Career Development and Authority of Secretaries-General in a Biographical Dictionary

By Dr. Bob Reinalda
Political Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands
b.reinalda@fm.ru.nl and www.ru.nl/fm/reinalda/IO_BIO

Panel on Political Authority of Secretaries-General of International Organizations
International Studies Association International Conference
Montreal, Canada, 16-19 March 2011

The panel at this conference continues the roundtable debate at the ISA Annual Conference in New Orleans in February 2010 which dealt with closing the theory-practice gap, in particular through a prosopographical analysis of secretaries-general (SGs) of international organizations (IOs). In New Orleans it was argued that a biographical dictionary of SGs of IOs is required in order to provide a better picture of the variety of people in the position of chief executive and representative of an international bureaucracy. Such a biographical dictionary will include short but informative biographies of individual SGs and descriptions of the social and professional connections of these individuals (prosopographies of groups of SGs). The biographical dictionary project is called IO BIO.1 Although no decision has been taken about the question of restriction to SGs of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – hence exclusion of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – this paper focuses on IGOs. I use the word SG, but am aware that similar executive heads have different titles, for instance, director or director-general. The paper will go into the question of political authority of SGs of IGOs from the perspective of entries in the IO BIO project, which is meant to result in a book and web publication by the time that enough entries will be available. The lives of the various SGs that will be included in the IO BIO Project will allow us to discern the political authority SGs of IOs have had and also to discern to what extent and under what conditions political authority has changed over a longer time period.

The first part of the paper summarizes the methodological considerations related to the description of the lives and careers of SGs in general. The second part deals with the major career elements to be described in an entry, in particular origin, career development, contacts with others and assessment of the successful, or unsuccessful, career. The third and fourth parts deal with leadership and political authority of SGs of IOs as major elements of a career description. The Annex provides daft instructions for writing an entry in the IO BIO.

The paper has a double character as it discusses the conference theme and uses this for the draft instructions of the IO BIO project to be elaborated after the panel session.2

Part I: WRITING THE LIFE OF A SECRETARY-GENERAL

Entries to the proposed Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations are to be written according to academic standards. The entries are not conceived as a catalogue of biographical details, as can be found in so-called Who is Whos, but rather as a complete and balanced account of the life and work of those SGs of IOs to be included in the dictionary. I will summarize these methodological considerations under the keywords ‘open mind’, ‘critical mind’ and ‘balanced description’.
**Open Mind**

A person analysing and describing the life and work of a particular SG of a particular IO must do this with an open mind, taking enough ‘distance’ from the object of description, in particular if in one way or another the author has personal or institutional ties with this person or the organization. This distance should prevent the author from wanting to leave out certain aspects of the life and work of that SG and not discuss these. An open mind hence comprises the willingness to also include in the analysis all kinds of failures, relations with questionable persons and disputed periods in the subject’s life or work.

These remarks are not made to preclude practitioners writing contributions. On the contrary, practitioners often know many things about their SG. However, editors of biographical dictionaries have been aware of the problems referred to here.

**Critical Mind**

One of the two main errors to be avoided when portraying a SG is *myth making*. This is not that easy given the fact that after a while the object of description may become a kind of ‘hero’ to the person who is doing thorough research about him or her. Even if the object of description has negative sides, the danger of intensively dealing with an individual of importance may result in some kind of glorification or idolization. Hence, to avoid myth making one needs to emphasize the importance of scholarly methodology, such as the collecting and dating of documents and the search for critical perspectives provided by witnesses, other accounts and literature. Dominant claims should be exposed and investigated critically and, where appropriate, with a sceptical mind. Because descriptions by the IO itself or secondary literature extant about a SG may present a mythical account, it is necessary to use original sources. The biographer should also be critical towards secondary literature that is relatively uninformative, overly detailed or contradictory. Hence, it should be stressed that the biographer should use as many primary sources as possible and also distrust certain publications due to the prejudice they may have. One should also distrust personal letters, diaries and other personal documents, because they may tend to self-justification and rationalization of the subject’s behaviour. Simultaneously it must be recognized that these documents are highly important primary sources.

Another error to be avoided is to see too much *coherence* in a life and to stress the ‘unity’ of person, whereas a life may be far more uncertain and indefinite than it looks like. To a certain extent it is the biographer who, when writing the portrait, constructs the personality behind the person. One should be aware that a person does not need to be portrayed as a complete or closed person, but rather as one with a complex personality. Furthermore one should not suppose that his or her career always follows an ascending line, because there may (probably will) also be downward career movements or less than handsome time periods or affairs.

Scholarly methodology will be helpful to avoid the two main errors mentioned. Looking for primary sources and personal statements and documents, reading interviews and raising questions about what once happened make the research into an individual life puzzling, thrilling and adventurous. Putting the pieces together and finding both the coherence and the contradictions are a satisfying activity when reconstructing a life, even if in the end not all answers can be given.

**Balanced Description**

Descriptions should be accurate and informative, even if the number of words that the short biography allows is relatively small. Colin Matthew, editor of the famous *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, argues that the purpose of an entry in a biographical dictionary is to give a ‘complete and balanced account of the life and work of its subject by supplying both
detailed personal information and a general assessment of the subject’s significance. Here are some aspects to be kept in mind.

It is helpful to follow the stages of the life and public career of a SG by discerning periods and phases, divided by watersheds, and focus on the contribution of a SG to his or her profession, the organization and international relations.

About watersheds in the private life questions arise, such as:
- Did the person receive a special form of training or was s/he recruited for a special task or job that changed the course of his or her life?
- Were there moments of deep sorrow, caused by the loss of close relatives or the experience of a disaster?
- Were there particular events that changed someone’s life (man on the moon, the first woman to be chosen in a specific body or position)?

With regard to watersheds in the public career of a SG questions arise, such as:
- Which political, economic or other events caused the SG to act?
- Did the SG manage to take specific initiatives?
- Did the SG develop or use new ideas, which began to play a role in the organization and its activities, and did those ideas influence events (or not)?
- Did formal or supposed changes play a role (from acting to full position, the first one hundred days)?

Assessing the contributions of a SG to his or her profession, the organization and international relations may help to define watersheds in the career, but may also play a role in the assessment of the subject at the end of the entry. Remember that watersheds in a person’s life do not need to be the same as watersheds in the life of an organization.

When fathoming the subject psychologically, try to understand the complex personality and the complexity of the mental structure. Older doctrines in this respect are those of ‘passion and reason’ and ‘temperament and character’.

However, when questioning the concept of the ‘exemplary person’, who is master of him- or herself and of his and her actions, we should be aware that certain attitudes and behaviour are functions of a hidden and unconscious structure and that mechanisms such as self-justification and rationalization of behaviour are reflected in the language used by the subject. Although it is difficult to look ‘inside someone’s head’, if one feels that psychological factors play a role, one should deal with them. Although this is no guarantee for success, it may be relevant to refer to these factors when they are mentioned in literature or documents. One may refer to authorities in the field or one may try to put psychological factors in words oneself.

With regard to the relationship between the individual and his or her environment, questions arise, such as:
- Is there any room for individual actors available, given the fact that in a realist account of international relations the heads of state are the dramatis personae, or that in a bureaucratic organization standard operating procedures are numerous? That a point of departure other than that of classical realism is possible will be discussed in Part III, but an author should be aware that a SG’s room for manoeuvre is not obvious.
- What is the hinge between life and work?
• What is the hinge between the individual and the collective historic event, demonstrated on the basis of public behaviour and deeds?
• Which are important contemporary political, economic and cultural trends?
• Are behaviour and ideas related to generations, gender or race relations?

