factors is clientelism and patronage relations. Nowhere else do vertical relations of dependence have such disastrous effects on notions of citizenship and horizontal solidarity as in the Arab region. The other is sectarianism and its exclusionary and divisionary politics. Although the interest in sectarianism has become the dominant trend in research on the Arab world, the fact that sectarianism has re-emerged attests to the failure to establish inclusionary citizenship regimes in the past, which needs explanation. The same applies for the authoritarian regimes. The heavy emphasis on mechanisms of control and pre-emption in resilience theories needs a historical analysis of how these regimes came about and why they have become exclusionary. The third factor that has hampered the development of equal citizenship is foreign and regional intervention. There is perhaps no other part in the world where foreign intervention has had such a negative influence as in the Arab world, supporting sectarianism, minority regimes, class differences and economic and political dependence, thereby enhancing weak state structures, authoritarianism, and lack of legitimacy of the political elite.

We believe that focussing on citizenship, citizen-state relations, as well as relations between citizens is a fruitful way not only of understanding the Arab Uprisings as a critical juncture in Arab politics and providing crucial insights into the dramatic events that have unfolded since 2011, but they are also the key to understanding the modern history of the Arab world.

**Guiding Elements Extent, Content and Depth**

Keith Faulks has made a useful distinction between three elements that cover central aspects of citizenship and are helpful in analysing citizenship regimes in the Arab world: extent, content, and depth.43

*Extent* concerns the issue of formal and legal membership of the political community and the dialectical process between exclusion and closure on the one hand, and inclusion and incorporation into society and the political community on the other. It addresses the issue of *who* is eligible for citizenship and who is denied the right to become a full member of society and the

political community and to enjoy the full rights that citizenship entails. Extent thus determines one’s status. Needless to say, extent has in itself a long history and differs from country to country. However, historically, in Europe and the United States the general trend has been towards greater inclusion and the expansion of political rights from just the privileged elite to larger sections of the population.\textsuperscript{44} According to Kivisto and Faist, it is the transformation of outsiders into citizens that has marked the process of inclusion in the West.\textsuperscript{45} It also touches upon the criteria for inclusion or exclusion, as, for instance, in Rogers Brubaker’s famous\textsuperscript{46} but widely criticised distinction between the civic, territorial principle (\textit{jus solis}) associated with the French republican tradition, whereby theoretically everyone under the jurisdiction of the state could become citizen, and the \textit{jus sanguinis} principle of German tradition that based citizenship on ethnicity.\textsuperscript{47} The civil rights movement in the United States marked an important step towards acquiring equal rights. “Recognition” of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity was one of the means by which one could be incorporated into American citizenry. But extent also covers new forms of discrimination, marginalisation, and exclusion, which are becoming increasingly globally connected.\textsuperscript{48} In the Arab world, extent has had a completely different trajectory than in Europe or the United States. The Arab world first had to make a transition from an empire built on diversity\textsuperscript{49} to a colonial regime that was based on exclusion and then build homogeneous nation-states out of this diversity. Neither the nationalist movements, nor the authoritarian states, nor the Islamist movements were able to meet the challenge of building inclusionary citizenship regimes based on equality and the recognition of religious, cultural, and political diversity.

\textit{Content} is related to the mixture of rights, duties, and obligations of citizenship. In contrast to extent, which relates to formal citizenship, content is concerned with substantive citizenship. Historically, the emphasis had been on the duties and obligations in the Greek \textit{polis} because citizens (males) were presumed to be active citizens. During the French Revolution for the first time rights were defined in the Declaration of Citizen and the Nation and the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{44} Fahrmeir, \textit{Citizenship}.
\bibitem{46} Brubaker, \textit{Citizenship and Nationhood}.
\bibitem{47} For a critique, see Joppke, \textit{Citizenship and Immigration}, 17–20.
\bibitem{48} For an excellent discussion on the issue between James Tully, Anthony Lade, Bonnie Honig, Duncan Bell, and others, see Tully, \textit{On Global Citizenship}.
\end{thebibliography}
principle of equal rights supplanted privilege. The “people” as a whole emerged on the historical scene as a source of legitimacy, and sovereignty was no longer vested solely in the monarch. This meant that the relationship between state and citizen became much more complex, intensive, and intrusive. In the new citizen regime, citizens paid taxes directly to the state, obeyed the same state laws, were conscripted into national armies, and were asked to sacrifice their lives for the nation. In return, citizenship rights were expanded and deepened, resulting in a dialectical relationship between subject and citizen, being objects of power and agencies to power. However, with the introduction of a neoliberal economy these social rights have come under severe pressure and the emphasis has been increasingly limited to civil rights or what has been called “negative liberties,” i.e. freedom from state interference. In this respect immigration has also influenced the mixture of rights and duties. Whereas during the heyday of the nation-state citizens were required to adhere to the same religion, speak the same language, and uphold the same sense of history and identity, this changed with increased migration and the emergence of multicultural societies and new forms of identification, loyalty, and integration. Novel forms of citizenship include hyphenated nationalities, hybrid identities, and a thin “constitutional loyalty” rather than undifferentiated loyalty and assimilation to a complete culture. With regard to content, the Arab world shows similarities as well as marked differences with the European and American models. While it also has experienced the rise of a strong nationalism, based on cultural, linguistic, and political homogeneity, it never gave birth to a democratic political structure that allowed for diversity and freedom of speech and organisation. In addition, the emphasis on social rights at the expense of civil and political rights has laid a heavy burden on the citizenship regimes once economic austerity measures were introduced in the 1980s and the “authoritarian bargain” was gradually dismantled. The main opposition, the Islamist movement, hardly presented an alternative. It developed a weak discourse of citizenship that was not based on rights but on a religious identity that was culturally exclusionary and politically authoritarian. The modernist, humanitarian current always remained a minority trend and only turned into the Wasatiyya trend in the 1980s.

