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### **Are unintended effects of International Development Cooperation sustainable? Evidence from a Dutch District Rural Development Program in Tanzania.**

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#### **Abstract**

This paper is situated in the context of development cooperation interventions that have become more complex in their evaluation attempts, particularly due to the interaction of actors whose interests and expectation over the same interventions are different. This has resulted in unintended effects, among others, whose evaluation in terms of sustainability needs attention. This paper narrows down to a segment of actors in the operationalization of the development cooperation between Tanzania and The Netherlands, the District Officials, who, while serving the project, got involved in the (mis)appropriation of the Dutch aid in a District Rural Development Program. The (mis)appropriation of the Dutch aid was intended to cater for their investments in order to promote their livelihoods. Interviews with the District Officials and the people close-by them and the focus group discussions with the people in which these Officials live suggest that the wellbeing from the investments are continuously sustainable to the District Officials; the wellbeing of the people close to the District Officials rises till when the officials retire; regardless of the wellbeing of the communities showing mixed outcomes, there is no indication of being worse off; where aid does not show effectiveness, people move a certain step higher than where aid found them. Moreover, the memories of the people on aid are still alive and positive more than a decade and a half ago when the DRDPs stopped. All in all, there is increase in wellbeing, an indication of the sustainability of the unintended effects of development cooperation. While the paper, on the one hand, indicates that measuring unintended effects requires a long-term vision, as some unintended effects peter down more rapidly than others, it also suggests that the aid goes through trust networks of the people.

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## 1.0 Introductory background

This paper is about the unintended effects of development cooperation. Traditionally, development cooperation has been seen as the engagements of the advantaged and disadvantaged nations on issues of foreign aid, judicial initiatives, and peacekeeping missions, and combatting international criminalities, such as terror acts, drugs, and human trafficking. The understanding of development cooperation is now taking another trend whereby the issue is about win-win relationships where trade and investment are conceived as legitimate effective ways to further economic co-operation for both sides, rather than assistance to a disadvantaged counterpart (Keeley 2012: 158).

It is not at all easy to evaluate international development cooperation because it is now found in the context of interventions that have become more complex in their evaluation attempts, particularly due to the interaction of actors whose interests and expectations over the same interventions are different. The evaluations become complex because the interventions are not viewed and assessed similarly. Even the nature of interventions themselves are not agreed upon in terms of the forms they should take: while the mainstream development cooperation thinks that there should be systematic interventions demanding a certain clear outcome and impact, other schools of thought are of the opinion that it is better to look for the poor and give them that money and they do with it whatever they want and think is best for themselves. While for the mainstream development cooperation interventions, an evaluation against intended effects seems logical, the latter face chaotic evaluations because of a rather chaotic nature of use of development resources. Barder (2011) enumerates three aims of aid effectiveness: sustained economic growth, improved quality of life, and the alleviation of suffering. While it demonstrably improves lives and alleviates suffering, its effect on economic growth is ambiguous. For this reason, according to him, it is better to ask not whether aid is effective, but which aid is effective. This position complicates the evaluation initiatives, as there is no single starting point in considering even the effectiveness of development cooperation.

The differences in the interests of the actors involved in development cooperation accounts for the results of the evaluations. We have seen the Dutch researchers being critical of themselves with the District Rural Development Programs in Tanzania, which had lasted for seventeen years, condemning them as having caused more poverty than the poverty they found when I was starting (IOB 2004)<sup>1</sup>. The same program, however, is met with great enthusiasm by the beneficiaries (Kamanzi 2007). The differences in the

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<sup>1</sup> I have been made to understand that the report was very much criticized because its sample of Songea and Mbulu Districts, which at that time had suffered from drought, a factor that conditioned respondents to talk of food shortage.

opinion over the same program are accounted for by Kamanzi (2007) as being a result of different objectives of the program implementers and the program beneficiaries (*idem*).

This paper deals with the mainstream development cooperation intervention by the Dutch government, the District Rural Development Programs. It concentrates on one of the key category of actors who played the role of “coordinating” the program to the beneficiaries, the District Officials. A critical aspect of the District Officials is their organizing practice of “appropriating” the program funds and resources for themselves.