Personal documents and interviews may reveal much about the private life, but the question is: when are these private affairs crucial for what is happening in the public sphere? It may be argued that biographers can be too restricted in going into the private life. For instance, should the private situation of a SG be mentioned that produced protocol problems in his diplomatic career? In my short biography of Joseph Avenol, the League of Nations’ second SG, I mention that he did not divorce from his wife in church (he did civilly) and did not marry his long-time confidante and hostess, as this would have meant excommunication.4 Some argue that this is irrelevant, as it is private, while others argue that the protocol problems provide a better understanding of his already difficult position.

Sometimes characteristic details are revealed through a well-chosen anecdote. These should not be avoided, if they reveal something that is known to contemporaries but no longer to later generations, if they show something essential or strengthen the story by clarifying a relationship. When in 1954 the Pope intervened in the debate about tripartite or universal membership of the International Labour Organization, director-general David Morse was delighted to make use of it, although no official ties between the ILO and the Vatican existed and although the Pope had referred to the wrong ILO constitution in L’Osservatore Romano. The ILO tried to correct the reference to the constitution but the editors sternly refused to do so, claiming that the Pope is infallible. The clash between these different cultures, with the ILO trying to be precise and a church with a much older tradition, is telling.

Three Categories and Three Sections
A specific aspect of a balanced description is the relative importance of the persons included in a biographical dictionary, with more words available for describing the important figures in the so-called ‘first category’ and less words for people in a lower category. The first category of most important SGs is allowed, for instance, 2,000 to 3,000 words.5 In this category we find the main leaders, original figures and initiators. It is not necessarily the IGO that determines the acceptance in this category, but rather the SG’s achievements. The second category, with some 800 to 1,200 words, comprises those who are mainly institutionally active. They are not important enough to merit a ‘lengthy’ biography, but important enough to be eligible for an entry of this length in the dictionary. The third category, with 400 to 700 words, is made up of the lesser, but still interesting gods. This differentiation still has to be made. At the moment I am constructing a data base of SGs of IGOs, which will help to categorize the entries.

The keywords ‘open mind’, ‘critical mind’ and ‘balanced description’ summarize the major methodological considerations when a biographer starts digging into the life and career of one or more SGs of IOs. In this paper I will not discuss what I call the first and third sections of an entry, which are mainly factual (see Annex 1). The first section deals with facts such as the SG’s full name, dates of birth, marriage, death etc., while the third section provides an overview of the SG’s archives, the SG’s publications as well as the available literature and websites about him or her. In Part II I will focus on the second section: the account of the SG’s life and work.
Part II: MAJOR CAREER ELEMENTS TO BE DESCRIBED

This part is an initial exploration of various dimensions of an IO BIO entry to be written about, as can be seen in Annex 1: ‘Draft instructions for the Three Sections of an IO BIO Entry’. So far I think of four major elements of the so-called second section: origin, career, contacts with other actors and assessment. These elements are important for each entry, and if all SGs, or a selection of them, are taken together we can say more about these four elements of the group.

Origin
This first element is relevant for answering the question of the background of SGs. Where do they come from? How has this group of actors been educated and trained? And how has it been recruited?

We may discern a check list with the following topics:

- Personal characteristics, such as
  - nationality (country of birth, regional or continental specifics)
  - social position of parents, including aspects such as race relations and gender attitudes
  - religion and related world views
  - marriage(s) / non-formal relationship(s), number of children, divorce(s)
- Education (primary, secondary, tertiary, other)
- Work experience in general
- Previous career positions in national institutions
- Previous positions in IOs (both IGOs and NGOs) (the next paragraph ‘Career’ discusses the career development within the IGO of which the subject became SG); one of the aspects to be discussed may be the distribution of secretariat posts (from the perspective of region, gender etc.)
- Political and other views relevant for the career.

Career
This second element discusses the individual career development of a SG within the bureaucratic and political context of a specific IGO. It focuses on the SG’s individual capacities and results as well as the organizational opportunities and restraints. The checklist comprises the following topics, of which the first three are mainly factual and the following three more analytical. In the actual description there will be overlaps, while the topics are discerned here.

- Career development within the organization before becoming SG (as far as appropriate): previous positions, participation in relevant bodies and conferences, publications, etc.
- Public behaviour, deeds and ideas of the person representing the organization; in short: the SG as politician in the international relations of states, IGOs and non-governmental actors (this will be dealt with more extensively in Part III); it should be asked: which periods and phases can be discerned, divided by which watersheds (discussed before under Part I)? Not everything shall be mentioned, but mainly those deeds and ideas that contributed to the issues at stake at the time and resulted in, for instance, an international convention, a program or an intervention and thus contribute to international relations
- Bureaucratic behaviour, deeds and ideas within the organization; even if this behaviour may be political as well, the issue here is the SG as leader or manager of
the organization and his or her impact on the IGO’s bureaucracy, which may be relevant for understanding the SG’s public behaviour and deeds. This will be elaborated in Part III.

- **Impact of the SG on the IGO’s policies and results.** Although generally speaking this outcome and impact issue is part of the previous topics, it is mentioned separately, because biographers should deal not only with success stories (achievements), but also, or even better, with (near) failures (cf. Young 1991:286). Sometimes the outcome of actions may be negative, whereas what matters is: what has been endeavoured and what has been achieved?

- **Leadership of the SG.** As will be shown in Part III leadership is the most elaborated concept with regard to SGs of IOs. Here one may use Young’s (1991) differentiation of leadership in the context of institutional bargaining (structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual) or Kille’s (2006) styles of leadership (visionary, managerial and strategic). One may also refer to the use of the position in office by a SG as analysed by Cox and Jacobson (1973) in their ‘anatomy of influence’ within IOs, or to the strong (or weak) leadership of the IO’s bureaucracy in problem solving as defined by Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009), and the roles of politically-active diplomats, norm entrepreneur and policy entrepreneur as discussed in the Chesterman volume (2007).

- **Political Authority of the SG.** Although political authority of SGs of IOs remains a rather unelaborated concept in the various approaches discussed below in part III, concepts that refer to political authority may be used, such as: ‘international statesmanship’ (Claude); mobilizer of consensus in support of organizational goals (Cox and Jacobson); framer, deviser of mutually acceptable formulas and broker (Young); moral authority as adding to leadership- and influence-based authority (Kille); the IO’s chief diplomat and political agent (Chesterman); and manager of change (Biermann and Siebenhüner).

**Contacts with Other Actors**

Various contacts with other actors will be part of the description of the career development mentioned above, in particular with regard to public behaviour and deeds, as well as contacts within and between bureaucracies. Here these contacts are mentioned separately because of the professional and social connections a SG of an IO has with other SGs, with heads of states or governments and with other actors, such as the representatives of NGOs and interest groups, parliamentarians as well as the press. ‘Other actors’ may be crucial for understanding the SG’s support, influence or achievements.

Paying explicit attention to the contacts with other actors is relevant because of the prosopographic dimension of entries in a biographical dictionary. This element of contacts will help to discern the networks of SGs with all other actors (governments, other IOs, non-governmental actors) and to understand the individual lives of SGs as part of a group of people with similar positions (both SGs and similar executive heads with different titles).

