The IO BIO Project: Biographical Genre and Leadership Database Applied to Executive Heads of International Organizations

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As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal factors. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make (Henry Kissinger, 1975).

Introduction

In celebration of the United Nations’ (UN) 70th anniversary, there are many reflections on the development of the organization, and related institutions, including this annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) with a particular emphasis on the issues of security and justice.\(^1\) As part of the two-segment workshop panel session ‘Guaranteeing Security and Justice: The Role of Individuals in International Organizations’, this paper builds out of the central argument (in the words of the UN Intellectual History Project) that ‘ideas and people matter’. One of the central types of people that ‘matter’ for international organizations (IOs) is the institution’s executive head, most often titled ‘Secretary-General’ (SG) although a number of other labels for the office are also prevalent across organizations. Such leaders are the central focus for the IO BIO Project, a multi-year research endeavour that encompasses the creation of a *Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations* (referred to in short as *IO BIO*) as well as a separate database of executive heads (all information available at the Project website: [www.ru.nl/fm/iobio](http://www.ru.nl/fm/iobio)).

Given the thematic emphasis of the ACUNS meeting on security and justice, this paper focuses analysis on executive heads of IOs engaged with these areas. First, however, to set the context from which this analysis emerges, the paper provides a broader justification for the examination of individuals undertaken in connection to International Relations and International Organization theory along with, due to the historical emphasis of the IO BIO, an exploration of the place of individuals in the history of these fields. This discussion builds to an explanation of biographical dictionaries and the short biography as a genre as well as a consideration of issues when writing and editing entries in IO BIO. To illustrate the IO BIO entries in action, and to return to the theme of the conference, the paper then employs the posted entries to analyze executive heads’ engagement with security and justice. It does so by providing an analysis of internal and external leadership in the group of ‘security’ entries and another analysis of three subgroups (Frontierpersons, Regulars and Reformers) in the ‘justice’ entries. The Project database is then mined for a larger-scale comparison across IO leaders working on security, and the process is used to consider the relative strengths and limitations to exploring SG leadership through such means. The paper concludes by reflecting on the overall findings from the analysis and thinking forward to implications for the next potential stages of the Project.

1. The Role of Individuals in International Relations and International Organization

The degree to which one views room for individuals in International Relations theory depends upon the vision. The older idea of ‘Great Men’ assumes that some male individuals matter by themselves to act as international leaders, such as Napoleon or Adolf Hitler, whereas in other cases of great leaders, such as Winston Churchill, it is posited that he was trained as a leader

\(^1\) For the UN’s own celebration of the 70th anniversary, see [http://www.un.org/un70/](http://www.un.org/un70/), which includes timelines detailing the leadership provided by the eight Secretaries-General at [http://www.un.org/un70/en/timelines/secretaries-general](http://www.un.org/un70/en/timelines/secretaries-general).
and strongly defended democracy. Realist theory, however, has argued that personal factors should be left out of international relations analysis entirely, based on the idea that all people have an egoistic nature (1978). Although Neorealist Kenneth Waltz in *Man, State and War* (1959) developed three levels of analysis (or images), he eventually focused on the international system (war) and domestic context (state) and left the individual (man) out, arguing that man’s nature is a given as the main cause of war and that individuals cannot explain variation in international relations. Interestingly enough, Henry Kissinger, a Realist as well, remarked in an interview in 1975: ‘As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal factors. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make’ (quoted in Byman and Pollack 2001: 108).

Kissinger’s remark indicates how more can be said about the role of individuals in international relations and also international organization, which other scholars have taken up. James Burns (1978), for instance, looked for elements that help explain what leaders do, such as setting up transactional relations with followers (e.g. exchanging votes for jobs) and transforming the needs of the followers (i.e. engaging people), which may also be done in the fields of foreign policy and international politics. Jean Blondel (1987) focused on the direction and size of change that a political leader may have in mind, which resulted in various categories of leaders, such as authoritarian, revolutionary, redefining and transformational leaders. Relevant for International Relations theory is that leadership is related to heads of state or government, but the analysis of political executives and their officials has focused on political institutions of the state, rather than on international institutions (Campbell 1993). A group of scholars, including Pierre Allan, Michael Nicholson, James Rosenau and Susan Strange, set up a workshop in 1992 to discuss individuals in international politics, which resulted in a book that covers issues such as ethics, engagement, identification and allegiance, and engagement in exceptional situations (Girard 1994). This showed some uneasiness about individuals in international relations, while individuals are also viewed as mattering under certain conditions or at particular moments. This is also true for specific theories, e.g. with regard to individuals in crisis situations (such as groupthink), types of leadership in international bargaining (Regime theory) or moments that allow change, but only if the window of opportunity is recognized (Historical Institutionalism).

The limits of bureaucratic organization were elaborated in the 1970s and 1980s through Graham Allison’s bureaucratic politics model (Allison and Halperin 1972) and Irving Janis’ (1982) groupthink concept. The related discussion of the position and behaviour of individual decision-makers in an institutional context and under specific conditions, such as in crisis situations, were applied in the field of foreign policy analysis, but hardly in the context of international relations and institutions. Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek (2013: 326) noticed that in International Relations literature the notion of crisis is hardly ever discussed. Rather, it looks like the problematical situation is taken for granted, which implies that the role IOs play in defining and tabling a crisis is overlooked. They regard this as ‘remarkable’, since the agenda-setting capabilities of IO Secretariats, even of the UN Secretary-General, have long been recognized.

Oran Young (1991: 285) brought the individual back into the study of international relations in the context of Regime theory. He defined leadership as the actions of individuals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in the processes of institutional bargaining. While a structural leader, the first of his tripartite typology and ordinarily a state, tries to bring pressure on others, entrepreneurial leaders are those who frame issues at stake, devise mutually acceptable formulas and broker the interests of key players in building support for these formulas. There is no need for this second type of leadership to remain restricted to heads of state or government, as it may also apply to executive heads of international
institutions, as is demonstrated by Constructivists who used Young’s ideas of entrepreneurship in the context of international standard setting through international non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Entrepreneurial leaders often become consumers of ideas generated by intellectual leaders, Young’s third type, which can be found at both the domestic and the international level.

New Institutionalism assumes that institutions have an effect on political outcomes through the actions of individuals, and discerns two ways to discuss how institutions affect the behaviour of individuals. One is the so-called ‘calculus’ way, based on instrumental and strategic calculation, seeking to maximize the attainment of a set of goals, given by a specific preference function, while the ‘cultural’ approach sees individuals as ‘satisficers’ rather than ‘utility maximizers’. The individual is seen as an entity deeply embedded in a world of institutions, composed of symbols, scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation. Institutions provide strategically useful information but also affect the self-images and preferences of the actors (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939).

A specific form of New Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism, presents ideas about incremental decision-making, path dependence and change, which allow a view of individuals using windows of opportunity in international relations. Institutional development is characterized by relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and reproduction. However, they are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux, referred to as critical junctures, during which more dramatic change is possible. Hence, due to the relaxation of structural influences on political action, individual actors can select between alternatives at critical junctures. A choice can then be made, but once a decision is made, path dependency continues, with alternatives closed off. While the path dependence approach is often used to discuss institutional continuity, the idea of critical junctures allows an understanding of chance. Political science analyses of critical junctures most often do not focus on small events, but rather on decisions by influential actors, such as political leaders, policy makers, bureaucrats and judges, and ‘examine how, during a phase of institutional fluidity, they steer outcomes toward a new equilibrium’ (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 354).