Depth is closely related to the commitment of citizens and their level of participation in the public sphere. What is demanded of citizens, what are their social and political responsibilities, and in what way can they contribute to the “common good”? An important aspect of depth has been the emergence of the public sphere and the right to openly discuss and participate in matters of common interest. It is associated with the rise of civil society and
independent horizontal organisations that individuals could join voluntarily. In Europe the rise of the public sphere is situated in the eighteenth century with the rise of newspapers and intellectuals. It expanded in the nineteenth century with the rise of national newspapers, the printing press, cheap books, salons for the middle classes and intellectuals, and the rise of trade unions and social movements. As with dependence/independence the dichotomy between the public and the private spheres was another way of excluding women from becoming full participatory citizens. Emancipation from the private sphere meant greater participation in the public sphere. Ideologically, depth is reflected in republican, liberal, and communitarian notions of citizenship, with the first and last upholding a “thick” concept of active citizenship and the latter a “thin” passive one. In contemporary citizenship studies, citizenship is not only constituted by passive and active rights but must be acquired by definite and specific “acts of citizenship.” In the modern Arab world, commitment of the citizen has fluctuated widely. While in the colonial struggle for independence citizens were mobilised and subjected to centrally led organisations, after independence the emphasis was on passive citizenship with limited rights. It is only during the last three decades that different forms of active citizenship were developed and notions of “thick” citizenship emerged.

The elements extent, content, and depth are not only instruments to analyse different citizenship regimes but also related to the issue of power and the question of who determines and controls extent, content, and depth. Is it the state that controls and regulates citizenship “from above,” or is the people, social movements, contestations, long term struggles, and interest groups that determine citizenship “from below”? The former leads to “passive” citizenship, the latter to “active” citizenship. But mostly the two go together. It is only at rare moments such as revolutions, the struggle for independence, or phenomena such as the Arab Uprisings that the movement from below dominates and acquires, for a brief period, the upper hand, meaning that existing citizenship regimes can be overturned.

Contribution
What do these general principles and dimensions of citizenship and citizenship studies contribute to the study of the Arab world and the present political crisis? How should they be adjusted to meet the specific historical, cultural, sociological, and political characteristics of the region?

50 For an analysis of concepts of citizenship in political currents, see the authors referred to in note 16.
We believe that the citizenship approach as outlined here allows us to explore the essence of the current crisis of the Middle East. We do not seek one specific explanation of this crisis, but open up for a number of explanatory strategies for a fuller comprehension of the crisis in time and space, centered around the concept and elements of citizenship. In this way we hope to contribute to and improve current theories in the field. Firstly, in contrast to the prevalent theories of authoritarian resilience that focus on the Middle Eastern authoritarian state and its power,51 citizenship studies is better able to take into consideration the effects state policies have on citizens and how these policies are formulated, constructed, manipulated, and supported by policing and surveillance. Moreover, it takes into account the responses of social actors, their notions of themselves and the ways in which they are organised, and the manifold forms of resistance and contestation, both passive and active, of state power. Secondly, in contrast to civil society theorists who, in the 1990s particularly, regarded civil society as the panacea for democratisation and pushing back the power of the state in the Middle East,52 citizenship studies take into account marginalised groups, informal networks that have no legal status and do not always have clear ideas about their relations with the state but nonetheless are significant for their actions, and “acts of citizenship” that influence the general concept and practice of citizenship. Thirdly, it can contribute to the transition debate.53 Daniel Brumberg, Oliver Schlumberger, Morten Valbjørn and others have correctly pointed out that transition theory, when applied to the Middle East, has been mistaken by taking the illusion of a transition to democracy for reality and being far too optimistic, a Western