Collective historic events and generational memories may be relevant here as well, because people of the same age may share similar experiences and world views, which may help to understand certain types of policy making or specific similarities and dissimilarities.

**Assessment**

Entries in a biographical dictionary also comprise a general assessment of the subject’s significance. In the words of the *Oxford Dictionary* the main question with regard to SGs of IOs is: *what kind of mark did the SG leave on his or her organization and international relations for any reason, whether good, bad or unusual?*
The biographer has to deal with the SG’s long-term reputation, his or her posthumous reputation or assessments found in literature. It is up to the biographer to assess the life and career of the SG described. Leadership and authority seem two major aspects for understanding and assessing the career of an IO’s SG.

While an assessment appears at the end of the entry, the occupational descriptor is given in the first section, immediately after the full name of the SG. It is intended to help the reader to identify the person quickly and in a general context. Whether such a descriptor should be specific and evaluative rather than generic and factual is a matter of debate. One general rule may be that the number of elements to typify a SG should be restricted, for instance to two characteristics.

**Part III: LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY OF SGs OF IGOs**

What do we know about what SGs of IOs can do? In this section I will discuss some international relations literature that will help to understand what a SG may and can do, as both executive head of an international bureaucracy and international political actor on behalf of his or her organization. This literature can help to describe the careers of specific SGs, because it sheds light on their position within IOs and international relations.

I opted for a chronological order of authors, interested in the interrelated complex of influence, power and authority of SGs as leaders of bureaucracies and as actors in world or regional politics. The inventory starts with Inis Claude (1956), who focuses on restrictions of international secretariats but does allow political leadership. It continues with Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson (1973), who in their analytical model discern a variety of actors and patterns of influence within an IO, with Oran Young (1991), who discerns three forms of institutional leadership in institutional bargaining, with Kent Kille (2006, 2007), who examines leadership styles of UN SGs and moral authority, and with Simon Chesterman (2007), who analyses political roles of UN SGs. The inventory ends with Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner (2007), who analyse the influence of international bureaucracies, that is, the international secretariats.

This inventory of main aspects (personal characteristics, bureaucracy and leadership/entrepreneurship, as well as influence, power and political authority – as far as these can be discerned) shows that personal characteristics, bureaucracy and leadership are more or less elaborated elements of all or most of the approaches. The element of leadership, or entrepreneurship, seems to be the most obvious concept related to the position of SGs of IOs. Of the interrelated concepts of influence (shortly defined as bringing about effects), power (as the capacity to exert influence) and political authority (as the added element of standing that makes it easier to accept the influence of an actor, in this case a SG) the concept of influence is elaborated far stronger than the concepts of power and political authority.

Table 1 summarizes the core information with regard to these aspects. I want to use this inventory to include some practical references in the draft instructions for authors contributing to the IO BIO project. These references should help authors, who in their description and assessments of a particular SG want to deal with terms such as leadership, influence, power and political authority. The paper is a first effort to get hold of these ideas. Further elaboration is needed.

*The Problem(s) of the International Secretariat*

In his book *Swords into Plowshares* (1956, 1966) Inis Claude discusses international organization as a historical process, in which the introduction of the secretariat is regarded as an innovation that transformed a series of multilateral conferences – part of the
multilateralization and regularization of diplomacy in the 19th century – into an organization. While various actors may control an international organization, the staff headed by a secretary or secretary-general is the organization and is the international component, according to Claude (1966:174-75). Focusing on the still young United Nations (UN) as the outcome of previous IO experience he discerned three major problems presented by the need for an adequate secretariat: efficient administration, allegiance and political initiative, with the SG as the person who needs to deal with these three interrelated problems in a state-dominated environment.

The bigness of the organization, the quantitative burden and qualitative variety of functions as well as the budgetary resources needed for the workloads assigned to an IO are among the problems of basic bureaucratic efficiency. A main problem with both short-term and long-term dimensions for a SG is the ‘battle over the distribution of secretariat posts’. The tradition of a general European orientation was reflected in the composition of the staff of the League of Nations and other older IOs, while after 1945 the UN showed an excessive Americanization of the staff, notwithstanding the awareness of the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. The principle of equitable geographical distribution of recruits then had to be reconciled with standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Pressure of member states for the maximization of their ‘quotas’ and protests of small states against the tendency of the great powers to assert a vested interest in the most important posts resulted in the ‘rule of thumb’ that jobs should be allocated in approximately the same ratio as budgetary contributions and in compromises of the claims of small and great powers (Claude Jr. 1966:180). Furthermore, the distribution of secretariat posts has been a matter of political disagreement, in particular between East and West and between North and South.

The problem of allegiance relating to an international secretariat refers to the concepts of ‘international loyalty’ and ‘independence of national governments’ on one side and ‘national loyalty’ and ‘respect’ for the security or economic requirements of national governments on the other. Although there is clear tendency towards the idea of an ‘international secretariat’, supported by practical measures to ensure that members of the staff act independently of their governments and responsibly to the organization, national (also regional or continental) loyalty has posed difficulties.

The third problem discussed by Claude is the problem of political initiative and the ideal of political leadership by a SG in which the SG also is an ‘international statesman’ (a for various reasons problematic term), rather than being an ‘anonymous, unobtrusive, administrative technician’. Here Claude (1966:189) refers to significant limitations to the office, such as the absence of a coercive capacity and the question of the amount of ‘international statesmanship’ that is permitted by the realities of world politics.

Notwithstanding Claude’s focus on the limitations of the office, both as a manager (in particular the first two problems) and as a political actor (the third problem), he also discusses the actual initiatives that specific SGs have taken as managers and politicians. He does so by comparing, for instance, Albert Thomas as the dynamic International Labour Organization (ILO) politician with Sir Eric Drummond as the sober civil servant of the League, also referred to as ‘leader versus clerk’. In his comparison of UN SGs Dag Hammarskjöld and Trygve Lie Claude argues that Hammarskjöld’s style of operation in combination with prevailing political circumstances allowed him to use the UN office as a political institution in a stronger way than his predecessor Lie.

The conclusion of Claude’s realist approach of serious limitations to the office of SG is that these do not rule out initiatives of SGs in managing the international secretariat or in showing political initiative and leadership, but that such ‘international statesmanship’ is exceptional.
Exercising Influence within an International Organization

In their study *The Anatomy of Influence, Decision Making in International Organization* (1973) Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson developed a framework of analysis, which allows a detailed picture of a variety of actors and patterns of influence within an IO. IOs are seen as political systems, comprising two subsystems, the first one consisting of states represented by governments and the second one of all participants in a particular decision-making process, i.e. apart from government representatives also members and segments of the international bureaucracy, representatives of other IGOs (having an observer status) and of NGOs (having a consultative status), individuals serving in their own capacities, such as experts, and even employees of the mass media (reporting about what is taking place) (Cox and Jacobson 1973:12). All categories of actors have influence on the outcome during a political process in which initiating, vetoing, brokering and control are important activities in relation to a particular issue. Initiators are the ones who take the initiative (not the formal ones, but the real initiators). Vetoers have the power to block initiatives as a result of their strategic location in the line of communication or their control of extensive political resources. Controllers are actors whose known or surmised views may have to be taken into account because of their control of resources, their formal authority or for some other reason. Brokers serve as go-betweens among the participants and as consensus builders (Cox and Jacobson 1973:12). This political process within the organization is structured by persistent groupings of actors, configurations of influence within organizations and elites made up of influential participants. The subsystem of all participants has two ideal type models. In the ‘pluralistic-bargaining’ model many actors fight for the microphone, while the ‘monarchic’ model is administered by the SG or his or her confidants.