The organizing practices refer to the strategies or manoeuvres that the District officials have used in order to appropriate funds from the development aid. The main aim of these strategies has been to make sure that public funds and resources from aid are in their hands in order to promote the individual livelihoods, the livelihoods of the people close to them, and in the community at large. It is important to note, however, that the organizing practices operated as a way to circumvent the non-participatory character of the Dutch operatives in these DRDPs, on the one hand, and the District officials took advantage of their official position of being at the district headquarters, the entrance of Dutch aid, on the other hand.

The organizing practices of the District are categorized as collaboration, corruption, and domination. With respect to collaboration, the District officials tried to diligently work together with the donors by trying to block enquiries about money and behaving as the Dutch officials wanted. On the other hand, though, when district officials worked together amongst themselves, collaboration was through underground complaining and forming small alliances in order to convince the donor to provide resources. In collaboration, what is critical is working together to avoid conflict, and in so behaving appropriating donor aid. In the category of corruption, theft, forgeries, and favoritism are critical. Domination is expressed through influence peddling, that is, using one’s influence in government or connections with people in authority to get favors or preferential treatment; suppression, that is, keeping the opposition party people low or subjugating them, and; smart force, that is, involvement of the village people in development activities by making them think of the nasty consequences if they did not comply with the idea of “joining the bandwagon for development”. All these organizing practices, nonetheless, have one function: to make sure that the funds or resources move from the Dutch coffers to the District officials with the aim of promoting their self-defined needs and aspirations (see Kamanzi 2007)

The question at hand is whether these funds or resources have resulted in some sustainability of some sort in the livelihoods of the people. The questioning of sustainability of the effects is not a strange notion in

development cooperation. Riddel (2014: i) puts it thus: “Well over 75% of projects meet their immediate objectives and impact has improved, even though sustaining benefits remains a challenge and there continue to be aid failures”.

The search for sustainability of development cooperation unintended effects in this study poses a great philosophical question of whether the end should justify the means. The appropriation of funds by the District Officials through treacherous ways cannot, in any case, be justified. Seeking for sustainability of the unintended effects from stolen moneys is a question that tries to find out if something fundamentally wrong can bring out something good, not to justify the wrong thing, but rather to find out whatever might have happened with development aid given the different processes, positive and/or negative of implementing aid projects.

In dealing with sustainability issues in this paper, I would like to make use of the livelihoods perspective whereby the preoccupation is adequacy in dealing with self-defined needs, processes equated with social inclusion (de Haan 2000:9):

*livelihood is sustainable if it is adequate for the satisfaction of self-defined needs and proof against shocks and stress. If livelihood is sustainable, it is synonymous with social inclusion; if not, it equates with social exclusion.*

In this perspective, two elements are critical: the wellbeing of the people in the different dimensions and the futuristic vision of wellbeing. I would, then, consider sustainability as continuous processes that promote people’s quality life in terms of facilitation in dealing with challenges of life. The question, therefore, that deals with the sustainability of the livelihoods of the people as a result of (miss)appropriated resources from DRDPs as a development cooperation program by District Officials, basically, demands that there is proof of promotion of people’s quality life in an incremental manner.

In the second section, after this introduction, the paper presents the methodological underpinnings of this paper. The paper proceeds with section three that describes what the DRDPs are; in section five, the paper presents the investments of the District officials. Section six presents issues regarding the sustainability of wellbeing and section seven the memories that people have about the DRDP. In section eight, there is presentation of the findings and potential policy an evaluation implications and section nine winds up the paper with a conclusion.

## **2.0 Methodological underpinnings**

This paper is a reflection that begins from the observation made from my PhD thesis (Kamanzi 2007): that

District Officials (miss)appropriated funds with the intention of promoting their livelihoods. From this observation, the question is whether these promoted livelihoods are sustainable or not.

In order to understand sustainability, three categories of respondents were interviewed this year. The first category had a total number of 5 (five) District Officials who worked with a DRDP were interviewed. These were: 2 Social Development officers and 1 Transport Officer (all retired) who worked at the District before, during, and after the DRDPs; 2 Agricultural Extension Officers (retired), who are still working at one of the Farmer's Extension Centers (FEC) started by the DRDP.

The second category was composed of people who were close to the District officials. These are neighbors and relatives. A total number of 18 people in this category were interviewed from each village of a District Official. In village A, 6 people were interviewed; in Village B, 4 people; in Village C, 4 people, and; in Village D, 4 people. The purpose of interviewing such people was to examine how their livelihoods were promoted by the District officials.