perception they have labelled “democrazy.”\textsuperscript{54} The advantage of citizenship studies is that it accepts a much broader scope of analysis, looking at a host of concepts and notions of citizenship while not pre-supposing that they will lead to democracy. Fourthly, citizenship studies can accommodate \textit{social movement theory} because it acknowledges agency and takes into account forms of self-awareness, conscious attempts to formulate state-society relations, and notions of social justice, all of which are directly related to central aspects of citizenship in the MENA region. It is particularly the main forms of contentions – making claims and demanding rights – that dovetail with citizenship studies.\textsuperscript{55} By recognising non-organised networks and what Bayat calls “non-movements,”\textsuperscript{56} citizenship studies goes deeper and recognises that marginalised “non-citizens” can become citizens by acts of self-assertion, such as organising their own services, demonstrating social responsibility, and mobilisation on the local communal level, or what Engin Isin has called “acts of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{57} Not always directly related to the state, or rights, these initiatives do eventually affect notions of citizenship and the “common good” or the “general interest,” although they are, perhaps, never consciously formulated as such, and are often not the same as they are in the West. Fifth, as citizenship studies has a special perception of citizen-state relations it also can prove to be a fruitful way in which to analyse the \textit{authoritarian bargain} and its “unravelling,”\textsuperscript{58} which has played such a crucial role in recent debates on political developments in the region. Sixth, as citizenship studies addresses the historical, political, anthropological, sociological, and ideological dimensions of citizenship regimes it also \textit{brings together these disciplines} that have made their mark in Middle East studies, as well as other disciplines such as political philosophy, which is almost non-existent within the spectrum of area studies. Finally, citizenship studies allows for broad comparisons with the rest of the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{56} Bayat, \textit{Life as Politics}.
\bibitem{58} Mehran Kamrava (ed.), \textit{Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East} (London: Hurst, 2014).
\end{thebibliography}
world and therefore acts as a corrective on the narrow focus of area studies. Not only does it encourage comparisons with Europe and North America, it also, increasingly, makes comparisons with the Global South.59

To summarise, the general purpose of introducing the citizenship approach to studies of the current as well as long-term crisis in the MENA region is not to invalidate all existing explanatory models, but to demonstrate how the citizenship approach improves and adds necessary insights into the complexities of the political dynamics of the region.

Content of the Book

This volume builds on existing works on the Middle East and North Africa that have focused on citizenship. There have been works on the colonial period,60 diaspora studies,61 constitutions,62 the Muslim Brotherhood,63


60 Works on the colonial period in particular have a strong citizenship angle. Surprisingly, the historical line between the colonial period and post-independence concerning citizenship has never been systematically pursued. See Chapter 2 of this volume for an attempt. For the colonial history, see Benjamin Thomas White, The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Mary Dewhurst Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881–1938 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).


Islam and citizenship, Arab political thought, migration, the position of Palestinians, gender and citizenship, general theory of citizenship, minority rights and citizenship, women and civic and economic rights, and notions of “everyday citizenship.” Aside from these works that directly address the issue of citizenship, there exist many other publications that address the same topic in an indirect way or that can easily be reinterpreted by citizenship studies to make them useful for studies on citizenship. These include, for example, studies on Islamic law, political Islam, personal status law, state formation, or, more specifically, on social pacts and what has been called the “authoritarian bargain.” The purpose of this volume is to try to connect these studies and provide a broader framework to study citizenship in the Arab world. The same applies to the Arab Uprisings. No systematic attempt has been made to compare citizenship conditions in the different countries and to relate the outcomes of the Uprisings, despite the fact that many scholars have pointed out the centrality of citizenship.

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64 March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship.
67 Davis, Citizenship and the State.
68 Joseph, Gender and Citizenship; Moghadam, Modernizing Women.
69 Butenschon et al., (eds), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East.
Part 1 of this volume focuses on the different ways extent, content, and depth have been combined in several Arab countries during the Arab Uprisings, depending on external influences, state formation, social formations, and ethnic and religious fissures. Insofar they traces the historical development of the practice and concept of citizenship they show how convoluted and diverse were the trajectories of citizenship in countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Citizenship regimes were often imposed by foreign countries, blocked by sub-national or supra-national loyalties, subverted by sectarian and class interests, or manipulated by authoritarian regimes “from above,” resulting in unstable state-citizen relations, with the rights of citizens remaining undefined and conditional. Historically, several phases can be discerned in the emergence, control and suppression, and re-emergence of notions of citizenship. The chapters show that the Arab Uprisings have been crucial in the formation of new definitions of extent, content, and depth of citizenship.

In Chapter 1, Anthony Gorman analyses the mixed British legacy. On the one hand, the British interference in the region made an important contribution to citizenship in the region by supporting democratic procedures laid down in constitutions, the establishment of political parties, recognition of trade unions, and the introduction of the rule of law. On the other hand, its support for reform was undermined by its imperial economic and political interests that led it to seek local intermediaries who could guarantee stability. It is especially on the level of extent and formal citizenship and the drawing up of boundaries that exclusionary politics had long-term adversarial effects. The recognition of minorities in Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan did not always work out well and often actually deepened existing communal divisions, thereby blocking a “genuine civil spirit” of shared citizenship. The British contribution to extent, content and depth remained limited, as voting rights were restricted and constitutions skewed to the advantage of the ruler and the executive.

In Chapter 2, Roel Meijer analyses the long-term development of citizenship regimes from the colonial period to the present crisis and the sequence of social contracts, each of them falling apart when its specific citizenship regime was undermined. In this way the colonial regime was supplanted by the citizenship regime of the “authoritarian bargain,” which broke down with the introduction of neoliberalism and the demand for a new social contract based on civil, political, social and economic rights based on new concepts of citizenship among different interest groups in society. Meijer argues that the re-emergence of notions of citizenship based on rights is characteristic of the Arab Uprisings. Where uprisings could sweep away the previous regime and establish a consensus on a common concept of the citizen, such as Tunisia, a new citizenship regime was established. Where they were incapable of doing
so and a pact had been made, such as Morocco in 1992, or a separate deal was made with certain sections of the opposition and the previous regime, such as between the Muslim Brotherhood and military in Egypt, or no deal at all was made, the regime remained intact, or collapsed. In all cases, extent, content, and depth were heavily affected.