The capacity of actors to exercise influence (their power), according to Cox and Jacobson (1973:19), is derived both from their position in office and from their personal characteristics. They believe that in general the individual attributes of SGs are more important than their position in office. Yet this position in office should not be underestimated. Although the resources available to SGs are limited, they have a few assets available, apart from some control of appointments (hence Cox and Jacobson see this in a more positive way than Claude did) and some weight with regard to the allocation of some resources, for instance, for technical cooperation projects and fellowships. A first asset available is the ability of SGs to use the international bureaucracy, or elements of it, in ways that they choose. SGs may initiate research to document arguments or to explore alternatives and they may maintain contacts or negotiate with states. Other assets are their strategic location in the communication networks of their IOs and the fact that their position affords them platforms from which they can make their views known. SGs can use these platforms to speak to larger and more limited groups, knowing that their position as executive head gives them a legitimate and sure means of stating views. They have the right to speak and can be virtually certain that the audience they choose will listen. The key task for SGs here is to mobilize a consensus in support of organizational goals. The requirements for success with regard to a SG’s qualities are an ‘effective relationship between the personality and particular talents of the incumbent individual, the characteristics of the organization, and the opportunities presented by its world environment’ (Cox and Jacobson 1973:398). Among the minimum requirements for success are maintaining effective working relations with at least some of the key member states that control the resources for the organization’s functioning, maintaining effective working relations with the voting majority in the organization’s conference machinery and ensuring that segments of the international bureaucracy do not work against the SG’s policies. Seen from the perspective of members and segments of the international bureaucracy, one should understand that these are important because they often exercise influence in the name of the SG. They do this in matters that receive little personal
attention from the SG, in matters that a SG cannot effectively control or because sometimes segments of a bureaucracy act quite independently. Individuals and segments may gain influence because of the importance of their work (such as legal interpretations or the provision of reports), because of the fact that they are becoming important aids to the SG or because they exercise influence independently of the SG, for instance, because they have their own supporters among the conference machinery of the organization (Cox and Jacobson 1973:399).

Cox and Jacobson discerned two subsystems and concluded that IOs are distinguished from each other according to whether the representative subsystem (only governments) or the participant subsystem (all actors as explained above) is dominant in decision making. Representative subsystem dominance means that an IO is governed in the main by the most powerful states. In this ‘oligarchic model’ the authority of the SG and of the international bureaucracy is defined ‘with precision, and wherever possible it is constricted’ (Cox and Jacobson 1973:430). In their 1973 research project this was the case in the International Telecommunications Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Monetary Fund. They also found dominance of the participant subsystem. The cases of UNCTAD and UNESCO showed a pluralistic-bargaining model, in which the pattern of influence is extremely diffuse and fluid. Because different coalitions pursue different goals and negotiate understandings on the allocation of resources, it is very difficult for a SG to manipulate the organization, as the room for manoeuvre is small. Participant subsystem dominance with a monarchical model, in which the important decisions are made by the SG and the influential individuals forming the establishment, was found in the cases of the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization. Here the SG and the establishment together manipulate the participant subsystem. ‘These individuals are in theory accountable to states; but in practice they enjoy much latitude and autonomy in what they do within the organization. Members of the establishment are more accountable to each other than to states.’ This situation may arise, according to Cox and Jacobson (1973:430), because the most powerful states tolerate this situation so long as the activities do not seriously affect them.

The conclusion about this framework of analysis by Cox and Jacobson is that it elaborates the SG’s position in office and enables an analysis of the position of a SG within the political system of an IO. The SG’s room for manoeuvre varies from ‘absent’ (in the oligarchic model) to ‘some’ or ‘little’ (in the pluralistic-bargaining model) and to ‘recognizable’ (in the monarchical model). This actual room for manoeuvre brings us to the concept of leadership in international relations and regimes.

Three Forms of Leadership in Institutional Bargaining
In his article about political leadership and regime formation Oran Young (1991) has tried to bring the individual back into the study of international relations, without diminishing the role of collective entities. He defined leadership as the actions of individuals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining (Young 1991:285). With regard to the roles that leaders play in the formation of international institutions, he developed a tripartite typology of political leadership (structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual), which may be helpful in understanding the leadership of an IO in institutional bargaining. The structural leader, according to Young, is an individual who acts in the name of a party engaged in institutional bargaining. Ordinarily this is a state. This individual leads by devising effective ways to bring that party’s structural power, based on the possession of material resources, to bear in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific interactions. This kind of leadership is a matter of timing and the ability to deploy threats or promises in ways
that are both carefully crafted and credible. The conversion of structural power into bargaining leverage is a matter of forming effective coalitions and taking appropriate measures to prevent the emergence of blocking or counter coalitions. The structural leader tries to bring pressure on others to assent to the terms of the proposed constitutional contracts.

The entrepreneurial leader is an individual who may or may not act in the name of a major stakeholder in institutional bargaining, but who leads by making use of its negotiating skill to influence ‘the manner in which issues are presented in the context of institutional bargaining and to fashion mutually acceptable deals bringing willing parties together on the terms of constitutional contracts yielding benefits for all’ (Young 1991:288). This kind of leader is important by virtue of its dominant position in some social setting. Individuals becoming entrepreneurial leaders can be acting in the name of states, IGOs or NGOs, which means that their efforts will be circumscribed by the interests of the organizations they represent and will be subject to removal if they neglect these interests. For the most part they function as agenda setters shaping the form in which issues are presented for consideration at the international level, as popularisers drawing attention to the importance of the issues at stake, as inventors devising innovative policy options to overcome bargaining impediments and as brokers making deals and lining up support for salient options (Young 1991:294). They are not mediators, because they are not third parties. Rather they are the ones who frame the issues at stake, devise mutually acceptable formulas and broker the interests of key players in building support for these formulas.

The intellectual leader is an individual who produces intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining and in so doing plays an important role in determining the success or failure of efforts to reach agreement on the terms of constitutional contracts in international society. This kind of leadership is a deliberative or reflective process which operates on a different time scale than the other two types. While the entrepreneurial leader is an agenda setter and populariser, the intellectual leader is a ‘thinker who seeks to articulate the systems of thought that provide the substratum underlying the proximate activities involved in institutional bargaining’ (Young 1991:300). Accordingly, entrepreneurial leaders often become consumers of ideas generated by intellectual leaders.

Although Young does not focus directly on leadership of SGs of IOs, his typology may be helpful to discern whether and when in institutional bargaining SGs exhibit structural, entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership. Styles of leadership are also discussed by Kille, who furthermore discusses the role of values that a SG has and that may influence his or her behaviour.