In each of the four villages, one focus group discussion with eight people was conducted. This made a total number of 32 people. The main aim of focus group discussions was to examine how the community in general promoted its livelihood through the District officials who worked with the DRDP.

The number of people hence interviewed was rather modest (55 people in total); it rather shows an indication of the long-term effects, and it is not intended to be considered as statistically significant evidence. However, since both the theory and the interviews point in a similar direction, it is deemed responsible to portray the numeric results to illustrate the findings.

With the interviews to the District Officials it was important to establish their experience with working with the DRDP and what they thought they gained from their work. It is in these interviews that themes such as investment in schooling for children, where to live, in land, in income generating activities, and status-related activities were dealt with to see how they continuously promoted quality life for the District Officials, the people close to them, and the community at large. Additionally, there was observation of the attribution of livelihood successes or not on the DRDP. Such questions were critical: what investments were established when they were active Officers in the DRDP? After the program ended, what happened to the investments? If the investments are still on, how have they been maintained? What impact have such investments had on the District Officials themselves, the close-by people, and the community at large? And how DRDP is still in the memories of the District Officials themselves, the close-by people,

and the community at large.

In order to measure whether there was sustainability the perception of wellbeing over time was considered. Scores of welfare were designed to follow this standard:

- +5 = very large improvement in wellbeing
- +4 = large improvement in wellbeing
- +3 = improvement in wellbeing
- +2 = small improvement in wellbeing
- +1 = very small improvement in wellbeing
- 0 = no change in wellbeing
- 1 = very small decline in wellbeing
- 2 = small decline in wellbeing
- 3 = decline in wellbeing
- 4 = large decline in wellbeing
- 5 = very large decline in wellbeing

These subjective scores of wellbeing were to follow this time interview series with respect to the DRDP: three years before the DRDP, at the beginning of the DRDP, in the middle of the DRDP, at the end of the DRDP, and three years after the DRDP. While the District Officials were asked to score their wellbeing as Officials at the District, the close to the District Officials and the community were asked to score their wellbeing as beneficiaries of the District Officials. For the District Officials and the close-by people, interviews were used and for the community, focus group discussions were used for the scores.

Data is presented in two main ways. The first way is by a selection of direct quotes from the respondents to show the reality of investments by the District Officials, the way the people close to these Officials related with them, and a conversation that typically shows the perception of wellbeing of the communities over time in the relationships between the District Officials and the communities. The second way is by presenting the graphs that show the trends in the perception of wellbeing. The first graph shows the trend of the District Officials; the second graph shows the trend of the people close to the District Officials, and; the third graph shows the trend of the in which the District Officials lived and live.

### **3.0 District Rural Development Programs**

With the reformulation of the Netherlands and Tanzania development cooperation in 1985, interventions were intended to support import, parastatal, enterprises and government bodies concerned with large scale production, large scale service organizations, and small-scale development activities oriented to the small-

holder agricultural sector (URT/RNE 1986:1). The DRDPs were then invented in order to improve the level of wellbeing of the rural population. The DRDPs were multi-sectoral, institutionally embedded in the local government structures, the District Councils, and followed a process approach, based on participatory planning processes (RNE 1992).

In the first phase (1987-1991) of the DRDPs, focus was on implementing activities in the productive sector and supporting the planning, implementation, and the monitoring capacities of the district councils; phase two, (1992-1996) shifted to improving the living conditions and increasing household income with an inclusion of the social sector activities of education and health; the third phase (1997-2004), shift was from rural development to strengthening local government authorities in decentralization (TAT 2004:3-4).

Eleven DRDPs (Mbulu, Maswa, Bukoba, Meatu, Kahama, Karagwe, Biharamulo, Ngara, Muleba, Bukombe, Karatu) were under the Dutch Embassy and two (Kondoa, Songea) were under SNV. Not all DRDPs started at the same time: three began in 1987; one in 1989; two in 1992; three in 1993; one in 1994; one in 1996; one in 1997, and; one in 1999.

#### **4.0 District Officials in the DRDPs**

District officials referred to are technocrats who are employed by local government at the districts to deal with everyday activities on the planning and implementation of development projects. They work with the Councilors by implementing development plans arrived at through participatory planning; they have worked closer with the DRDP donors at the district as they would plan and strategize with the donor on how to implement the funded projects; they also work with the people, particularly with sensitization with regard to development issues.