Elements such as bureaucratic politics, leadership and moments of decision-making can also be built into Neorealism. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack (2001: 114) for instance depart from the more common Neorealist path and argue that individuals do play a central role in shaping international relations, including the causes of war, alliance patterns and other relevant areas. Their ideas are neatly summarized in their hypotheses on the role of individuals, which pronounce that individuals set the ultimate and secondary intentions of a state and can also be an important component of a state’s diplomatic influence and military power. Individual leaders furthermore shape their state’s strategies and affect the behaviour of opposing states that must react to leaders’ idiosyncratic intention and capabilities. With regard to how individuals matter they have hypotheses on personality traits. While states led by risk-tolerant leaders are more likely to cause war, states led by delusional leaders start wars and prolong them unnecessarily. While states led by leaders with grandiose visions are more likely to destabilize the system, states led by predictable leaders will have strong and more enduring alliances. They also discuss enabling factors at moments when individuals matter. The more power is concentrated in the hands of an individual leader, the greater the influence of that leader’s personality and preferences. Individuals are more important when systemic, domestic and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous. Furthermore, individuals are more important when circumstances are fluid. With regard to Waltz’s images Byman and Pollack also discuss the interaction between images, since individuals can shape the second image: ‘Domestic opinion, bureaucratic politics, and other second-image factors are not independent of individuals. In bureaucratic politics, it is not inevitable that where you stand depends on where you sit, especially if where you sit is determined by the leader’ (Byman and
Pollack 2001: 143). Individuals can also shape the third image: ‘To the extent that third-image theories rest on the assumption that the distribution of power is a key moving force in international relations, then individuals must be counted when measuring the distribution’ (Byman and Pollack 2001: 144).

The issue here is not whether Byman and Pollack, or stricter Neorealists, hold the correct vision, but rather the invitation to see where, when and under what conditions individuals matter in international relations. Kissinger hinted at this, but he did not give an explanation. Some smaller theories can be helpful and Byman and Pollack’s attempt to renew the study of Waltz’s first image shows that the influence of other forces such as systemic factors, domestic politics and bureaucratic pressures should be ignored. However, to see individuals as part of a larger whole, political scientists, according to Byman and Pollack (2001: 146), will have to employ ‘biography and psychology in addition to traditional tools such as economics and history’.

Individuals and International Organization Theory

Unlike Olsson and Verbeek, Waltz (1979: 111) relates leadership to states and not to IOs, as he does not see any room for leaders of IOs in international relations. He argues that leaders of organizations are ‘not masters of the matters their organizations deal with’ (sic). They have become leaders ‘not by being experts on one thing or another but by excelling in the organizational arts’. Their objective, according to the organizational arts, is ‘to secure the continuity and health of the organization itself’.

Although Waltz is correct in the sense that an executive head wants to secure the continuity of his/her organization, his vision of leadership of an organization may be questioned. Ernst Haas, for instance, in his book Beyond the Nation-State (1964) applied Bureaucracy theory to IOs and showed that the leadership of an IO’s bureaucracy may produce instruments which enable the organization to be politically active in international relations. Among these instruments are the uses of expertise produced by the organization itself and the selection of both external supporters and enemies by the executive head. Shortly after Robert Cox (1969) also argued that a leader can turn an IO into an international actor and in their seminal work, The Anatomy of Influence (1973), Cox and Harold Jacobson analyzed IOs as political systems in which the executive heads have some assets available that support leadership efforts. For instance, the executive heads may initiate research to document arguments or to explore alternatives and they may maintain contacts or negotiate with states. Here Cox and Jacobson disagree with Waltz that leaders of IOs are not experts on ‘one thing or another’. Furthermore, executive heads hold a strategic location in the communication networks of their IOs, with platforms that allow them to address several audiences, knowing that their position gives them a legitimate and sure means of stating views. Their key task then is to mobilize a consensus in support of organizational goals (Cox and Jacobson 1973: 398). The empirical research in Cox and Jacobson’s book (eight cases) shows that executive heads did use these assets.

In Managers of Global Change (2009) Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner use a narrower definition of IO, because they regard the Secretariat, rather than the entire organization, as the bureaucracy. They reject the rationalist and Neorealism assumption that international bureaucracies strive predominantly to maximize their mandate, funding, staff and power and instead argue that international bureaucracies are more interested in resolving the political problems they have to deal with. Their nine case studies reveal that these Secretariat bureaucracies have a sizeable autonomous influence as actors in global environmental policy by acting as knowledge brokers, negotiation facilitators and capacity builders. These roles are in line with the ideas of Haas, Cox and Jacobson about an IO’s
directed agency. Biermann and Siebenhüner also discuss the quality of the leadership of the bureaucracy.

In line with what has been said about new institutionalism and the way institutions have an impact on individuals, executive heads of IOs can be viewed as individuals who, within particular contextual constraints, bring a personal style to bear on their activities. Kent Kille (2006) discerns various leadership styles of executive heads, which are made up of a set of interrelated personal characteristics drawn from ‘responsivity’ (which is a combination of self-confidence and conceptual complexity), ‘belief that can influence’, ‘need for recognition’, ‘need for relationships’, ‘supranationalism’ and ‘problem-solving emphasis’. Kille does not consider personal traits and contextual variables as competing factors, but argues in the end that the interaction of the two is likely to provide the greatest explanatory value. The three leadership styles of executive heads of IOs that he discerns are related to how executive heads view constraints: as something to be challenged, respected or accommodated. In addition, SGs may also act as moral leaders, when they use their ‘ethical framework’ as a filter that helps to guide their interpretation of and engagement within the context they are working (Kille 2007).

With regard to outcomes, leaders of IOs may fail or be successful to some extent. Constructivists Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore do not discuss leadership of IOs explicitly, but their book Rules for the World (2004) may help to understand faulty or failed leadership. They address the capability of IOs to exercise authority via their bureaucratic nature and focus on the problems that arise when bureaucracies become obsessed with their own rules at the expense of their primary mission in ways that produce inefficient and self-defeating outcomes, referred to as dysfunctional behaviour or pathologies. A team led by Ngaire Woods (2015) has published a comparative study on effective leadership in IOs. The team elaborated seven indicators of effective leadership and applied these to 11 cases. The results provide an overview of organizational conditions that allow leadership to be more or less successful.

The question of whether there is room for individuals in IO theory can be answered positively, because organizations offer executive heads the means to play certain roles in international relations. While this is a point of departure in Organization theory, it is not in International Relations theory. Over a quarter of a century ago Gayl Ness and Steven Brechin (1988: 269-270) criticized the discipline since International Relations theory had ‘an essentially naïve view of organizations as simple mechanical tools that act directly and precisely at the bidding of their creators’, whereas the Sociological view of organizations (which also existed but was neglected by International Relations theory) saw organizations as ‘recalcitrant tools that come to have a life of their own, serving interests other than the rational and altruistic ends for which they were originally, at least publicly, created’. Recalcitration, a life of its own and serving interests other than those of the founding member states (the latter referred to as ‘slippage’ in Principal-Agent theory) are elements that are related to leadership of IOs. Slippage occurs when an Agent (the IO) shifts policy away from the preferred outcome of its Principal (the member states that have delegated some authority to the Agent) toward its own preferences (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8).

In the case of IOs, the Agent (in particular the executive head) is able to act, because of a desire to perform toward the objectives of the IO, use the windows of opportunity that arise, make use of the disagreement among member states and look for supporters among all international actors. In the article in which Brechin and Ness (2013: 33) look back on the International Relations discipline after 25 years, they mention the relevance of research on IO leadership by asking questions such as: How do IO leaders and other powerful internal and external constituents define organizational interest? How do these leaders navigate the powerful external forces and dependency relationships as well as internal demands?
Given the space required for describing organizational developments and events, writing a historical overview of IOs (see Reinalda 2009) does not leave much room to deal with individual leadership. However, historical overviews help reveal that leadership matters at crucial moments, such as during the First World War, when international relations had been broken but many IOs managed to survive, thanks to the careful leadership of their executive heads. Leadership also mattered in 1945 when the International Labour Organization (ILO) wanted to get access to the new UN system that was being set up without obvious ILO participation. These examples raise the question of when Secretariats started to play a role in IO history.

The administrative character of the early IOs in the nineteenth century was rather simple, often emulating the rapidly bureaucratizing governmental machinery on the national level. In quite a few cases the officers and functionaries of the bureaus were appointed by and maintained under the ‘supervision’ of the government where the bureau was located. The duties given to the permanent bureaus that came into being since the institutionalization process of the 1860s (collecting information, preparing statistics, publication of documents and a specialized magazine) reflected the conventional juristic view at the time that the international milieu was one where states led an independent and isolated existence, with no other obligations to any other entity but themselves (Muldoon Jr. 2010).