In Chapter 3, Raymond Hinnebusch and Ola Rifai analyse the difficulties Syria encountered in the transition from being part of an empire to becoming a nation-state after World War I. They contend that citizenship is based on the dual processes of state formation and nation building and that this was difficult in Syria because of the artificial boundaries drawn up by the European imperial powers and the ethnic and religious diversity of the population. Citizenship presupposes state centralisation and mass political participation, but this was hampered on the one hand by supra-national ideologies such as pan-Syrianism, pan-Arabism, and pan-Islam, and on the other hand by sub-national identities, such as millets, city affiliations, and regional attachments. Moreover, Syria suffered from deep class divisions and strong sectarian loyalties. In its early stages, Ba’athism was able to overcome these obstacles and create a “populist social contract” based on reform, social equality, sectarian inclusion, and the emergence of a distributive state. Gradually, however, it became a patrimonial state dependent upon patronage, co-optation, and vertical relations of dependency. With the introduction of neoliberal economic measures in the 1990s, and especially after the death of Hafiz al-Asad in 2000, the coalition of forces began to fall apart, leading to the rise of crony capitalism, growing inequality, widespread regional poverty, and the deepening of sectarian fissures. The second part of the chapter deals with the call for “inclusive citizenship” during the Damascus spring in 2001, the Damascus Declaration of 2005, and, particularly, the uprisings in 2011, which first centred around notions of equal citizenship and a cross-sectarian civic identity, and was aimed at promoting new citizen-state relations, regardless of sectarian background. Yet Syria degenerated into a sectarian war that has merely served to deepen the primordial allegiances, precluding attempts to find a new consensus on extent, content, and depth of citizenship.

In Chapter 4, Sami Zemni analyses the relationship between citizenship and the Tunisian revolution through the emergence of the concept of “the people.” As in the case of Syria, a general feeling that the regime had broken the “unwritten contract” between ruler and ruled by being captured by a “gang of thieves” who ran the state for itself was widespread. It was the collapse

of the right to social mobility and social and economic advancement through education that particularly enragèd the population. Previous social rights had been transformed into “favours” dependent on personal loyalty and dependency, while the arbitrariness of the regime insulted the people’s sense of dignity. Zemni’s main argument is that after the revolution the nation was, for the first time, confronted with its divisions along class and identity lines and that it had to define a new national consensus based on a new definition of citizenship in order to redraw the meaning of the principles of extent, content, and depth. However, the newly found concept of “the people” did not suffice and a new consensus had to be reached. Tunisianité became the lynchpin of the new social contract, laid down in the new constitution. It was based on the acceptance of pluralism and the resolution of differences through debate, and recognised civil and political rights as well as gender equality, although it excluded the Salafis from being part of the new consensus and restricted political participation to voting in elections, thus limiting the inclusionary character of the revolution and the notion that the people as a whole could determine the extent, content, and depth of citizenship.

In Chapter 5, James Sater focuses on those elements that impeded the emergence of citizenship and limited the effects of the demonstrations of the February 20 Movement, the movement that emerged in Morocco during the Arab Uprisings in 2011. Adopting Springborg’s concept of instrumental clientelism (Chapter 15), he shows how pervasive the patronage system of the monarchy is and how it dominates the Moroccan polity and civil society, and how co-optation into the makhzen effectively impedes and absorbs the possibilities of contestation and formal political opposition, thus making it difficult to mobilise crucial sections of society on the basis of a rights discourse. In a manner detailed in resilience theories, the king controls extent, content, and depth of citizenship by hollowing it out and absorbing its potential threats. Sater builds on Springborg’s analysis by pointing out that de-politicisation is an important aspect of patronage; the notion of Morocco as one big family with the citizens as the monarch’s children, whose relations with the king, based on “punishment” and “clemency,” does little to enhance independence, self-awareness, and the rights central to citizenship.

In Chapter 6, Morten Valbjørn argues that, theoretically, citizenship has the advantage that it is both universal and specific, and therefore goes beyond the dominant authoritarian-democratisation paradigm. He compares the general outline of citizenship as it has been developed by Nils Butenschøn and Roel Meijer in republics with that in the monarchy in Jordan, arguing that it is comparable but not the same. The fact that Jordan was created by European powers and did not emerge out of a nationalist movement, and that King
Abdallah had wider regional ambitions, hampered the development of citizenship in the form of rights and common identity. As in Syria, sub-national loyalties to tribes, sects, and often foreign advisors and administrators created a weak level of national identity. However, in the 1950s Jordan started to see developments similar to the general trends of the region. Indirectly benefiting from oil rents in the Gulf, it was able to compensate for the repression of political parties and political rights with the expansion of the public sector, offering social rights, and becoming a “monarchical version of the authoritarian bargain.” As in other countries in the region, this came to an end with the austerity measures of the 1980s, when a brief period of liberalisation occurred, followed by two decades of what Valbjørn has called a “transition to nowhere.”