Three Leadership Styles and Moral Leadership
In his book From Manager to Visionary, The Secretary-General of the United Nations (2006) Kille discusses various leadership styles found in the literature on UN secretaries-general (hence a particular group of SGs). A leadership style according to Kille is made up of a set of interrelated personal characteristics. Among these personal characteristics are features that may characterize the behaviour of SGs of IOs, as opposed to national politicians, such as responsivity (which is a combination of self-confidence and conceptual complexity), ‘believe that can influence’, ‘need for recognition’, ‘need for relationships’, ‘supra-nationalism’ and ‘problem-solving emphasis’. The book examines how the leadership style of a SG impacts on how SGs attempt to use their position in an influential manner, set out as available ‘avenues of influence’. Administratieve duties, for instance, are seen as an avenue of influence with regard to bureaucracy, given the important capabilities that may be derived from administrative duties. The central and strategic position of a SG within the organization provides for an important potential avenue of influence. Three main categories of avenues of
influence through IGOs are: 1) agenda setting’, further divided into administrative duties, strategic political positions and public pronouncements; 2) peaceful settlement of disputes, both mandated and independently initiated; and 3) peace-keeping operations intervention. Three styles of leadership are discerned: visionary, managerial and strategic. A *visionary style* refers to a SG who serves as a strong independent leader for the UN. Dag Hammerskjöld, for instance, can be regarded as a SG with such a visionary style. The same goes for Boutros Boutros-Ghali with his pro-active vision in a period of transformation and new forms of international conflicts. The *managerial style*, as opposed to the visionary one, rather refers to a manager operating as the humble servant of the states. Here Kurt Waldheim with his reserved bureaucratic style is the example. The *strategic style* then bridges the perceived strengths of the two previous styles, with Kofi Annan as the example, given his less visionary style than that of his predecessor and his strategic use of bureaucratic changes. SGs thus are viewed as individuals who bring a personal style to bear on their activities, be it within several contextual constraints. Kille does not consider personal traits and contextual variables as competing factors, but argues that the interaction of the two should provide the greatest explanatory value. In this sense the three leadership styles are related to how SGs view constraints: as something to be challenged (Hammarskjöld, Boutros-Ghali), respected (Waldheim) or accommodated (Annan).

Personal integrity and moral values may add to the influential use of the office, with ethics as a personal power resource. The idea of *moral leadership* is discussed in the book *The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority*, edited by Kille (2007). While the powers of the SG listed in the UN Charter are relatively restricted, it is argued that the moral stature of office holders can increase the potential capabilities of the office well beyond basic Charter powers. With the UN seen as a ‘moral power’ working on behalf of the peoples of the world, executive heads of the UN and UN agencies – and this probably is true for other IOs as well – represent the international community in a manner that transcends the interests of individual member states. The role of moral leadership by the SG is related to normative terms which in part are mentioned in the Charter, such as integrity, independence and impartiality. Kille, who is also interested in the importance of religious values of SGs, employs the concept of an ‘ethical framework’ to capture the moral and religious dimensions of leadership. Such a framework is the combination of personal values that establish ‘the beliefs, forms of reasoning, and interpretations of the world that guide an individual when making judgements about proper behavior in specific contexts’ (Kille 2007:20). Religious values are part of this framework.

Kille brought various interactions together in a figure called ‘Ethical Framework Development and Impact’. It comprises ‘Environmental Factors’ (such as religious tradition, education, culture and family upbringing) and ‘Experiential Factors’ (such as personal history and experience), which together result in an ‘Ethical Framework’ with an ‘inner code’ of religious and moral values. This individual ethical framework operates in and interacts with the ‘External Context’ with UN Charter principles, an international political ‘external code’ and role expectations of the SG. This interaction between the individual’s ethical framework and the external context may have lasting effects on a SG’s ethical framework and may have important implications for an officeholder’s policy choices. Decisions of the SG resulting from this interaction may have a feedback influence on the experiential factors and a secretary-general’s ethical framework may influence changes in the international political ‘external code’.

With regard to moral and religious values and to moral reasoning it must be taken into account that SGs operate in secular organizations composed of countries with a wide array of cultural and religious mores. This implies an impediment for biographers, because SGs want to be viewed as ‘impartial on this score’ and therefore are hesitant to express their views in
public (Kille 2007:347). With regard to the impact of moral and religious values from the external context, Kille concluded that it is not the influence of external factors alone that counts, but rather the interaction of an ethical framework with the external context. SGs use their inner code as a ‘kind of spiritual filter’ that helps to guide their interpretation of the context in which they are operating (Kille 2007:348). This research project on moral leadership shows that morality and religion do play a part in shaping the SGs and how they handle the office. The analytical framework developed by Kille provides a helpful roadmap for mapping the individual ethical frameworks and for examining the moral leadership and authority of SGs, although it remains difficult to establish a direct link between a SG’s personal values and his or her conduct in office.

Political Roles of Secretaries-General

Various political roles of SGs are discussed in the book Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, edited by Simon Chesterman (2007). Although the book, like Kille, strongly focuses on the UN, it allows a more general view on political roles of SGs than solely the UN. The administrative role (after the phrase in Article 97 of the UN Charter that the SG is ‘the chief administrative officer of the Organization’) is not discussed in this book. The office soon changed from a predominantly administrative role to one that embraces a wide range of functions. In more recent times, according to Chesterman (2007:xi), almost everyone views the SG as the organization’s chief diplomat and political agent. Hence, the role of the SG ‘has come to be seen as primarily political’. Four political roles will be discussed.

The first political role of the SG to be mentioned, despite the limitations of the office as discussed by Claude, is the use of a ‘group of friends’. Building on the diplomatic role of a UN SG in the traditional sense the chapter in the Chesterman book by Teresa Whitfield shows that in the security field the SG may be able to mobilize governments through encouraging interested states to form supportive informal coalitions (or to put it differently: not all principals agree or follow the same strategy). As in other instances this device is the product of a liberal interpretation of the Charter, often initiated by the SG or Secretariat. Issue-specific small coalitions of states are known as ‘groups of friends’. These build on the ‘good offices’ function of a SG (existing, though not mentioned in the Charter) which the SG can undertake with or without a specific mandate on the basis of the moral authority which a SG derives from the Charter and with the ‘somewhat ephemeral legitimacy’ of the UN behind the SG (Whitfield in Chesterman 2007:87). The SG relies on senior officials designated to act as his or her envoys or representatives and on states motivated to provide backing and encouragement to his or her efforts. Although the creation of a group of friends is not without its problems, it provides the SG with an auxiliary device which may enhance his or her ability to influence the resolutions of conflicts. It can be imagined that in IOs other than the UN similar devices built on the diplomatic role are constructed in highly-sensitive issue areas.

The second political role is the public role in which the SG is expected to act as spokesman of universal values and for the interests of humanity as a whole. In this use of the ‘bully pulpit’ of the office the SG is not impartial but upholding the purposes and principles of the organization, thereby, according to Kofi Annan, ‘at least implicitly supporting those who do likewise, and condemning those who do not’ (in Chesterman 2007:xi). This device, which requires a measure of caution in the exercise of his or her independence, is related to the significance of what a SG says in a security situation which lacks a coherent normative framework. Where the SG or the UN as a whole cannot perform their functions effectively, a SG may provide intellectual leadership and steer debate, according to Quang Trinh (in Chesterman 2007:119). While the representative organs represent diffuse, often strategically and politically opposed perspectives, often struggling to present any form of consensus, the
SG is closer to the on-the-ground realities of any given situation. In steering the course of the debate, the SG’s advantages are that ‘he or she can express a singular view, and that the view is informed by the practical responsibilities of managing military and humanitarian missions at an operational level’ (in Chesterman 2007:111). While a SG in matters of security can speak in favour of universal human rights and in defence of the victims of aggression or abuse, he or she can also speak in other issue areas, for instance, by championing the cause of development and the right of the poor to achieve better standards of life in larger freedom (Annan in Chesterman 2007:xii).