In practice, however, the Secretariats became more and more responsible for preparing the agenda and reports for the periodic conferences, often under the responsibility of a governing Board or Council, which soon became identified with the organization’s proper functioning. Craig Murphy (1994: 111-112) showed that most states remained unaware of the effects of this institutional innovation, because governments saw the periodic conferences as a way to oversee the organization’s work, whereas the necessary preparation for the conferences in fact gave the functionaries power over the agenda. Murphy calculated that by 1910 Secretariats of IOs were playing the roles that used to be carried out by the monarch’s personal attendants or the foreign ministry of a hosting country, not only before, but also during and after the meetings of the General Assembly. The institutional memory related to these roles enhanced the position of the Secretariat and the Secretary’s awareness of the path dependency in what the IO had been undertaken.

The extensive discussion about the League of Nations’ Secretariat during the peace talks in Versailles in 1919 further enhanced the position of both the Secretariat and its Secretary-General. The idea of a Secretariat based on national officials who would be loyal to and paid by the member states was rejected and replaced by that of a truly international secretariat, whose members had to distance themselves as far as possible from national ties and to devote themselves to the purposes of the organization, who also paid them. This international model was followed by many later IOs, including the UN and the connected specialized agencies. When IOs were established not much thought was given to the requirements of the office, but the executive heads of these new institutions (for example, the ILO and the specialized agencies of the League of Nations that came into being after 1919) had particular feelings about their position and showed such skills that they secured their position internally and became known internationally as leaders of their organizations. Leadership of an IO proved to be not only significant for relations with member states, but also for relations with other IOs, the so-called inter-organizational relations, which already mattered during the interwar period (see Reinalda and Kille 2016).

In the authors’ paper for the 2013 ACUNS Annual Meeting, we made an initial analysis of IO leadership based on the 20 entries IO BIO had published at the time, discerning between what we termed ‘Frontierpersons’ and ‘Reformers’ (Kille and Reinalda 2013: 13-14).
Similar to the idea of American settlers who had only just come to live on the edge of what they regarded unclaimed territory, we may see the individuals who start as the first executive heads of an IO as **Frontiersons**. They are mapping the unclaimed international issue area and are tasked with building up the organization’s administrative machinery, based on a constitution drawn up by the founding states, followed by the organization’s activities and policy-making. With regard to **Reformers** we thought about those executive heads who are selected, based on the assumption that they understand the reform demands that have been formulated by various actors and generate ideas to reform the organization accordingly. A third intermediate category could be executive heads, which function in established organizations: they are not the ones who set up the organization or are supposed to reform. These may be called **Regulars**. While it is easy to designate the first category of Frontiersons, in practice it is often more difficult to discern between the other two types.

In the history of IOs secretariats proved to be important bodies in need of leadership. Historical research can deal with the question of how successful or effective executive heads of IOs have been. The results should be expected to vary across executive heads. In our 2013 ACUNS paper we categorized both weaker and stronger executive heads, and developed the assumption that in order to play a more significant role in international relations executive heads of IOs must combine strong internal and external leadership (Kille and Reinalda 2013: 12), which will be further explored in the entry analysis below following the broader explanation of biography as a genre and how this has been employed in the IO BIO Project.

2. The Short Biography as a Genre and the IO BIO Project

One way to be informed about the career of an IO’s executive head is a full biography. However, the number of such books published is restricted. Another way to map the careers of executive heads of IOs is a biographical dictionary with much shorter biographies of only a few pages, which nonetheless offer insights into the development of international careers.

The genre of biographical dictionaries with short biographies dates from the nineteenth century. Although the appeal of ‘great persons’, as discussed before, has remained a crucial component of biography as an art, scholarly explanation of the lives described has become more important. The genre in specialized biographical dictionaries contains shorter or longer biographies of men and women important in the fields of culture, economics and politics. The new genre basically produces more or less coherent lives representing complex personalities as part of, and contributing to, their time. Essential elements of the modern scholarly biography are the open-mindedness of the biographer, the critical use of original and secondary sources, the avoidance of myth making, an understanding of the time period and its institutions and an effort to assess the individual, both as a personality and in relation to his or her environment and activities.

Colin Matthew, editor of the renowned *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* between 1992 and 1999, argued that the purpose of an entry in a biographical dictionary is to give a ‘complete and balanced account of the life and work of its subject by supplying both detailed personal information and a general assessment of the subject’s significance’ (for this biographical dictionary project, see http://global.oup.com/oxforddnb/info/print/intro). The main question with regard to IO executive heads, in the words of the *Oxford Dictionary*, would be: what kind of mark did the executive head leave on his or her organization and international relations for any reason, whether good, bad or unusual? A biographical dictionary is different from a *Who’s Who*, which presents career, personal and other information as a series of facts in a catalogue, as condensed as possible. Although a *Who’s Who* may offer a helpful chronological overview of the phases of a career and life, it does not provide the balanced and informative account the *Oxford Dictionary* is seeking by offering a
historical description of the life and career, in which other people also act and the context is discussed as well.

The combination of various accounts of the life and work of individuals in the same field, such as IO executive heads, gives the genre of the short biography a prosopographic dimension, because the individuals are part of a larger or smaller group, with members who in many respects are interrelated and interact. This group perspective allows learning more about the group or certain subsets of, in our case, IO executive heads. This may include information about their origin and background, their training and previous careers, their ideas and visions of international relations, conflict and cooperation, their career patterns and their contacts and networks with other actors, including those with other executive heads.

*IO BIO Project on Executive Heads of IOs*

The IO BIO Project is designed to collect, disseminate, and analyze information on leadership provided by executive heads of international governmental organizations (IGOs). Since the biographical literature on IO leaders is limited, central to this endeavour is the construction of the *Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations (IO BIO)* in order to provide a more complete picture of the variety of individuals who have held these positions. *IO BIO* does not restrict itself to the UN System, but also covers regional and other IGOs, whether of a universal or more restricted character. The focus is those SGs who have left a mark for any reason, whether good, bad or unusual and the collection of entries includes deceased SGs as well as those who have been out of office for five years or more and most probably will not return to office as SG. The biographical entries are intentionally kept short and focused (between 800 and 3,600 words; the length is determined by level of importance, with three category levels) to ensure accessibility. Yet, through providing biographical data, a balanced account of life and work, as well as references and a picture, an entry presents an accurate and coherent description of the entire life and career of each SG. In addition, in order to allow for understanding of the interactions between SGs and group analyses, entry authors are encouraged to pay attention to the social and professional connections for the executive head being profiled (i.e. the prosopographical approach).

As of early May 2015, *IO BIO* has posted 45 entries on the project’s website, and has some 40 others under construction. The published entries range from Joseph Avenol of the League of Nations to Eric Wyndham White of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and cover 30 different IOs, varying from the Commission of the European Community to the World Meteorological Organization (see Appendix 1 for all persons and IOs). Thus, *IO BIO* already provides a valuable reference for scholars and practitioners interested in IO leadership. However, the Editorial team (Reinalda and Kille, Editors and Jaci Eisenberg, Assistant Editor) strongly encourages additional authors to volunteer to research and write an entry so that *IO BIO* can continue to expand in scope and coverage. Experts on a particular IO and/or SG, either as a scholar or former practitioner, interested in writing an entry are welcomed. Further information, including full author instructions on how to write an entry, tools for finding needed data, and a listing of available SGs in need of an author, is provided at the *IO BIO* website. To express an interest, the Editors are available through the Project email of iobio@fm.ru.nl, and potential authors are encouraged to provide their name, institutional affiliation, contact information, and explanation of why they would be good writers of the proposed entry.

The IO BIO Project also includes an extensive database of SGs covering almost 130 organizations and 900 SG positions across those organizations, which allows for broader analysis beyond the biographical entries. The public form of the database, also provided on the project’s website, lists SGs in alphabetical order by last name and also has a listing by
organization in alphabetical order with their SGs stipulated in the order that they held office. This database serves as a key reference for authors to review when selecting a SG to write an entry on, but the Editors have also worked through their own research to structure the database into a sortable spreadsheet format. As reported on below, this allows for comparative analysis across office-holders on a range of categories present in the database, including variation in title, home country, gender, age, and length of time in office.