He acknowledges that the Arab Uprisings were about rights, but they were also very diverse, and often conflicting and contradictory, reflecting different interests. The demand for political rights therefore remained weak in comparison to other countries, and consequently the monarchy could continue its game of divide-and-rule. Jordan’s continuing difficulty in determining its boundaries and the status of its inhabitants, including what civil, political, and social rights they should have, was compounded by the Palestinian issue, which impeded the establishment of an inclusionary state, equal citizenship, and broad political participation.

In Chapter 7, Ida Almestad and Stig Stenslie analyse one of the main problems of state-citizen relations in the region, which is especially marked in oil-rentier states such as Saudi Arabia where the authoritarian bargain has acquired a specific conservative Islamic and paternalistic flavour. Citizen rights are laid down in the Basic Law, Saudi Arabia’s constitution, where, in exchange for a pledge of allegiance to the ruler, the citizen is entitled to health care, job security, unemployment fees, and pension funds. These are, however, not rights, in the sense of abstract citizen rights, but are beneficences, “gifts” (makrama), given at the discretion of the ruler and dependent on personal loyalty to him; they can, therefore, be withdrawn at his whim. Furthermore, the country upholds a “graded or differential citizenship” of privileges in a hierarchy that has the ruling family and tribal aristocracy at the top, and women and minorities at the bottom. Extent, content, and depth are determined by a mix of tribal, monarchical, and conservative Islamic notions of loyalty. It is against this rampant inequality that increasing resistance has arisen among the population, and particularly the Shiʿi part of it, which has been formulated in the rights discourse of citizenship. That the demand for equal civil and political rights is not limited to liberals, Shiʿis and women, but also includes Salafis, signifies a revolution in Saudi political thought and the emergence of new pressures “from below.”
In Chapter 8, James Sater analyses how the high percentage of migrants in the Gulf states has led to a differential citizenship regime that not only affects relations between full citizens and non-citizens, but also the relationship between full members of the community. The Gulf states experience a “citizenship hierarchy” between citizens themselves, based on tribal, familial, economic, sectarian, and gender bases, as well as between citizens and the migrant expat community, based on work permits, rights of abode, investment opportunities, and so on. The state benefits the most from this citizenship regime because on the one hand it initiates plans that need migrants and drive up the numbers of expats, while on the other it forces full citizens to seek support from the state in order to protect their culture and wealth against the migrants who form the overwhelming majority of the population in most Gulf states. In this monopolistic situation the state determines the extent, content, and depth of citizenship for its own citizens as well as the status of migrants. Citizens wage a rear-guard battle for cultural authenticity and extent – closure of citizenship rights, or what Sater calls the “hardening of the core” – seldom demanding political rights. This is the case in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar, but this is seen to a lesser extent in Kuwait, which has less migrants and a more powerful local merchant community that has political rights, and Saudi Arabia, which has a larger local population. In all cases, naturalisation is almost impossible and mixed marriages are discouraged as they jeopardise full citizenship rights.

In Chapter 9, Nils Butenschøn discusses different explanations for the lack of regime legitimacy, democratic reform and the exceptional resilience of authoritarian regimes in the region. While recognising the importance of many such contributions from the 1960’s onwards, focusing as most of them do relevant to the citizenship approach, he suggests that an analysis of the strategic environment of ruling elites and their opponents should be added to enhance our understanding of obstacles to dynamic changes in the political order. Given the peculiar patterns of power politics in the MENA region we need an approach that includes analyses of the interaction between actors on the local, regional, and international levels. The challenge is that we are confronted with an extremely complex strategic environment: The combination of regimes that generally speaking are characterised by a weak level of legitimacy and a contested power-base, on the one hand, and being located in a politically polarised region subjected to exceptionally intense geopolitical rivalries, on the other. The main argument is that the combination of these factors creates political dynamics that work against citizenship-based policies and societal trust. At best, reforms from above are introduced securing stability for a while, but not the kind of stability that opens up the political system for its citizens.
The picture that emerges is a complex multi-level pattern of interdependencies. Thus an “iron triangle” of counterforces on local, regional, and global levels will, if necessary, be mobilised to protect the status quo.

Part 2 focuses on the concepts of citizenship. The first chapter deals with the ideational notions and legal aspects of citizenship, especially in Islam. The chapters make clear that the notions of citizenship and concept of rights have always existed in Islam, but it is also clear that these have expanded over the past years. As the Muslim Brotherhood became integrated into the political process but at the same time became object of repression the concepts of rights were rethought and strengthened and the notion of rights associated with citizenship (muwatana) more thoroughly anchored in the overall ideology of the movement, demonstrating that Islamism is quite flexible. The same also is the case with Salafism. There as well, the Arab Uprisings have forced quietist Salafi movements, not just in Egypt but from Morocco to Yemen, to accept politics and therefore to rethink the position believers within the political context of the constitutions of the nation-state and the parliamentary system, as citizens with rights and obligations. From the changes in the constitutions, however, we can observe that these rights have a communal rather than an individual dimension and that the rights versus the state are weak, a tendency that is supported by secular ideologies and is only more recently being challenged by new libertarian trends in Arab political thinking. These chapters make clear the state’s ability to determine the extent, content, and depth of citizenship has been challenged by Islamic and secular movements. The results, however, have been deeply ambiguous.