District officials are civil servants who have the salary and allowances which vary a lot. Highly paid civil servants could earn around 300 to 370 EURO a month after taxes. There were some who got as lower as around 100 EURO. Added to the salaries are the allowances. When an official goes to work in the rural areas, he/she was paid around 15 EURO a day; when he/she worked in town, he/she was paid a maximum of 40 EURO a day; extra duty allowance was paid at a maximum of 6 EURO a day, and when he/she attended a meeting or seminar or workshop, he/she was paid a sitting allowance of a maximum of 9 EURO a day. These allowances were added to one's salary. The highest share of allowance went to one who went for work in an urban place, and the lowest went to extra duty. This implies that, for instance, if an official went to work in the urban area for 10 days, he/she already had an extra income of 400 EURO besides his/her monthly salary.

During the DRDPs, there was a pension scheme for civil servants. In the lowest category, pensioners received around 40 EURO, around 80 EURO for the middle category, 125 EURO for the higher category for each six months. If this is compared to what these officials get during their service period, it is little and it becomes insufficient for their way of living. They cannot cater for all the commitments and responsibilities together with their extras when they stop working as officials.

District officials, apart from the official work they do, have excessive other commitments: many dependents and relatives to take care of; contributions to community-based organizations and religious groups; voluntary leadership; providing space in their homes for meetings; getting jobs for the people. Much as they are considered to be high earners, they also have high spending patterns in order to take care of all these commitments and their personal issues (Kamanzi 2007).

In order to maintain these commitments, which earn them status in their communities, these District Officials get to investments in education of their children and relative's children, securing sure permanent place to stay in village by acquiring land and constructing houses in the villages, and initiating income generating activities through the maximization of available resources at the District, among which the donors' funds through corrupt behaviors of extracting resources from the donors at the district by treacherous and criminal manipulations including theft and forgeries. Construction materials were stolen in the stores; there were lots of forged documents: fake meeting minutes, fake receipts, fake reports, etc.

## **5.0 Investments of the District Officials**

The investments are seen from the level of individual District Official, to the people close by him/her, and at the level of the community. The money obtained by the District officials when they worked with the DRDP was used in various productive ways. The following quote from one of the retired officials summarizes what I could say is what has been the experience of most officials:

*I have bought several banana plantations from the money I made when I was at the District in the program; I have enough bananas and I can sell to other people. I even bought Orweya. Those days when I bought it, many people laughed because they said I was mad buying a plot with stones and only grass; they expected me to buy a banana plantation. I have already sold a portion of it at ten million shillings; I am waiting that the prices go up and I sell some more; the remaining will be for my children. I constructed two small houses for renting from the money I sold the plot; my old friend whom I assisted when I was working got me someone working with an NGO to rent it. ... You can see those cows outside there: I bought a female one by then; now look, I have more six; I have sold some calves, and I can get milk every day*

*and I sell some. ... My last-born is in her third year of secondary school; her two elder sisters and two brothers are already working and they assist her for fees and pocket money*

This is typical conversation that you can get from retired District Officials. From a woman District official, the presentation is not so different:

*I really got enough income from the program; I have a nice plantation which I added and took care using manure from the cattle I bought when I was at the District. Lots of things I have in the house, I bought using money from allowances in the DRDP project; I put a lot of money in the school fees for our children. My husband was a farmer and had a small shop; his income was not enough. But with more money from the project, our children have all studied. ...*

It reveals how they managed going through their work life as officials in terms of investment and how their investments are yielding for them when they are retired. Of course, this is about the successful District Officials; there are some who did not do well and they are no longer alive.

The District Officials have had effect to the people around them. I quote in length one of the respondents, who is a neighbor to one of the District Officials:

*... I know her very well. She has been with us from when she was working at the District. She retired and she is with us. She really helped us a lot when she was at the District. ... Go to her because you have a sick baby, she knows what to do; go to her when you need some contribution, she has an open hand; ... she is well-off; she has her own house; she has cows and pigs; she has a good banana plantation and she sells things to us; ... the other boy who passed here with a motorcycle got it from her and he pays him at the end of the week. ...*

From the eyes of the close-by people, these District Officials are well off; they have been very instrumental and helpful to the people. It is even because of what the District Officials invested in before they are able to have a good life which extends even to the people close to them.