**Issues When Writing and Editing IO BIO Entries**

*IO BIO* authors work with detailed ‘Author Instructions’ (available at [www.ru.nl/fm/iobio](http://www.ru.nl/fm/iobio)) to fully and properly address all three sections of an entry: personal data, account of the entire life and career(s) and concluding with information about archives, publications and literature. Relevant information with regard to the period before someone becomes an international civil servant covers elements such as personal background, education, professional experience as well as political and societal views. Furthermore, of interest is how an individual becomes engaged in working for an institution and how the IO selects him or her as executive head. The executive head as a politician in international relations, which may be covered by both ideas and actions, but definitely public behaviour (this can be summarized as external leadership) should be addressed, as well as the executive head as a leader of the organization’s bureaucracy (hence, internal leadership). Authors pay attention to relations with other actors, among them the executive heads of other IOs (which may help to recognize their networks and will add to the prosopographical dimension) and also the life after the time in office should be explained along with the kind of mark an executive head has left on the IO, the profession and international relations, whether good, bad or unusual (i.e., the assessment).

Among the problems authors and editors may encounter is the *availability of information* on executive heads. Remarkably, IOs themselves tend to be not very informative about their leaders in publications or on websites. Many IOs restrict themselves to publishing the dates of becoming executive heads and leaving the office, plus, if available, mentioning the major prizes that were awarded. Nowadays a picture may also have been added. In some cases there are short life descriptions, but it is rare to see discussion of the efforts and achievements of the individual. Even with diplomatic prudence as an excuse, this seems a rather restricted position. Hence, what is missing most is information about policies set in motion by the executive heads as well as information about the degrees of success and failure of these policies. Failure is even more informative, because organizations and individuals attempt to do things, but in practice handicaps and impediments exist, which make it all the more interesting to see how far actors have managed to come.

Writing about an international career depends not only on the organizational expertise an author brings, but also on the state of available analyses, histories and other literature. Furthermore, it makes a difference whether the archives are open, well ordered or even digitized. Occasionally oral histories with former employees are available, but former employees may also not want to share information, because they are afraid to ‘hurt’ the organization, assuming that an interest in conflicts or failures may harm the organization to which they feel attached. At the same time former employees or practitioners are appropriate sources of inside information. Some IOs are more open than others. In case of ‘closed’ organizations, other sources become more relevant, among them media publications, which are a more useful source if journalists who understand the functioning of the organization write the articles. Sometimes information is available through other actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
The best way to describe the emergence of the entries of a biographical dictionary is *putting the pieces of the puzzle together*. Often there are pieces of information available in *Who’s Whos*, specialist literature, books and articles about IOs and international relations, some primary sources, autobiographies, obituaries, interviews and oral histories which need to be combined into the desired ‘complete and balanced account of the life and work’. Authors and editors sometimes feel like detectives looking for missing pieces and details. The IO BIO Project website has ‘Tools to Find More Data’ about executive heads, because there are several biographical dictionaries and *Who’s Whos*, oral history and digital projects related to specific IOs and also other helpful databases. Sometimes relevant information can be found in specific university or general libraries, hence authors need to explore such opportunities. Once in a while one finds unexpected digitized documents available, and in other cases documents are waiting to be digitized. Book indexes are very helpful in tracing persons, but are not always available. Experience shows the advantage of first composing the final section listing out the archives, publications and literature, because that helps to find out which relevant sources are available as well as the publications of the executive head. Making such an inventory helps to inform an author about aspects of the individual who will be analyzed and described. Making an inventory of what is known, and unknown, about the person to be described before starting archival research is also helpful, as this makes it easier to look for specific details in the archival material, or to recognize surprises.

Reliability of information is also highly relevant. The status of documents has to be assessed and the portrayal of individuals in literature should not be taken for granted. In order to avoid myth-making one needs to emphasize the importance of scholarly methodology, such as the collecting and dating of documents and the search for critical perspectives provided by witnesses (Madelénet 1984: 640). The necessity of using original sources, also for the short biography, cannot be stressed enough, because the secondary literature extant about a person may not be very informative, may be contradictory or also overly detailed, or may present a mythical account that has outlived its usefulness or relevance for the present. Autobiographies are helpful and fine sources to employ, but the images presented should also be distrusted and compared with what can be found in other sources, because personal documents, diaries and memories may tend to self-justification and rationalization of behaviour. James Clifford’s book with the encouraging title *From Puzzles to Portraits* (1970) as well as more recent publications about biography as a genre (e.g. Lee 2009), or autobiography (see for instance Helga Schwalm on autobiography at http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/autobiography) underline the necessity of being critical.

Setting up a life and career description should avoid predestination. Hence, the outcome (becoming an IO’s executive head) should not be mentioned or suggested in the beginning of the entry’s main part. Rather, the reader should be made to patiently follow the various stages of the life and career, as well as the watersheds that can be recognized, in a more or less chronological order: youth, education, first professional experience, career development, international recruitment and further career development, including the time as executive head, activities after the period of being an executive head, and passing away. The text should be as factual as possible, as well as informative and accurate, and written with an open mind. Authors need to explain environmental and organizational details, which are relevant for understanding what is happening, but general and organizational history should be left out as much as possible, as the individual life is at the centrepiece. Other important actors should be mentioned by name and authors should not avoid discussing problematic situations, relations with questionable persons or disputed periods in the described person’s career or life.

The ‘rather not mention this’ attitude that can be found with practitioners, relatives or authors who admire their executive head often relates to private information (e.g. a divorce, a
relationship or a child). However, such events may have an impact on the career and should be taken into account. *IO BIO* has come across situations in which a SG had to deal with such events. Life and work are interrelated and mentioning this provides a better explanation of what is happening than leaving such details out. Should partners be mentioned? Some argue that they should not because they are outsiders, but in real life partners may play relevant supportive roles, allow the career to develop by taking care for other activities and even be subtle advisers with a somewhat more distant view. Nowadays, mentioning these elements is more accepted. A practical problem can be that private information is less available, but an author should at least attempt to find the information when it looks like private issues play a role in the career. Mentioning some peculiarities from the personal life may actually illuminate the personality better than the handling of difficult problems within an organization. The use of a well-chosen anecdote may also help to catch the sense or essence of a life story, even if many authors tend to omit anecdotes. If well chosen, then they are allowed in *IO BIO*.

The question may be raised whether individuals are coherent personalities? Or is it the biographer who, through his or her interpretation of elements, connections and cohesion, constructs a coherent personality that may never have existed as such? Often life may be far more uncertain, indefinite, vague and mysterious than a biography may suggest. Coincidence, whether chance or mischance, may happen and it should not be taken for granted that a career follows an ascending line. Authors, however, have an understandable inclination to disregard downward career moves and both staff of organizations and relatives reading a draft text do not appreciate the mentioning of downward moves, whereas this does matter for a biographer, who is trying to understand a career.

Given the fact that executive heads of IOs are a universal phenomenon, i.e. coming from all over the world, it should be taken into account that the modern biographical genre took shape in the context of the Western, humanist and industrialized culture as well as individualism (Clifford 1970: 42). This is not true for other cultural traditions in which it is less common to mention the names of relatives, age or status, let alone issues that are related to disputes that are seen as elements not to be discussed publicly or explicitly. This implies that in cases of executive heads coming from a different cultural tradition, it will be more difficult to find or mention information that a biographical dictionary would like to include. Continental differences may also be relevant, as was found out when a mapping exercise of African executive heads was undertaken, using the *IO BIO* Project’s database. While leadership in the African context is strongly seen as a matter of heads of state and government, informal leadership is also related to militias, rebel groups and other non-governmental organizations, however, remarkably enough, not to IOs (Reinalda 2014). Given this ‘lower’ status of executive heads of IOs in the African context, it will be more difficult to find the information the *IO BIO* Author Instructions requests.