In Chapter 10 Knut Vikør argues that as far as content is concerned Islamic law protects the subject from arbitrary rule and instead gives a normative set of rules and admonitions that the ruler has to abide by if he wants to gain legitimacy. These belonged to the “rights of God” (interpreted as the “rights of society”), the “general good” (masalih), and the five “necessities” (maqasid). According to Vikør, the ruler could not easily overstep the limits of these rights, which protected the believers’ religion, life, intellect, lineage and property, religion, and society. On the whole, it seems that the ruler accepted the restrictions laid down in Islamic rule (al-siyasa al-sharʿiyya), which allowed for a considerable degree of freedom while demanding his rule would comply with the “spirit of the sharia.” The need for the sovereign to legitimate his rule in Islamic terms sets limits to arbitrariness. State courts, too, could not easily contravene Islamic law. Other practices, such as hisba, also seem to have worked to the benefit of the common good and upheld a “balance” in society. Extent in Islamic law was determined by gender, freedom (slave/free), and religion (Muslim/non-Muslim), and was not based on equality, but on the
whole it did have rules and regulations that were predictable and can therefore be called the rule of law. The notion of “fairness” also guarded against arbitrariness.

In Chapter 11, Michelle Browers analyses the ideological history of citizenship from Rifāʿa Rifāʿi al-Tahtawi in the early nineteenth century through to the Arab Uprisings of 2011. She shows how concepts and notions of citizenship and the projected relations between citizens and the state have constantly adapted themselves to specific Arab ideologies, being integrated into Islamic law by al-Tahtawi, adapted by Arab nationalist thinkers during the second half of the twentieth century to Arab authoritarianism – constituting the basis of the authoritarian bargain under Nasser – to recent the Arab Uprisings in 2011. Unsurprisingly, in the 1950s and 1960s, whether formulated by secular nationalists or Islamists, social and economic rights were stressed at the expense of political rights and pluralism, which were often seen as divisive and Western. Social justice, often seen as a moral, distinct element of Islamic civilisation, was regarded as the touchstone of citizenship. Intellectual musings on citizenship also reflected the failure of the building of the nation-state and the common interest, which, after the 1967 defeat, immediately fell under the “spontaneous sway of the tribal,” in the words of Sadiq al-ʿAzm. The increased interest in Islam, citizenship, and equal rights of non-Muslims, was expressed by the Wasatiyya group in the 1980s. The innovation of the Uprisings is marked by the adoption, for the first time, of “the people” and people’s sovereignty, as expressed in the graffiti on a wall in Cairo, “We are the leaders we have been waiting for.” Self-assertion, sit-ins and claim-making themselves became means of expressing solidarity and citizenship.

In Chapter 12, Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen analyses the concept of citizenship in the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated ʿulama, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and the Wasatiyya intellectuals Tariq al-Bishri and Salim al-ʿAwwa, among others. He demonstrates that citizenship as a concept did not really figure in the Brotherhood’s discourse until the movement became tenuously integrated into the political system after the 1970s and had to rethink the relationship between subject and state and address the issues of extent, content, and depth seriously for the first time. A whole range of concepts on the political level were introduced to underscore new political rights of the citizen including the introduction of the “civil state” (as opposed to the Islamic state), the acceptance of the originally secular term “citizen” (muwatin), the notion of political equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the downgrading in the political field of terms such as “unbelievers” (kuffar). This change in thinking was reflected in the political platforms and programmes of the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1990s onward, which also became more critical of the power of the executive,
enhancing the political rights of citizens. They found their way into the Justice and Freedom Party established after the fall of Mubarak, whose charter states the “The State is based on the principle of citizenship, where all citizens enjoy equal rights and duties guaranteed by law in accordance with the principles of equality and equal opportunities without discrimination because of religion or race.” The acceptance of the sovereignty of the people also meant a shift in asserting citizenship. Its stand on content, mostly formulated in conservative moralistic terms, however, stressed its communalistic dimension based on “family values” and “public morality,” which directly affect depth. Moreover, as Skovgaard-Petersen argues, reform is mostly based on “justice,” not “freedom,” and privileges the state, in a sense, presenting an “Islamic-lite” authoritarian bargain. A new generation will have to emerge to further develop citizenship as a concept.