The third political role of a SG is the norm entrepreneur. Ian Johnstone draws on social constructivist theory and transnational legal process. In the constructivist tradition he is interested in how norms affect actors and how states and other agents, among them IOs, create norms and embed them in the fabric of international life. He identifies the three phases of norm creation, institutionalization and interpretation in a diffuse process and argues that the SG is one participant in a complex discursive and deliberative process. The SG is not a normative free agent, but embedded in and constrained by the political and institutional context in which he or she operates. The SG participates in normative processes that he or she does not control. However, this embeddedness is also a source of influence. ‘If the United Nations is an “organizational platform”, then the Secretary-General has a privileged place on that platform. He is consulted by governments and his words carry weight, especially on matters that fall within his operational responsibilities, like the protection of civilians’ (Johnston in Chesterman 2007:137). In addition the SG also speaks to representatives of civil society and business leaders. Johnstone’s description resembles what Cox and Jacobson referred to as the strategic location of SGs in the communication networks of their IOs, which afford them platforms from which they can make their views known. Johnstone distinguishes between legal and other sorts of norms (social, moral and the like), because legal norms provide a more solid foundation for a SG to pass judgement on behaviour than other types of norms. ‘Legal norms are easier to identify than social norms or moral norms, especially when in treaty form. Moreover, legal norms by definition embody shared understandings because their origins can be traced to state consent. And their power depends in part on how well they cohere with the broader environment in which they are situated’ (in Chesterman 2007:138).

Johnstone suggests that a SG as a norm entrepreneur succeeds best when he or she joins emerging normative trends, usually first promoted by a group of states and powerful non-state actors, rather than trying to generate ‘new norms out of whole cloth’ (in Chesterman 2007:138). The SG should use the UN ‘to crystallize emerging understandings among states and non-state actors, rather than striking out in entirely new normative directions’ (in Chesterman 2007:124).

The idea of the SG as an entrepreneur is also found in the fourth political role of policy entrepreneurship. This role has become more important and more complicated as the state-based order has given way to a multiplicity of new actors, such as transnational corporations, NGOs, other civil society actors and networks of experts. David Kennedy assesses the end of a universalism with a central UN position. In a multilateral order in which, given the many other configurations, the UN will rarely be the central player or forum, the SG should refrain from speaking for the ‘international community’, but rather speak for the ‘Secretariat of a particular institution, with particular powers and limitations’ (in Chesterman 2007:170). In this new order there is a need for more support for diverse experiments with regulation appropriate to wildly divergent economic, social, and institutional situations. The SG, according to Kennedy, could be the ‘catalyst’ for moving the UN ‘from the era of the welfare state to the age of global regulation and transnational law, by sharpening awareness of local political choices and designing variegated arrangements to address global problems through mobilization of diversity rather than homogenization’. The SG therefore must be a skilled
diplomat and manager, but also ‘an entrepreneur for new ideas and diverse policy solutions to complex global problems’. This forward-looking vision, based on actual trends, goes beyond the present setup of the UN. To become the new catalyst entrepreneur, the SG must be ‘intellectually nimble, comfortable with heterogeneity, distanced from the universalizing habits of the current UN establishment, and more interested in the problems of complex regulation, than the comforting ethical self-confidence of universal norms (in Chesterman 2007:177).

Two of the four political roles discussed in the book edited by Chesterman build on the traditional diplomatic role of the UN SG. They allow the SG to develop auxiliary devices which enhance his or her ability to influence the resolution of conflicts (groups of friends) or help to steer the course of the debate (bully pulpit). The third political role of norm entrepreneur, according to Annan, falls somewhere between these first two. ‘It is the role of making proposals to member states in their collective persona as deliberative and legislative organs of the United Nations – proposals for action to deal with issues that affect the global interest, and proposals to adapt the United Nations itself to changing times, making it more efficient and effective’ (in Chesterman 2007:xi). The fourth political role of policy entrepreneur endeavours to question the present UN position by describing a situation in which the UN no longer is the central player as assumed in the previous roles. The SG then can play a role as a catalyst in a process of transformation.

The Influence of International Bureaucracies in World Politics

The influence of international bureaucracies is analysed in the book *Managers of Global Change, The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies*, edited by Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner (2009), who regard the state of knowledge on the influence and dynamics of international bureaucracies as unsatisfactory. They distinguish between an IO and an international bureaucracy, because they do not regard the entire organization as a bureaucracy, but only the secretariat. In the case of the International Labour Organization they see the International Labour Office as the international bureaucracy. They define an international organization as an institutional arrangement that combines a normative framework, member states and a bureaucracy (Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009:39), whereas an international bureaucracy is an ‘hierarchically organized group of civil servants who are expected to act following the mandate of the organization and the decisions of the assembly of member states’ (Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009:7). These civil servants have ‘a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area’ (Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009:37).

The approach by Biermann and Siebenhüner differs from international relations theory, as they keep apart the collectivities of member states as IOs and international bureaucracies as actors. It also differs from international law, which has a too narrow concept of IOs given its focus on international legal personality, and from management studies, which define organizations too broadly and neglect international bureaucracies. However, they refer positively to new public management, which builds on the understanding of (international) public authorities as ‘service units’ that can improve their efficiency and their effectiveness through the implementation of modern management techniques. The approach by Biermann and Siebenhüner has similarities with principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism (as influenced by constructivism), because both theories provide an explanation for autonomous influence of IOs and their bureaucracies. However, they also disagree with these theories. Principal-agent theory (cf. Hawkins, Lake et al. 2006) fails to explain the variation in the behaviour of international bureaucracies in cases of comparable principal-agent relations, as Biermann and Siebenhüner have found in the cases discussed in their book, and it neglects the internal dynamics within bureaucracies and the formation of autonomous interests of
international bureaucracies (organization-wide sets of preferences) (Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009:27). Biermann and Siebenhüner diverge from sociological institutionalism in various respects. They employ a narrower concept of international bureaucracy than Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, who equate IOs and international bureaucracies and use both terms interchangeably, because for them IOs are bureaucracies (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 2004:ch. 2). Furthermore Biermann and Siebenhüner are less concerned with ‘pathologies’ of bureaucracies than with their potential to contribute to problem solving. While both principal-agent theory and sociological institutionalism assume a self-centred interest of bureaucracies, which leads to pathological bureaucratic behaviour, Biermann and Siebenhüner reject the assumption that international bureaucracies strive predominantly to maximize their mandate, funding, staff and power. Instead, they find that international bureaucracies are more interested in resolving political problems than in increasing their power as such. Biermann and Siebenhüner rely less on the Weberian norms of rational-legal actors than Barnett and Finnemore do, as many international bureaucracies function according to similar rational-legal bureaucratic patterns. Drawing on organizational theory and its empirical notions of organizational cultures and internal procedures Biermann and Siebenhüner analyse international bureaucracies as social processes and collective entities constituted by their distinct organizational cultures, structures and behaviours. They argue that much variation in the autonomous influence of international bureaucracies can be traced back to differences in these organizational cultures, that is ‘the “software” within bureaucracies that are otherwise similar in their legal mandate, resources, and general function’ (Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009:8).