The issues discussed here as well as the editorial guidelines in the Author Instructions represent the *IO BIO* editorial policies. What can be said from the perspective of the Editors is that authors have been willing to look for information the editors would like to include, although it happens that information cannot be found. If the Editors have information available, they share this with the authors. Since draft texts move between Editors and authors, drafts grow to texts that can be published. If new or other information becomes available, texts can be adapted (which is mentioned). Readers of entries published by *IO BIO* may assess to what extent the authors and Editors have succeeded in following the guidelines.
Security- and Justice-Related Entries in IO BIO

Bringing individual lives together as a group implies that something general should be said about the group as such. The IOs included in IO BIO contribute to solving common problems and attaining specific goals in international relations, amongst others by helping member-states to adapt to changing environments and to overcome the transnational problems related to these changes. Those who created the IOs had three main motives, which Harold Jacobson (1979: 64) labelled as the promotion of trade, peace and human dignity. In accordance with these motives IOs have helped states to adapt to the dynamics of technological developments and the international economy (trade motives); to create, maintain or improve political structures at global and regional levels that promote security (peace motives); and to strengthen the states’ national socio-economic basis by promoting social welfare and human rights (humanitarian motives).

As clear as this distinction between trade, peace and human dignity may look like, practice is more problematic because often a combination of these motives is found. It is, for instance, assumed that a lively trade with respect for human rights will enhance the chance of peaceful relations between states even more strongly than each motive on its own will do. IOs do not restrict themselves to a specific motive, but combine these. This is true for an umbrella organization such as the UN, but many other IOs have diversified by dealing with both practical assistance and human rights (e.g. the ILO and the children’s fund UNICEF with, respectively, fundamental workers’ rights and children’s rights). Since all three motives are included in the IOs in the IO BIO Project, it is difficult to simply sort out IOs according to one of the motives.

In the 45 IO BIO entries the words ‘security’ and ‘justice’ are rarely directly employed: security is mentioned 70 times (with Sadako Ogata scoring highest: 16 times) and justice is mentioned only 24 times. Only 7 out of 45 entries mention both words. The words ‘peace’ and ‘peaceful’ are mentioned 97 times. These numbers seem too weak a basis for (text) analysis. However, in this paper we created three groups to discuss in more detail: two are based on the entries published by IO BIO (discussed in section 3 on security entries and section 4 on justice entries) and one selection from the database (discussed in section 5 on security organizations).

The collection of entries published in IO BIO depends on the availability of authors and entries completed thus far. Hence, the analysis at this point is based on an incomplete grouping of executive heads, with some organizations already much better covered than others. However, the collection as it stands does already allow for identifying who the more or less successful leaders are. Some IOs belong to the UN System, others are related to the UN and still others do not belong to the UN System. How the groups of security entries (based on the peace motives in the behavior of the executive heads) and justice entries (based on the other two motives) are composed will be explained in the following two sections.

In the section on security entries the focus will be on the (non-)combination of internal and external leadership. The entries inform us about how the executive heads chose their leadership roles, both within the organization (internal leadership) and within international relations (external leadership), respectively whether we can speak about a combination of strong internal leadership and strong external leadership (the so-called Combiners) or not (the Non-Combiners). Our assumption is that only Combiners will be successful. In the section on justice entries we will differentiate between Frontierpersons, Regulars and Reformers and focus on their role expectations with regard to setting up an organization, leading an existing organization and adapting an existing organization.
3. Internal and External Leadership in IO BIO Security Entries

This section focuses on how executive heads of IOs who already have entries in IO BIO chose their leadership roles. We focus on their activities in the field of security, without taking into account whether their IO is a security IO (as is done in section 5). Among the entries published that qualify for this section are executive heads from the League of Nations system (both the League itself and its specialized organizations), the UN System, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Latin American region (two regional organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)). The 13 executive heads are brought together in Table 1, which also discerns between the three subgroups of Frontierpersons, Regulars and Reformers (as discussed before) as well as Combiners and Non-Combiners. Our assumption is that only those executive heads of IOs who combine strong internal leadership of the organization’s bureaucracy and strong external leadership in the international relations between states, IOs and other actors will be successful. They are called Combiners, whereas the other group of Non-Combiners will not be as effective, either because a Non-Combiner is internally weak, externally weak or weak in both respects.

Security-Related Entries in IO BIO

Before discussing the leadership roles of the executive heads with security-related entries in IO BIO, we mention the 13 executive heads included in Table 1 according to the four groups of the League, the UN, NATO and Latin America.

Relevant in the League of Nations system are Frontierperson and Combiner Fridtjof Nansen as High Commissioner for Refugees (1921-30) and two League Secretaries-General, both Regulars, but one a Combiner (Séan Lester 1940-46) and another a Non-Combiner (Joseph Avenol 1933-40).

With regard to the UN System, we define the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as UN-related, given the 1957 agreement between IAEA and UN and the 2001 relationship agreement between OPCW and UN, and the UN itself clearly labels both as ‘related organizations’ (http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/org_chart.shtml). The five executive heads in this cluster are Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart (UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1951-56), Thorvald Stoltenberg (UNHCR 1990) and Sadako Ogata (UNHCR 1990-2000), W. Sterling Cole (IAEA 1957-61) and José Bustani (OPCW 1997-2002). Three of them are Frontierpersons: Bustani (OPCW), Cole (IAEA) and Van Heuven Goedhart (UNHCR). One is a Regular: Ogata (UNHCR) and one a Reformer: Stoltenberg (UNHCR). Three out of these five executive heads can be regarded as Combiners (internally and externally strong leaders): Van Heuven Goedhart, Ogata and Bustani, and two of them are Non-Combiners: Stoltenberg and Cole.

Although NATO is not related to the UN, it has been an important actor in the global security situation and, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has built a more coordinative relationship with the UN. IO BIO has three entries of consecutive NATO Secretaries General between 1952 and 1964: Frontierperson Lord Ismay (1952-57) and Regulars Paul-Henri Spaak (1957-61) and Dirk Stikker (1961-64). All three proved to be Non-Combiners, being internally relatively strong leaders, but externally weak leaders.

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2 Three executive heads from the League of Nations system with entries in IO BIO (Rachel Crowdy of Social Affairs, Ludwik Rajkchman of the Health Organization and Harold Butler of the ILO) are not included here because their actions are not enough security-focused.
The Latin American region contains two executive heads of two IOs (OAS and UNASUR): Reformer and Combiner João Baena Soares (OAS 1984-94) and Frontierperson and Non-Combiner Néstor Kirchner (UNASUR 2010), who both focused on the security dimension.

Table 1: Combiners and Non-Combiners in the IO BIO Security Entries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combiners</th>
<th>Non-Combiners</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frontierpersons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fridtjof Nansen League of Nations</td>
<td>W. Sterling Cole IAEA 1957-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCR 1921-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart</td>
<td>Lord Ismay NATO 1952-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR 1951-56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Bustani OPCW 1997-2002</td>
<td>Néstor Kirchner UNASUR 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulars</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Séan Lester League of Nations 1940-</td>
<td>Joseph Avenol League of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Nations 1933-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dirk Stikker NATO 1961-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reformers</strong></td>
<td>Stoltenberg UNHCR 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>João Baena Soares OAS 1984-94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Everything discussed about the individual executive heads is based on the IO BIO entries published on the website.

Starting with the League of Nations system, Nansen is a born and experienced organizer and diplomat, who acted as an initiator in a new situation of a multitude of displaced persons, resulting from war, civil war and the collapse of empires (the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman ones). In this security situation Nansen developed recognizable international procedures that could be adapted under several conditions (working with governments and NGOs, plus the creation of an international travel document, the so-called Nansen passport). Nansen also succeeded in coping with incremental decision-making on new groups of refugees that the League Council accepted and he coalesced with the ILO, given the need to find employment for refugees. Nansen’s work was confirmed by some League conventions in the 1930s and later picked up by both the UN in creating the 1951 Refugee Convention and Van Heuven Goedhart as UN High Commissioner (also discussed in this section). The Nansen example can be seen as the beginning of path dependency in the field of refugees and displaced persons. The notion of path dependency, developed within historical institutionalism, suggests that institutions continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing political manoeuvring, but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories (Thelen 1999: 387). The Nansen example is also relevant because it shows the borders of this work, i.e. when member-states lose their interest in solving still existing refugee issues as happened to Nansen during the second half of the 1920s.
Although *IO BIO* has not yet published entries of UN Secretaries-General, it has two entries of Secretaries-General of the League of Nations. Avenol, the League’s second executive head, proved a leader with little aspiration. His administrative capacities were restricted, although he introduced some French bureaucratic procedures into the Secretariat, and the relationship with his staff deteriorated during frictions over the League’s security policies. As an external leader during the 1930s, Avenol’s actions weakened the organization as a bulwark of collective security and diminished the role of the Secretary-General. Eventually he accepted Nazi-Germany as victorious, showed loyalty to the French Vichy government (which rejected this) and attempted to close down the League.