The community's perception of the investment is rather different from the above perceptions:

*F. You say you know him and how he worked at the District and that he worked with the DRDP. Fine. Do you know what he did exactly?*

*R1. The details no, but the normal things yes. For example, I know he came here and did a lot of sensitization so that we can construct the classrooms at our school here in the village with their help at the District. This is possible, but if you have nobody powerful, like Village X whose Councilor is the Chairman of Counsel, forget: you will waste time by contributing a lot and seeing little. ...*

*R2. He also talked about getting into groups in order to benefit from agricultural inputs. ... But this is what they all say when they come to us. ... But look at how he has benefitted? Look at his house; look at his plantation and the cows and pigs? He has lands. ... He is not like us at all.*

*F. But he was a worker and he got salary; so he has to be different from you, I think.*

*R3. Yes, but do you mean that even his friends were workers like him? I do not think so. ... He shared with them; he actually could invite them in meetings that paid*

What one gets from such a discussion is the fact that the community as such does not benefit, apart from a few people who are friends to the District Officials. And in order for the community to benefit, there needs to be more connection between the politicians who control the resources and the village itself. This was confirmed in a focus group discussion in one of the villages where the Chairman of the Council came from:

*We wish someone else had died; ... this man was proper at the council; he made sure that we got the roads here; he made sure that our schools were constructed. ... He knew how to do it for us there and we went ahead. But after his death, all went down as it was before. ... You see, the problem is that people have their own problems and their relatives too. They have to think about themselves first. Charity begins from home. ... I do not want to say that the deceased was special, he had his friends who benefitted a lot too, but at least we saw something as a village during his time of leadership.*


Much as there is recognition of the work of the leader for the community, there is still acknowledgement that the individual is first and the friends; later it is when the community comes in. In actual fact, this Councilor at that position does not do something else other than favoring “himself” through the village; and as Councilor, he has several villages under him; that is why other villages do not get his service.

It can be argued that the District Officials invested for their wellbeing; they did the same for the people close to them. However, when it comes to the community at large, they did not invest. A contrast is made against them by showing how the politicians made a difference in some village. In this example, however, it is still the politician investing towards “his people”.

## **6.0 Sustainability of the wellbeing**


I try to look at sustainability from the District Officials themselves, then the people close to these Officials, and finally to the community where these Officials live. Figure 1 shows the scores of the District Officials on a scale from “very large decline in wellbeing” to “very high increase in wellbeing”, three years before the DRDPs started to three years after the DRDPs closed.

**Figure 1: Wellbeing scores of District Officials**



An observation that can be made here is that they all show that there has been an increment in the wellbeing. Beginning from the time before the DRDP to the time after the DRDP, all the District Officials show that their wellbeing is perceived to increase.


The wellbeing scores of the people close to the District Officials is summarized in the Figure 2:



Evidently, there has been an increase in the perception of the wellbeing by the people close to the District Officials. Generally speaking, the increase is sharper till mid-way the DRDP, and almost no increase after the closure of the DRDP. This can be understood by the fact that it was until when the DRDPs were


operating that there were resources and opportunities that could flow from the District Officials to the close-by people, after which few resources were available.

With respect to the communities in which the District Officials live, Figure 3 summarizes the results of the scores:



All the villages begin from where there is perception of negative wellbeing and none goes beyond the level of perception of no change in wellbeing, a cut off point between positive and negative perceptions in wellbeing. These scores are a result of joint ranking in the focus groups. The results give a mixed reality of some communities remaining static in their perception of their wellbeing before and after the DRDP, while two show a relative increase till at the end of the DRDP and staiticity after the end of DRDP.

If we turn to the averages, Figure 4 is informative:



The general trend with the scores is that while for both the District Officials and the close-by people there seems to be an increase of wellbeing, this trend continues after the DRDPs for the District Officials and seems to be stagnant for the people who are close to the District Officials. There is actually no positive

trend in the wellbeing of the community. The increase in the wellbeing of the people close-by to the District Officials ends after the DRDPs because the officials do not have any extra resources from the DRDPs and they are struggling with their lives too:


*When he was working, he was very generous; he could assist anybody when he was approached; he gave school fees, he gave contributions in different groups in the village and at the Church; for example, he took me to the hospital when I was sick with my son. ... Now he is also busy trying to manage his life; he does not have a lot of money, even though he is better than me; but he cannot give what I want as he would do when he was working. ...*

And that the impact of the of the District Officials can hardly be seen is testified by the respondents:

*This village, like many villages here, is big. What do you think she could do for us? She had her problems and she wanted to solve them; she has her friends and children and relatives. ... The village is too big for her and moreover, it is not her task to bring development to this village; she is not a politician. ...*

### 7.0 Memories of DRDP by the People

In this section, the discussion is on whether the people where there was a DRDP program still have memories of the DRDP and on what. Each one, from the District Officials, the people close to them, and the members of the focus group discussions, was asked to name three institutions, in order of importance, which institution they thought had impact on their current lives. Incidentally, all of them mentioned three institutions: DRDP, World Vision, and TASAF. The responses are summarized in this table below:



DRDP is one of the institutions that people think has had impact on their lives. One of the District officials


argued:

*Well, I shall be ungrateful if I did not place DRDP as the most important in impact on my life. That is where I got lots of money. I had my salary, yes, but that was too little to do lots of things. With DRDP top-ups, yes, I did a lot and I am still surviving on what I got and put in my different things.*

Another one said:

*I have a real problem to choose between DRDP and TASAF to be honest. But I have to choose one, in any case. I think, let me have TASAF as number one and DRDP as number two. I had so many meetings with TASAF as it was directly under me for women. I think this might have shaped me more than DRDP, I think. ....*

As can be seen in the graph below, almost all the respondents were of the opinion that DRDP did very much on constructing schools, constructing roads, promoting dairy cattle, and dealing with agriculture:



A conclusion can be made here: that DRDP is still in the memories of the people in which it operated.

They have its memories in the sectors of education, roads, and agriculture. Let me close this section with one quote from a farmer:

*One thing I can assure you, our district without DRDP roads would have been useless; they are still with us; we use them till now; rains remove the soil on top, but when we replace it, it is still in the same DRDP roads. Try to imagine this area without roads: how could the bananas be transported to town? What about coffee, how would we transport it? ...*

## 8.0 Discussion of findings and potential policy & evaluation implications

From what has been seen so far, there is evidence of sustainability of the development cooperation effects. There is indication of rise in wellbeing. The District Official, who is a middle agent between the donor and the beneficiary, has wellbeing that continuously increase; the close-by people benefit as far as when the official retires, and of course, their wellbeing is at a different higher step; even for the two communities out of the four, they still have wellbeing 3 years after the program; the only thing is that while their wellbeing did not continue to increase, it was sustainable in the sense that it plateaued at the new level.

More evidence of the effectiveness of aid to the middle people can be seen from this example that was given me by one of the Dutch operatives in the DRDPs:

*Of course I have the example of the 18 year old fundi (1987) who was employed (and trained) to assemble the few 100 bicycles that DRDP introduced. The guy was proactive and was asked to manage the large DRDP TV screen in the Council Hall, for which he proposed to start a cinema session every weekend. He became famous in the district and was elected councilor, after which he became chairman. He got stuck when he wanted to challenge the sitting MP. ... (email communication 04.12.2016)*

We are in front of powerful people, the District officials who capture aid at strategic points in the chain of aid delivery. These are the people who can have sustained effects of aid, and not the community at large. This phenomenon can be accounted for by two main challenges: the accountability and multiple arena.

*Accountability challenge:* Failure of development aid is accounted for through a number of reasons, among which the manipulation of aid by the aid gatekeepers, who are the bureaucrats where aid is negotiated for implementation (Kamanzi 2007) and the dysfunctional or chaotic institutional setting within which the projects are undertaken (Weinar 2006). Whether the gatekeepers or institutions we are in front of the realm of powerful actors constantly capturing the resources intended for the worst-off. Mechanisms to render these powerful accountable are not so clear: the rich cannot easily render the poor accountable and vice versa for (in) effective development aid; the intermediate institutions cannot render the donors accountable and vice versa. A good example is much as the EU does not give enough aid as it promises, for example the classic 0.7% of their national income each year in aid (Tindale 2013), who is render the EU accountable? What accounts for little significant accountability is the lack of empowerment of the poor, who are the major beneficiaries of aid (Weinar 2006). There is no clear mechanism that can be used to render the powerful actors accountable for sustainability of aid.