With regard to influence of international bureaucracies in world politics Biermann and Siebenhüner develop a definition of ‘strong leadership’ of a SG, although they do not use the term SG. They discern between cognitive, normative and executive influence, with bureaucracies playing specific roles. With regard to cognitive influence international bureaucracies act as ‘knowledge brokers’ who influence the behaviour of political actors by changing their knowledge and belief systems. With regard to normative influence international bureaucracies act as ‘negation facilitators’ through the creation, support and shaping of norm-building processes for issue-specific international cooperation. And with regard to executive influence international bureaucracies act as ‘capacity builders’ through the direct assistance to countries in their effort to implement international agreements.

Going into the internal factors of bureaucracies (the people and procedures) the role of leadership of an international bureaucracy is discussed through four aspects: ‘organizational expertise’ (the ability of the staff to generate and process knowledge), ‘organizational structure’ (the formalized internal rules and procedures that assign tasks and positions in the hierarchy), ‘organizational culture’ (the set of commonly shared basic assumptions in the organization that result from previous organizational learning processes and include the professional cultures and backgrounds of the staff members) and ‘organizational leadership’. Four styles of organizational leadership are discerned: ‘hierarchical’ (where executives decide by themselves without involving their employees), ‘consultative’ (in which executives ask for the opinion of their employees and decide by themselves), ‘cooperative’ (in which directors together with employees search for new solutions but directors decide by themselves) and ‘participatory’ (in which employees are granted far-reaching participation in decision making). Leaders of bureaucracies can be popular, charismatic and effective in this framework (or the opposite) and may exhibit structural, entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership, as defined by Young. Other relevant aspects for leadership are the commitment and work ethics of the rank and file and the leader’s flexibility and openness to change. Biermann and Siebenhüner define ‘strong leadership’ of an international bureaucracy as the behaviour of a leader that follows a style of leadership that is charismatic, visionary and
popular as well as flexible and reflexive. Strong leadership thus includes ‘the ability to rapidly
gain acceptance and acknowledgment by employees and externals, to develop, communicate,
and implement visions, and to learn and change routines’ (Biermann and Siebenhuener
2009:58).

Biermann and Siebenhüner’s research project with nine case studies produced a large
part of variation in the degree and type of influence of international bureaucracies that can be
explained by internal factors of bureaucracies (the people and procedures), because the
leadership and staff shape a bureaucracy’s policies, programs and activities and eventually its
autonomous influence. With regard to ‘organizational expertise’ they found out that the
function of knowledge broker requires a knowledge base within the bureaucracy. Additional
conditions for cognitive influence are the neutrality of the expertise and a broad representation
of stakeholders during the process of integrating the pieces of information and opinion. With
regard to ‘organizational structure’ it was found that flexible internal hierarchies and internal
structures for learning and review facilitate the autonomous influence of an international
bureaucracy. With regard to ‘organizational culture’ (often neglected in international relations
theory) it was found that this culture plays a powerful role in determining the type and also to
some extent the degree of autonomous influence and that diversity or homogeneity of staff
and professional careers partially shaped the particular direction of the cognitive and
normative influence of the respective bureaucracies. With regard to ‘organizational
leadership’ it was found that the particular type of leadership of a bureaucracy leaves it marks
on its autonomous influence. ‘Even though governments as principals eventually select the
chief civil servant at the helm of most bureaucracies studied, this person can evolve – if
charisma, vision, and leadership skills allow for it – into a powerful autonomous factor in the
governance of the issue area’ (Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009:343-44). This evolution is all
the more likely, because the leader at the helm of a bureaucracy shapes the other internal
factors (organizational expertise, procedures and cultures). Finally, Biermann and
Siebenhüner found that a form of ’strong leadership’ matters and correlates with stronger
autonomous external influence of the bureaucracy.

Focusing on the leadership of a SG of an IO the conclusion with regard to the
Biermann and Siebenhuener approach is that their distinction between IOs and their
secretariats (international bureaucracies) and their use of organization theory allow an
understanding of international bureaucracies and their influence in world politics, with a
special spotlight on (strong or weak) leadership of the bureaucracy’s leader.

**Part IV: CONCLUSION ABOUT POLITICAL AUTHORITY**

Although this may be caused by my selection of the literature and by my reading, authority of
SGs of IOs is hardly mentioned in the works discussed in the previous part. With regard to
authority in the field of IOs Barnett and Finnemore discuss authority of IOs, rather than
authority of SGs. They define authority as the ability of one actor to use institutional and
discursive resources to induce deference from others. Although international relations theory
regards sovereignty of states as the only basis of authority, Barnett and Finnemore claim that
in international life authority is also conferred in differing degrees and kinds on actors other
than states, with IOs prominent among these other actors (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:5).
IOs, according to them, enjoy various types of authority, such as rational-legal authority and
authority drawn from moral standing, expertise and delegated tasks. All four types contribute
in different ways to making IOs authoritative, either by putting them ‘in authority’ or by
making them ‘an authority’, or some mix of the two. The person ‘in authority’ is the person
occupying the role or position society recognizes as legitimate to exercise power, for instance
the SG of an IO. When this person ceases to be SG, that authority will be transferred to someone else. A person who is ‘an authority’ derives standing from expertise demonstrated by credentials, education, training and experience. This kind of authority inheres in the individual who has it, regardless of changes in social position or institutional role. IOs can be made authoritative as well, according to Barnett and Finnemore (2004:25). Rational-legal authority and delegation are central to putting an IO in authority, while expertise tends to be central for making the IO an authority. Moral claims can contribute to both kinds of authoritative status.

The literature on SGs discussed above, rather than referring to authority itself, refers to the nature of the grounds of what authority is: the ability to induce deference or the securing of compliance or assent concerning a decision or course of action. The grounds of such compliance or consent are ‘power’ (ultimately the contingent operation of coercive sanctions; obviously the aspect missing with SGs, as stressed by Claude, with others arguing that SGs have or may gain some power), ‘influence’ (some persuasive reason or attitude, as central in the Cox and Jacobson approach) and ‘leadership’ (which relies on some form of accepted superiority). In the context of IOs as organizations the idea of ‘leadership’ as a pattern of behaviour which has as its purpose the organization and direction of the efforts of a group towards desired ends (Roberts and Edwards 1991:72) is most often used, in particular by Young, Kille and Biermann and Siebenhüner. The idea of ‘political initiative’ and the term ‘entrepreneur’ are closely connected to it, if not similar. Of the classification of types of authority by Max Weber rational-legal authority is mentioned, with authority resting on clear legal norms and referring to legitimacy, but the charismatic type of authority, with authority resting on the personal qualities of the individual, is hardly mentioned (although Biermann and Siebenhüner do so explicitly). Table 1 summarizes the various aspects of leadership and authority as discussed above. The characteristics of political authority of SGs of IOs found are:

- as mobilizer of consensus in support of organizational goals (Cox and Jacobson)
- as framer, deviser of mutually acceptable formulas and broker (Young)
- as moral authority adding to leadership- and influence-based authority (Kille)
- as the IO’s chief diplomat and political agent (Chesterman)
- as manager of change contributing to problem solving (Biermann and Siebenhüner).