Deputy Secretary-General Lester, however, stood up against Avenol, outmanoeuvred him administratively and became Acting Secretary-General. He was strongly supported for his integrity and courage by a skeleton staff of only one hundred and succeeded in keeping the reduced Secretariat and other League bodies, which were removed to the Americas, going during the Second World War. Lester proved determined to keep the League’s organization together for the post-war era and succeeded in formally dissolving the organization and handing over the organization’s assets to the UN after the war. Although both the UN and literature showed little appreciation of Lester’s custodianship of the League throughout the Second World War period, it should be recalled that the expertise available in the non-political technical work of some League bodies helped prepare the setting up of the UN between 1943 and 1945. Lester was the one who kept the embers of international organization alive during a difficult period.

The two Combiners who served as Frontierpersons in the UN System, Van Heuven Goedhart and Bustani, were successful in building up their new organizations. High Commissioner for Refugees Van Heuven Goedhart was elected because of his understanding of the Refugee Convention issues and followed up on what had already been established by the League of Nations, but also needed to act in a situation in which strong political and practical restrictions were put on the UNHCR. He succeeded in finding his own resources (from private foundations) and establishing his own expertise (hiring scientists to describe and analyze the situation), while using windows of opportunity (e.g. the Berlin crisis), actively selecting outside supporters and cooperating with the ILO. OPCW Director-General Bustani who knew the chemical weapons problematic well (an argument in his selection as executive head) promoted universal membership and made sure that during procedures all countries could be heard. He secured a line with the UN and created an organizational culture with clear political standards and legal procedures. As an external leader he succeeded in increasing the number of signatories to the convention (from 87 to 145) and had a huge number of inspections performed, including in countries mentioned as ‘usual suspects’.

High Commissioner Ogata, a Regular and Combiner, improved staff morale and succeeded in finding internally acceptable solutions for new issues such as voluntary repatriation and internally displaced persons (not in the mandate). She acted as a protector and negotiator for refugees as well as a fundraiser in an escalating global refugee crisis and cherished her relations with both the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council, being the first UNHCR to address this body.

While all three executive heads from the UN System combined internal and external leadership qualities, we also see political restrictions. Bustani, unanimously re-elected for a second term, met with an extremely hostile environment when the United States (US) government accused him of promoting biased inspections (experts did not confirm this) and the new George W. Bush administration disagreed with his policy to admit Iraq to the OPCW. This resulted in US threats to cut off the organization’s funding and Bustani’s removal from the organization in an incorrect and unlawful procedure, as was confirmed by the ILO’s Administrative Tribunal. Bustani did not look for reinstatement of his post, but showed that
basic principles of international administration were violated. Hence, the end of Bustani’s OPCW career shows the restriction of leadership of an IO’s executive head, i.e. if the strongest power does not allow this. This, however, does not deny his quality as an organization head who combined internal and external leadership.

The two Non-Combiners or weak leaders in the UN System covered by IO BIO entries were Frontierperson Cole of the IAEA and Reformer Stoltenberg of the UNHCR. Cole’s major internal problem was that he had little experience in administration and diplomacy. He also had the wrong temper, demanded a salary that was too high for UN standards, had a bad relation with the Board and started costly projects, while the external successes during his time of office depended mostly on the work of others. These elements resulted in a strong opposition to a second term.

Stoltenberg on the other hand managed to cope with an organizational crisis (the previous UNHCR being sent away) by improving staff morale (further improved by his successor Ogata) and managing the serious financial crisis effectively. His internal leadership thus was strong, but the environment did not allow him to play a role, as the UN Secretary-General made the International Organization for Migration (IOM), rather than the UNHCR, responsible for the Kuwait problem. However, the major element in assessing him as an externally weak leader was his preference to return to Norwegian politics, rather than continue as UNHCR. It can be concluded from these two UN Non-Combiners that administrative qualities are required, with Cole as a negative and Stoltenberg as a positive example.

Moving on to the NATO group, Ismay, as Frontierperson, succeeded in setting up an effective administration in an alliance that was strongly dependent on military, but in order to be accepted in domestic politics also needed a civilian dimension. Ismay built the secretariat on the foundation of a genuine international civil service and, given the fact that he was not consulted in serious issues on the agenda of NATO, he succeeded in getting an enhancement of the executive head’s position after the mediation of three wise men. Ismay worked hard to influence public opinion, but was constrained because he needed a Council mandate and had to struggle with a lack of coordination of national foreign policies and an organizational inclination to not disclose information. His ability to lead the organization also met with serious limitations in its environment, in particular because the Strategic Allied Commanders Europe were the dominant leaders in NATO.

Ismay’s successor Spaak, an experienced politician, managed to lessen NATO’s secrecy and provided more information to the media with a goal of reviving public interest in and support of the organization. Although Spaak often found himself at odds with the US ambassador to NATO and had to accept interferences by the Strategic Allied Commander Europe, he managed to handle them, which did not occur with de Gaulle’s staunch opposition to NATO at the time. As a result Spaak failed to improve alliance consultation and influence the direction NATO was heading for his successor.

Stikker in his turn improved NATO’s secretariat position by making staff analyses of national positions that might help reduce the concerns and uneasiness that undermined the alliance’s coherence. Even if not all politicians shared Stikker’s confidence in Atlantic unity, Stikker travelled to the capitals in order to emphasize NATO solidarity. Because the Secretary General had no political or diplomatic representatives capable of informing him of the status of the situation, Stikker engaged NATO military authorities and used their information and connections to offer his good offices. Although he was externally weak due to independent US policies and de Gaulle’s continued animosity, his internal leadership and the cautious way he handled de Gaulle made the organization continue to perform its functions.

In all three NATO cases external leadership was severely restricted due to power relations in a primarily military alliance, but the Secretaries General of this organization
continued to build up a secretariat that would support the organization’s work, for instance by disseminating relevant information to the public and offering good offices where needed among the membership. This development is relevant for understanding the ways in which an IO functions, particularly if relations between IOs develop, as is true for NATO and the UN, which began collaboration in the early 1990s and found out that their procedures were rather different, which hindered cooperation.

When taking over as executive head of the OAS, Baena Soares had to restore the Secretary-General’s credibility, because his predecessor had left the organization charged with administrative and personal misconduct. He proved to be a strong internal leader as he succeeded in undertaking several institutional reforms, including amendments to the Charter and a Protocol that gave the Secretary-General more room for manoeuvre in the field of peace and security. Although the reforms had not entered into effect, Baena Soares decided to make use of his implicit powers, given the crises occurring in Haiti and Central America. He decided to embark on a diplomatic trip to the region and did this together with the UN Secretary-General and with the support of Latin American countries. Internally the US opposed this action, but without success, as the official OAS mission to Central America took place and resulted in a peace plan, cooperation with Central American governments and a support and verification instrument. During his second term the OAS launched a mission to San Salvador, led by Baena Soares, which had to be given up. While the OAS was called for help in Panama and active in the field, the US government decided to intervene unilaterally through an invasion, which aborted the OAS effort. All OAS members condemned the US. The unilateral action of the US unveiled the limits of OAS actions in regional conflicts. In spite of his political defeat, Baena Soares can be assessed as a strong external leader, as the OAS adopted mechanisms to improve the organization’s conflict resolution capabilities, strengthened democracy through electoral observations and enlarged the role of the Secretary-General, also in the field of security. Here too it must be observed that relations between IOs matter, in this case between a regional IO and the UN.

Kirchner was the first executive head of UNASUR. Due to his early death he was in office too short to assess his internal leadership, but what mattered was his external role in mobilizing consensus between Argentina and Brazil about setting up UNASUR and he acted as an adequate broker in the border conflict between Colombia and Venezuela in 2010. Since UNASUR was set up with a trade motive, this case shows the relevance of controlling security issues between member states.