*Arena challenge:* De Haan and Kamanzi (2010) argue that the interventions in development cooperation go through different arenas, leaving impact wherever they pass, but most often except where they are supposed to have impact, that is, on the intended beneficiaries. This is criticism to a top bottom approach of development aid, which inherently leaves room for the powerful to appropriate aid for themselves. Even when aid is designed to get to the poor through officially and formally well-organized participatory initiatives at the local level, the problem is the elite capture. There is need to get to thinking more about the self-organized trust networks, a point I shall bring in the next section when discussing the findings.

There is no doubt that where aid has gone there has been some change of variant magnitude and different interpretations of effectiveness. The change can be questionable as to whether it is intended or not, whether it is proportional or not or even whether it is positive or not. The positivity can be extended as far as questioning the sustainability, a subject of this paper. This paper has shown how there has been unintended positive effects, with sustainability to the different actors, even though at different levels. The appropriated resources by the District Officials are beneficial to them to a large extent and their close by people to some extent. The community at large benefits a little bit, at least by moving to a certain higher level of wellbeing.

The challenges that have been brought forward, that is, the accountability and the multiple arena challenges, are pertinent to this study. The first challenge points to development aid being nobody's business as such. There seems to be no one to account for the misguided efforts and outcomes of development aid. The multiple arena challenge points to the fact that there is a long way to go for aid if it is disbursed from the top to the bottom; in between, there are so many arenas in which aid percolates and hardly reaches the intended beneficiaries. Regardless of these challenges, as we have seen from the findings, development aid is not total waste: some higher levels of wellbeing are achieved by both the powerful and the less powerful. This is a point to push for more aid, actually, regardless of the donor fatigue syndrome, a result of thinking that aid is useless. From this perspective, aid should not be stopped as such, but more innovative ways of giving it is what is crucial.

An option that has been pointed out by some aid scholars has been that one of looking for the poor and giving them aid directly, without going through the hassle of engaging middle people. The most prominent proponent of this school of thought has been Desai (2003) and Hanlon (2004) whereby the argument is that looking of the poor and giving them aid, and forgetting about what they do with the aid. This is an old argument, which can be seen in the cash transfer operations. In Tanzania, for example, Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) Phase Three is doing this; they have identified who the poor are and they are giving them money to deal with different vulnerabilities, among which health and food security. Several

are snugs: identification of the poor (who are they and who are they not), the little money that is given (around 10 Euro in three months), and the processes of disbursement of this money (through central and local government channels) (Kamanzi 2013). Again, such approaches cannot escape from gatekeepers, who are powerful actors constantly capturing the resources. What is important, however, the beneficiaries talk of “success” stories with the little money they receive.

The “success” stories with the little money obtained through cash transfers and even the story of sustainability of the wellbeing of the District Officials are a starting point about thinking on how to deal with aid: if people have the resources, something substantial can happen in their lives. The issue is how to get the resources into their hands. What I suggest is the use of “trust networks”, which according to Tilly (2007: 81) contain:

*Ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprise at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others.*

These networks contain a number of people who are connected by similar ties; sheer existence of such a tie gives a member significant claims on the attention or aid of another; a network will be based on carrying one major long-term enterprise (Tilly 2007: 81-82). Such trust networks change over time, and hence the need to recognize them over time, as well. Re-directing our efforts to give aid to the trust networks is commitment of the efforts of international development cooperation to a bottom-up process of enhancing development of the people by the people themselves. From this perspective, it is, therefore, crucial for international development cooperation to engage in identification of trust networks and their major long-term enterprises and to channel aid to them in order to foster their enterprise. It is a perspective that takes into consideration the power of the people themselves, their trust to get together to deal with their identified enterprise.

It is important to have a long-term perspective of unintended effects. Some of the unintended effects last and others do not. Such a diverse picture couldn't have emerged if only an evaluation was done right after the end of the program. This implies that there is need for planning for the evaluation of unintended effects, to build on the positives and discourage the negatives.

## **9.0 Conclusion**

Unintended effects of development cooperation are sustainable, though at different levels. While for those who are at the gatekeeping position, that is, close to where aid is disbursed, have effects on their wellbeing

that last longer and continuously, those further away from the source of aid benefit through the gatekeepers. People still attribute their wellbeing now, or facilitation processes to their wellbeing, to the DRDP. This implies that there has been even a longer term felt impact of the DRDP. There is no indication that aid leaves people worse off; in real bad situations whereby aid has been totally mismanaged, at least the people are where they are and/or they have moved a small step ahead and are stuck there. From this perspective, there is no bad aid at all!

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