The analyses and ideas of leadership and political authority can be used for the description and assessment of the lives and careers of SGs of IOs in the IO BIO project (see draft instructions in Annex 1 for a first attempt).
Table 1: Leadership and Authority of SGs of IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors/ Editors</th>
<th>Personal Characteristics</th>
<th>Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Leadership/ Entrepreneurship</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Political Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claude</td>
<td>Political initiative may occur</td>
<td>Efficient administration and allegiance are problematic</td>
<td>Political leader versus clerk</td>
<td>Using the office</td>
<td>Absence of coercive capacity</td>
<td>Political statesmanship is exceptional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox and Jacobson</td>
<td>Personal characteristics are important in combination with position in office</td>
<td>Some control of appointments and allocation of resources; Using bureaucracy for tasks and as platform; Effective working relations outside &amp; inside the IO; Confidants</td>
<td>Creating and using room for manoeuvre</td>
<td>Influence in particular in monarchic model, less in pluralistic-bargaining model and hardly none in oligarchic model</td>
<td>Capacity to exercise influence derived from personal characteristics and position in office</td>
<td>As mobilizer of consensus in support of organizational goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Role of the individual in context IO</td>
<td>Roles as agenda setter, populist, innovator and broker</td>
<td>(Structural,) entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership</td>
<td>As stakeholder in institutional bargaining</td>
<td>Little material resources for structural leadership</td>
<td>As framer, devisor of mutually acceptable formulas and broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kille</td>
<td>Interrelated personal characteristics in interaction with contextual constraints</td>
<td>Administrative duties as an avenue of influence</td>
<td>Managerial, strategic or visionary style of leadership</td>
<td>3 avenues of influence: agenda setting, peaceful settlement of disputes, PKO intervention</td>
<td>Moral authority, adding to leadership- and influence-based authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chesterman</td>
<td>Willingness to play political role</td>
<td>Liberal interpretation of IO’s constitution, upholding the IO’s purposes and principles, using the organizational platform and being a catalyst</td>
<td>Politically-active diplomat (group of friends, bully pulpit), norm entrepreneur and policy entrepreneur</td>
<td>Looking for supportive informal coalitions; steering the debate; embeddedness in normative processes as source of influence; forward-looking vision</td>
<td>Based on good offices capacity, moral authority of IO and legal norms</td>
<td>As the IO’s chief diplomat and political agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biermann and Siebenhüner</td>
<td>Charisma, vision and open and flexible leadership skills</td>
<td>Organizational leadership, using expertise, structure, culture and leadership styles; Commitment of rank and files</td>
<td>Strong leadership of the bureaucracy, contributing to problem solving</td>
<td>Cognitive influence (as knowledge brokers); normative influence (as negotiation facilitators); executive influence (as capacitybuilders)</td>
<td>Knowledge base</td>
<td>As manager of change contributing to problem solving</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX 1: Draft Instructions for the Three Sections of an IO BIO Entry

FIRST SECTION: Personal Details
Try to find the personal details of this first section as much as possible in official registers of population, births, death and marriages.
1. Complete name at birth (family name, all first names)
2. All name changes throughout life, including additions like Jr. or Sr.
3. Name by which one is generally known
4. Nickname(s)
5. Pseudonym(s), alias(es) or pen name(s)
6. Occupational descriptor, either generic and factual or specific and evaluative; keep the elements to typify the SG described in the entry restricted to two
7. Parents’ names, life dates (years) and occupation(s) (including house work and voluntary activities)
8. Records of siblings and other noteworthy family members
9. Date and place of birth
10. Date and place of baptism or similar religious moment
11. Date and place of marriage
12. Name, life dates and occupations of spouse (including house work and voluntary activities)
13. Number of daughters and sons
14. Date of divorce, plus date(s) and place(s) of further marriages and divorces; mention all marriages, spouses and numbers of children; if appropriate, also mention non-formal relationships
15. Date and place of death; if relevant, mention burial details
16. Awards, recognition and acknowledgments
17. Picture, preferably taken during the time of the SGship; add source and details

SECOND SECTION: Account of Life and Work
Attention should be paid to elements, such as:
1. *Origin:*
   a. personal background (nationality, social position of parents, religion, race, family situation)
   b. education (various forms)
   c. professional experience (in general, in national institutions, internationally),
   d. international recruitment (how did someone become engaged in the work of the IGO(s) or INGOs?) and previous international positions
   e. relevant political and other views

2. *Career development in the IO before becoming SG* (as far as appropriate)
   a. previous positions, participation in relevant bodies and conferences, publications, etc

3. *The SG as politician in international relations:* public behaviour, deeds and ideas
a. attention should be paid to periods and phases of the career as SG, divided by watersheds; not everything shall be mentioned, but mainly those deeds and ideas that contributed to the issues at stake at the time and resulted in, for instance, an international convention, a program or an intervention and thus contribute to international relations; do not avoid paying attention to relevant private affairs and insert a proper anecdote (but not too many)

b. descriptions should include outcome and impact, also paying attention to (near) failures: what has been endeavoured and what has been achieved?

c. the author may apply ideas about leadership, such as the room for manoeuvre that a SG may create and use through personal characteristics in combination with his or her position in office (Cox and Jacobson), Young’s typology of leadership, Kille’s styles of leadership and vision on moral leadership and the political roles a SG may play, as discussed in the Chesterman volume

4. The SG as leader of the IO’s bureaucracy

a. attention should be paid to periods and phases of the career as bureaucrat, divided by watersheds, and the impact of this bureaucratic leadership on the SG’s public behaviour and deeds

b. descriptions should include outcome and impact, also paying attention to (near) failures: what has been endeavoured and what has been achieved?

c. the author may apply ideas about the use of his or her position in office a SG may make (Cox and Jacobson) and about strong (or weak) leadership of the IO’s bureaucracy, as analysed by Biermann and Siebenhüner

5. Contacts with other actors

a. these are other SGs, heads of state and government, representatives of NGOs, interest groups, advocacy groups, parliamentarians, the press etc.

b. in part this will be done in previous sections, but it may be summarized or discussed separately to make explicit the SG’s network as well as relevant similar experiences (collective historic events, generational memories)

6. Assessment: What kind of mark did the SG leave on the IO and international relations, whether good, bad or unusual?

a. the author may deal with the SG’s long-term reputation, his or her posthumous reputation and assessments found in literature, including leadership and political authority; discuss myth making

b. if appropriate, attention should be paid to the complex personality or psychological factors

THIRD SECTION: Archives, Publications, Literature and Websites

1. Archive(s) and location (institution, place); if appropriate internet access

2. Publications by the subject; in a chronological order; in many cases a selection has to be made given the restricted number of words allowed; if a publication is mentioned in the text (title, place, year), it should not be repeated in this list of publications

3. Literature about the subject; in a chronological order; in many cases a selection has to be made given the restricted number of words allowed

4. Relevant website addresses, including latest access dates
References
Chesterman, S., Ed. (2007). Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

1 My paper for the New Orleans Annual ISA Convention (Closing the Theory-Practice GAP: Prosopographical Analysis of Secretaries-General of International Organizations) and a summary of the debate at the Round Table can be found at: www.ru.nl/fm/reinalda, then IO BIO.
2 I would like to thank Kent Kille for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
4 Model Biography as Annex to my New Orleans paper, 16.
5 No decisions have been made on IOs to be included, categories or numbers of words.
6 The creation of the observer position of IGOs is another example of an initiative by the SG in close interrelationship with the General Assembly (cf. Reinalda 2009:344-46).
7 Here the concept of intellectual leadership is used in a weaker sense than defined by Young above.