**Internal Leadership, External Leadership and their Combination**

What can be a first conclusion about executive heads and their leadership in this mixed security cluster? Some executive heads can be classified as effective international actors (Nansen, Van Heuven Goedhart, Ogata, Bustani, Baena Soares), because they were able to perform in their specific fields (refugees, chemical weapons inspections and peace missions), while others had trouble in performing (Cole, Stoltenberg and the three NATO Secretaries General Ismay, Spaak and Stikker), either through handicaps with regard to internal leadership or because of handicaps in external leadership due to power relations in the organization’s environment or structural characteristics of the organization. Two of the seven Non-Combiners are weak internally and externally (Avenol and Cole), four combine strong internal and weak external leadership (Ismay, Spaak, Stikker and Stoltenberg) and one remains undecided (Kirchner).

With regard to *internal leadership* of the organization’s bureaucratic apparatus, these examples show that administrative qualities and experience as well as good relations with staff are required. Cole of the IAEA and Avenol of the League show that the absence of such
qualities does restrict an executive head in performing. The examples of Ogata, Stoltenberg, Lester and Baena Soares show that an executive head who at the beginning of his or her term in office finds a secretariat with a bad staff morale and lacking resources, will work to improve morale and working conditions in order to use the bureaucracy effectively. Further research may be necessary to see whether differences in the internal structure of their IOs are to be taken into account. The three NATO examples show that the availability of a functioning secretariat is not obvious, but that the elaboration of secretariat functions and roles results from what the executive heads manage to set up within the organization. One of the functions that are crucial for security IOs is securing the provision of significant information about the situation in member-states to the executive head.

With regard to external leadership of an IO, it was found that all performing executive heads were prepared to take risks, use windows of opportunity and mobilize resources and use relations within, or with (for the OAS), the UN System. Two examples show a borderline of external leadership, if the hegemon or strongest power does not allow action by the executive head. Both cases (Bustani of the OPCW and Baena Soares of the OAS) refer to Combiners or internally and externally strong leaders. Bustani, however, was removed from office in an improper way and Baena Soares saw an ongoing OAS mission aborted. In both cases the unilateral action of the hegemon impacted the further functioning of the organization. In the case of the OPCW international jurisprudence on the legality of acts that violate basic principles of IOs came into being. Dissatisfaction with the hegemon’s action impacted also the position of the hegemon within the IOs. With regard to NATO, the external leadership capacity of the Secretaries General was restricted by the dominant position of the Strategic Allied Commanders Europe, or the military arm, and in the case of Spaak and Stikker also by environmental restrictions due to the strong French opposition to the organization at the time. The fact that the US has played a dominant role in this alliance organization and that its military character favoured secrecy should also be taken into account, whereas the Secretary General needed to play a role in the public sphere and be more open. The examples show that the Secretaries General continued to develop and play that role. A final conclusion so far is that restrictions to external leadership may be the result of external conditions (major power influence) and of capacities related to the structure of the organization.

4. Frontierpersons, Regulars and Reformers in IO BIO Justice Entries

This section differentiates between the three subgroups of Frontierpersons, Regulars and Reformers and focuses on their role expectations with regard to setting up an organization, leading an existing organization and adapting an existing organization in the field of justice. Given the topic of the ACUNS conference, we discerned a justice group of entries. For this purpose we define justice in a broad way, including those executive heads of IOs set up with humanitarian motives, with human rights at the core and those promoting social welfare in a circle around the core. We add another circle by including those set up with trade motives. The group size of UN executive heads makes it less important to add other, non-UN ones, although available.3

Justice-Related Entries in IO BIO

The executive heads are the following 24 persons, with one person appearing in two different IOs (Prebisch in the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (UN ECLA) and the UN

3 From the League of Nations system Butler, Crowdy and Rajchman, and some other IOs Donald Johnston, Thorvald Kristensen, Sicco Mansholt, Robert Marjolin and Per Unckel.
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)) and one person in two consecutive IOs (Hoffman in the UN Special Fund (UNSF) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP)), making a total of 26 positions (see Table 2). The core holds one executive head: Robinson (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) 1997-2002) and the social welfare circle 12 executive heads (with Hoffman appearing twice): Morse (ILO 1948-70) and Hansenne (ILO 1989-99); Chisholm (World Health Organization (WHO) 1948-53), Mahler (WHO 1973-88) and Brundtland (WHO 1998-2003); Saouma (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1976-93) and Ingram (World Food Programme (WFP) 1982-92); Huxley (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 1946-48), Evans (UNESCO 1953-58) and Maheu (UNESCO 1961-74); Hoffman (UNSF 1959-65) and Hoffman (UNDP 1966-72). The third circle of economic IOs contains 13 executive heads (with Prebisch appearing twice): Meyer (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 1946), Black (IBRD 1949-62), Woods (IBRD 1963-68), McNamara (IBRD 1968-81) and Clausen (IBRD 1981-86); Myrdal (UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) 1947-57), Prebisch (UN ECLA 1950-63) and Gardiner (UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN ECA) 1962-75); Wyndham White (GATT 1948-68), Prebisch (UNCTAD 1964-69) and Ricupero (UNCTAD 1995-2004); Goad (Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)) and Davies (WMO 1955-79).

Eight of these 26 executive heads in the UN Justice Cluster are Frontierpersons (with Hoffman appearing twice): Chisholm (WHO), Hoffman (UNSF) and Hoffman (UNDP), Huxley (UNESCO), Myrdal (UN ECE), Meyer (IBRD), Prebisch (UNCTAD) and Wyndham White (GATT). Eleven executive heads are Regulars: Black (IBRD), Clausen (IBRD), Davies (WMO), Evans (UNESCO), Gardiner (UN ECA), Goad (Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)), Ingram (WFP; but turning into a Reformer), Maheu (UNESCO), Morse (ILO), Prebisch (UN ECLA) and Robinson (UNHCHR). Seven executive heads are Reformers: Brundtland (WHO), Hansenne (ILO), Mahler (WHO), McNamara (IBRD), Ricupero (UNCTAD), Saouma (FAO) and Woods (IBRD).

Fifteen out of these 26 positions can be regarded as occupied by Combiners (internally and externally strong leaders): Black (IBRD), Brundtland (WHO), Clausen (IBRD), Davies (WMO), Goad (IMCO), Ingram (WFP), McNamara (IBRD), Maheu (UNESCO), Mahler (WHO), Morse (ILO), Myrdal (UN ECE), Ricupero (UNCTAD), Robinson (UNHCHR), Woods (IBRD) and Wyndham White (GATT). Eleven of these 26 positions were occupied by Non-Combiners (with Hoffman appearing twice): Chisholm (WHO), Evans (UNESCO), Gardiner (UN ECA), Hansenne (ILO), Hoffman (UNSF), Hoffman (UNDP), Huxley (UNESCO), Meyer (IBRD), Prebisch (UN ECLA), Prebisch (UNCTAD) and Saouma (FAO).

Table 2 summarizes this group of executive heads.
Table 2: Combiners and Non-Combiners in the UN Justice Entries in IO BIO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frontierpersons</th>
<th>Combiners</th>
<th>Non-Combiners</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eugene Meyer IBRD 1946</td>
<td>Raúl Prebisch UNCTAD 1964-69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eugene Black IBRD 1949-62</td>
<td>Luther Evans UNESCO 1953-58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tom Clausen IBRD 1981-86</td>
<td>Robert Gardiner UN ECA 1962-75</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Davies WMO 1955-79</td>
<td>Raúl Prebisch UN ECLA 1950-63</td>
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<td>Edward Goad IMCO 1968-73</td>
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<td>James Ingram WFP 1982-92</td>
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<tr>
<td>René Maheu UNESCO 1961-74</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Morse ILO 1948-70</td>
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<td>Mary Robinson UNHCHR 1997-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reformers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Halfdan Mahler WHO 1973-88</td>
<td>Edouard Saouma FAO 1976-93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert McNamara IBRD 1968-81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rubens Ricupero UNCTAD 1995-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Woods IBRD 1963-68</td>
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</table>

What can be said about the more and less successful executive heads in UN justice, based on the entries published in IO BIO? We will first discuss the core of this cluster, i.e. human rights, and then continue with all the others and follow the order of Frontierpersons, Regulars and Reformers.