In Chapter 13, Emin Poljarevic analyses the Salafis’ notions of citizenship. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been influenced by external concepts, as Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen demonstrated, Salafism is broadly based on the “purity” of Islam and orthopraxy, and thinks in terms of friends and enemies and has developed means by which to keep a distance from all sources of “pollution.” It is based on exclusion and maintaining sharp borders with the “other,” who represents the “evil” and “corrupt” out-group, while limiting inclusion to their own religious community, most succinctly expressed in the principle of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (loyalty to Muslims and disavowal of non-Salafis). Nevertheless, there are important differences between various Salafi groups, primarily with regard to their mobilising strategies. Citizenship in these pre-modern and even pre-political terms can only mean membership of the umma, and that the hadith and Qur’an in all their transparency determine extent, content, and depth. Citizenship in the Salafi sense is based on duties, rather than rights. One becomes member of the “saved sect” by fulfilling one’s duties and obligations. This apolitical attitude, however, became difficult to maintain once the Arab uprisings forced Salafis to become involved in politics. Several notions helped them to make this step, such as the flexible notions of “necessity” and the “general interest,” and to adopt stances that have compromised their highly exclusionary notions of citizenship. In Egypt, this meant taking part in elections under “alien” constitutions that recognise the equal rights of citizens. That Salafism is clearly influenced by political circumstances is further underlined in Saudi Arabia, where the duty of “obedience” (ta’ā) to the ruler (wali al-amr) is central to the religious sanctioning of the authoritarian bargain based on royal benevolence (makrama), or in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), where, due in part to the escalation of sectarian animosity, the most rigid communal, exclusionary, and discriminatory form of Salafism
is upheld as an alternative to the failed attempts to construct nationalist, pan-Arab, or even briefly in 2011 liberal citizenship regimes in Syria.

In Chapter 14 Rachel Scott analyses the citizenship regime that resulted from the uprisings in Egypt, as laid down in the constitution of 2014. In contrast to earlier chapters on citizenship and activism, or performance, she focuses on the disciplining power of the state that crushes these movements from above. She traces tensions in the conceptualisations of citizenship to the history of dhimmi status, and the millet, which coincided with the nation and were based on communal self-rule and the expansion of the power of the secular state from the nineteenth century onwards, which encroached on the millet and finally took over the nation, restricting the religious law to the personal status law. In this way, the determination of extent, content, and depth, which were partly determined by the millet, were gradually transferred to the state. Rather than assuming a dichotomy between the so-called secular liberal and the authoritarian and the more Islamist periods, Scott argues there has been a continuous, state-managed citizen regime in Egypt since the nineteenth century, in which the state increasingly came to define religious categories and the relation between religion and politics, laid down the boundaries between majority and minority, and determined the nation’s accepted religions and national culture. The ability of the state to determine extent, content, and depth is reflected in its claim to uphold the “public order” and regulate what is and is not acceptable, and who can be excluded and persecuted. This is especially manifest in Art. 3 of the constitution of 2014 that recognises “heavenly religions,” that is, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, but excludes other religions, such as the Baha’i faith. The notion of the public order has also been taken up by intellectuals who invoke it to restrict civil rights in the public sphere. It has also been supported by the Coptic church, whose power over its followers as their representative is based on the recognition of the state, and as such goes directly against the demands for equal citizenship rights that a number of Coptic youth movements demanded during the uprisings.

Part 3 deals with the practices and specific claims to citizenship. The first chapter deals with the main practices in the Middle East that obstruct, hamper and undermine claims to objective and abstract rights: patronage and clientelism. These have appeared throughout the book and in many ways the emergence of a discourse of rights and equality over the past decades leading to the Arab Uprisings is a revolt against the vertical relations of dependence and submission. Most of this part is therefore taken up by research of the discriminated, marginalised, the socially, ethnically, and religiously excluded, youth, and women, and how they formulate claims to dignity and organise contentious actions. This struggle is fought on the ideological level and the
performative level. The emphasis is on expressions, actions, symbolism, performances, signs of solidarity, claim making, and enactments. The chapters focus on the Arab Uprisings of 2011, but also include other, earlier citizenship manifestations. For a brief period, these manifestations claimed the exclusive right to determine the extent, content, and depth of citizenship, encompassing an unbounded inclusivity, an undefined consensual content, and a limitless depth and commitment to the general good. As such, they exceed the reformist aspect of the Arab Uprisings. It would, however, be a mistake to overlook the legal dimension. At some point action has to be translated into formal political measures, i.e. laws and constitutions. Neither would it be wise to ignore the regressive side of the Uprisings, as the last two contributions describe.

In Chapter 15 Robert Springborg argues that clientelism is the primary obstacle to the introduction of a democratic polity based on equal citizenship. He makes a distinction between “dense clientelism,” which is culturally embedded and emotionally loaded, and “instrumental clientalism,” which is a modern means to build political alliances and divide resources. However, even in the latter both culture and “path dependence” play a major role and the difference with dense clientalism is less obvious than is often assumed. Research confirms that the strong sense of hierarchy and the predominance of authority over autonomy in Muslim countries point to persistent cultural roots and “survival strategies” that preclude self-expression and self-decision making. The prevalence of linguistic, ethnic, and religious cleavages in the Middle East have enhanced these tendencies. In the end, clientalism hampers the spread of a rational-legal, programmatic, and democratic culture and has severe adverse economic and political effects, enhancing dependence, inequality, and underdevelopment. Patronage, rather than citizenship, provides the “glue” that holds polities together and determines the extent, content, and depth by building vertical, exclusive, segmented loyalties that undermine horizontal, broad, inclusionary entities built on a sense of individual rights.

In Chapter 16, Rania Maktabi takes us to the other spectrum of Kuwait politics, i.e. the exclusion of Kuwaiti women from full civic rights, mainly because male kin have guardianship over female family members. She analyses the impact of the enfranchisement of women in 2005 on the articulation and raising of women-specific issues in parliament, such as strengthening Kuwaiti women’s autonomy in obtaining a passport; improving their chances on the labour market; increasing their access to public housing; and strengthening

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74 See Asef Bayat, who stressed the reformist and the non-revolutionary character of the uprisings.
the civil and social rights of the children of Kuwaiti women married to non-citizens, including stateless *bidun* men. While the demonstrations of the Arab Uprisings were spectacular events, incremental and piecemeal formal improvements in the civil and economic rights of Kuwaiti women reflect the changing content and depth of gendered citizenship in an authoritarian Gulf state with limited albeit deliberative parliamentary processes. Claims raised by both male and female MPs for strengthening Kuwaiti women’s citizenship rights reflected pressures for bolstered female citizenship. At the same time, the reformist dimension of the Arab Uprisings had a gendered face that deepened internal social divisions in Kuwait. Increased focus on female citizenship in parliament, in court, and in the media shored up the privileged status and position of Kuwaiti women as holders of Kuwaiti citizenship documents in contradistinction to segments of the *bidun* population with no affiliation to Kuwaiti women.

In Chapter 17, Assia Boutaleb, continues this approach and explains the role of youth in the Uprisings but employs the anthropological perspective of the practice rather than the ideational. She argues that youth was not the only social group protesting in 2011, but that it expressed a general critique of society and “was the best in analysing and explaining the political game.” But perhaps more importantly than content and extent of citizenship was the dimension of depth as it was expressed in practice. The two groups she analyses in Egypt and Morocco show an extraordinary degree of commitment and sense of social responsibility. In both cases they engaged in explaining their rights to citizens, for instance by explaining the workings of the electoral system, the importance of the new constitutions, and providing information on the economic or international situation. Rather than imposing ideas from above, they organised debates, dialogues, and public training. In this way they disseminated a sense of civic engagement and active citizenship, in the sense of citizens sharing joint responsibility for their future. These “acts of citizenship” are not heroic transgressions of the political order or radical disruptions of civic norms but, as Boutaleb states, “[T]hey are minor, everyday acts, such as discussing or arguing issues of public interest, but through them a civic relationship is produced between ordinary citizens.” Their main purpose is to break down the predominant sense of apathy and culture of subordination. In addition, in contrast to the classic ruling bargain, these acts of citizenship were expressed in terms of a suspicion of the state, which was no longer seen as the source of rights and a provider of services. In response, the state has waged a propaganda campaign to exclude the youth by linking it with drugs, criminality, and the disruption of the public order.
In Chapter 18, Claire Beaugrand analyses the position of the people without rights in Kuwait, the bidun, and how they “by virtue of their acts, constitute themselves as legal and political subjects.” The bidun have, over the years, become the quintessential victims of what Sater calls the “hardening of the core” of citizenship in the Gulf. Victims of a bureaucratic mistake in the 1960s, they were excluded from the welfare provisions citizens obtained and from having any rights at all, and increasingly were regarded as total outsiders, aliens, who posed a security, cultural, and economic threat, and consequently are not recognised as beings. As such, the bidun are a good example of the politics of citizenship of the state. Their status as “non-existent” beings was underlined in the marginal spaces they inhabited. Although the bidun case goes back several decades, as was typical of the Arab Uprisings they no longer relied on patronage but developed innovative forms for promoting their case. The protests in 2011 were led by a new generation of young leaders who were not members of civil society and were independent. Their protests were spontaneous, innovative, and public, and adopted new forms, such as organising public demonstrations or days of commemoration, handing out flowers to parliamentarians, and outright defiance of the authorities, forcing the latter to take the case of the bidun into account. Regardless of the outcome, through these acts of citizenship the bidun managed to assert their right to have rights.

In the Chapter 19 and the conclusion of the book, Engin Isin gives an exposé of what citizenship studies can contribute to the study of the Middle East. He points to new developments in citizenship studies such as the sexual and environmental rights. Moreover it is clear that in a globalised world citizenship is no longer confined to nation-states. Isin also argues against the trope that subjects are turned into citizens. Instead citizens are both: they are subjects and citizens, subject to power, control, and discipline, reduced to obedience and submission on the one hand and empowered to contest those forces and change them through contestation and subversion on the other. Following Etiènne Balibar, Isin accepts the dual nature of the modern citizen-subject who is a “subject to power” and a “subject of power.” In the first the state works on the citizen, who is legislated and acted upon, while in the second the citizen contests this power, alters it, and acquires agency. In the words of Isin: “What distinguishes the citizen from the subject is that the citizen is this composite subject of obedience, submission, and subversion.” Citizenship is confirmed in performances, rituals and acts. Citizenship in this universal form is shorn of its European bias. In terms of extent, content, depth, this raises important questions which Isin does not explore but can be asked on the basis of this volume. These are: How does the subject-citizen work out in the Middle East from the
colonial period to the present? How does it apply to Islamist movements, or other social movements or transnational movements in the region, and how has the authoritarian state determined the citizen-subject in the region, and how has it since the Arab Uprisings tried to put the citizen jinn back in the subject box? The questions that Isin throws up underline the complexities of applying insights of citizenship studies to the Middle East.

Bibliography