Starting in the core of human rights, High Commissioner Robinson entered an office that suffered from minimal resources and a low morale and thus worked to make it more effective and increase its resources. As an external leader she began to implement the UN Secretary-General’s policy of integrating human rights into all the UN’s activities and engaged with the boards of the IBRD and IMF to improve their human rights records, developing good relations with the World Bank President. She travelled to countries where there was conflict as well as gross violations of human rights and criticized governments, but also signed wide-ranging agreements to improve human rights in those countries and began to report to the UN Security Council. Her poorer leadership at the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban weakened her position and she lost Russian support when criticizing Russia on Chechnya and US support after her opinion about the treatment of prisoners in Guantánamo Bay. Having been an outspoken High Commissioner during five years, Robinson then met with borders set by major power relations in the environment of the office. Her final situation looks similar to that of Bustani at the OPCW, be it that she was not removed but did not continue.

Frontierpersons

The Frontierpersons in this group reveal two Combiners (Myrdal and Wyndham White) and six Non-Combiners (Chisholm, Hoffman twice, Huxley, Meyer and Prebisch at UNCTAD) (see Table 2), whose performance may help to reveal factors of success and failure in setting up their IOs.
Myrdal of the UN ECE (1947-57) made sure that his secretariat was an independent and scientifically based body, for which he hired talented and hard-working experts. He also made sure that his statistical publications were established independently from national governments, which could not modify the reports. While the Cold War left the UN ECE little room, Myrdal proved able to keep the middle way between West and East. Wyndham White of the GATT (1948-68) started from a somewhat different point of departure, because the original agreement lacked infrastructure, mandate and legitimacy as well as an address and funding. Wyndham White was the one who succeeded in transforming the agreement into a de facto IO. The Executive Secretary initiated and regularized meetings, continued to prepare for new rounds of tariff negotiations and was proactive in explaining and defending both the work and the related ideas. Wyndham White proved an externally strong leader, who dared to take risks and needed all his skills in conflict resolution to surmount differences. He was creative (e.g. invented the Green Room procedure) and had good relations with other IOs. In short, GATT’s successes were linked to his person. Alfred Eckes calls him a ‘powerful bureaucrat’ in an article about individuals who shaped the world trading system (Eckes 2000: 309).

Prebisch was an internally strong, even charismatic, leader, because he had strong ideas about the problems of the Latin American economy and was able to engage qualified economists who would also work as a team, knowing that Prebisch would protect them. This was true for both his period at UN ECLA (1950-63) and UNCTAD (1964-69). As a driving force in International Development theory he can be qualified as a successful and highly influential leader, however, as an executive head his policies, such as a Latin American common market and negotiation results between North and South in UNCTAD, were unsuccessful. The challenge of conventional economics by his alternative school of thought and his thorough team building were crucial for transforming UN ECLA into an active body and for setting up UNCTAD. In this respect there is a clear similarity with Myrdal in setting up the UN ECE.

Huxley as a visionary Frontiersman with highly original ideas and a recruitment of important scientists at UNESCO (1946-48) is similar too, but he matched these characteristics with a lack of administrative skills and severe restrictions of his mandate set by the US. This prevented him from becoming an effective leader. Chisholm of the WHO (1948-53) had a military and medical background, whose internal leadership profited from his visionary and oratory talents. He managed to set up a well-organized secretariat and staff it with competent people, but was unable to implement his vision, due to strong national preferences in his environment, which left the WHO little room for manoeuvre. Meyer, who as an experienced financier started the task of institution building at the IBRD (1946), met with sharp disagreements with the executive directors in terms of personality and procedures and concluded that he had responsibility without authority. He gave up and left institution building to his successor. Hoffman of the UNSF (1959-65) and UNDP (1966-72) was an exception in the UN at the time, given his close connections to the private sector. He was good in soliciting money, but internally and externally not strong enough as a leader. He focused on top-level negotiations and left the management of operations to his chief assistants, however without taking care of coherence and effective reactions to criticisms.

Regulars

The group of Regulars has eight Combiners (Black, Clausen, Davies, Goad, Ingram, Maheu, Morse and the already discussed Robinson) and three Non-Combiners (Evans, Gardiner and Prebisch at UN ECLA) (see Table 2). They help to understand what happens when executive heads run established organizations.
Both Black and Clausen brought their banker’s qualities to the IBRD. Black served between 1949 and 1962 and, internally, began improving the still problematic relationship between the president and the board of directors by consulting informally and ahead of time. When lending for reconstruction in Europe was done after the Marshal Plan had come into being, Black focused on economic development and successfully turned the IBRD into the World Bank Group (by establishing two other institutions). He increased membership, resources and also technical advice, took care of the Bank’s credit and reputation for probity and strict standards and, when necessary, acted as an important mediator. Clausen, who served between 1981 and 1986, showed managerial expertise and delegation of authority, but some also criticized him that internal consensus remained superficial. He expanded the loan programmes that demanded states liberalize their economic policies and understood from criticisms that larger projects may have environmental consequences. One of his handicaps was that, unlike previous beginning IBRD Presidents, he was not very familiar with the working of the US government. While Clausen continued to promote growth of the IBRD’s roles and criticized Reagan’s fiscal policies, the administration told him that his re-election would not be supported and Clausen then announced that he would step down.

Morse of the ILO (1948-70) was a manager with a sharp political mind, who managed to moderate change effectively. He directed an influx of new staff and built a tight network of contacts and friendships within the UN System (amongst others with Hoffman). During controversies within the organization he did not take sides but rather played the role of moderator and showed skills in balancing tensions. Externally he also was a strong leader by turning the organization’s attention to the developing world and introducing a strong human rights focus into the older world of international labour law. In the early 1950s Morse, an American national, refused the Congress committee on un-American activities to investigate American ILO employees, citing the independence of the international civil service, which made a principled and practical difference with UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie who allowed such investigation.

Davies of the WMO (1955-79) had many administrative talents, which helped him improve the secretariat’s efficiency and make the WMO a full member of the UN System. He devised an efficient document identification system, made sure that the technical information could be understood by lay audiences and for collaboration used direct personal contacts with other executive heads. He took care to include all countries in his global governance projects, in particular those in the global South whose meteorological infrastructure was underdeveloped, and fostered collaborations with other UN agencies whose mandates overlapped with that of the WMO.

Goad of the IMCO (1968-73) was well aware of his weak position, given the truly intergovernmental and consultative character of the organization. However, as modest as he was, he managed to change the secretariat’s structure by creating various sections and a Deputy Secretary-General, thus enhancing the position of the secretariat. During his time in office various conventions on oil pollution and prevention of marine pollution came into being, which he handled carefully. The same goes for relations within the UN System, although he could not prevent boundary disputes with UNEP.

Ingram of the WFP (1982-92) is a special case, as he developed an ambitious reform agenda, which eventually resulted in the separation of the WFP (a FAO unit by origin) from the FAO, led by Saouma (1976-93), but only after a long-lasting and bitter fight between two stubborn personalities who had clear agendas but different ideas about the role of the WFP. During his tenure Ingram succeeded in increasing the number of staff and financial contributions to the WFP, allowing the WFP to perform.

The staff of UNESCO regarded Maheu (1961-74) as very authoritarian, even tyrannical. However, Maheu succeeded in making the organization popular and prestigious
among young people, particularly in the field of world heritage and culture. While the Eastern bloc and developing world favoured his progressive orientation toward decolonization, disarmament and racism, the US and UK were anxious about his ambitions. Given these power relations Maheu managed to keep his position in spite of the opposition of many Western states. This reveals a situation, in which control by Western states is ineffective.

Following the Combiners just described, the two Non-Combiners are Evans and Gardiner. American citizen Evans was UNESCO Director-General between 1953 and 1958. He was a professional and pragmatic administrator, but lacked intellectual inspiration and felt uncomfortable with the in the organization dominant French culture. His weak leadership was furthermore undermined by politicization, due to the Soviet Union becoming a member and McCarthyism. While the US government did not trust him, the Americans threatened to suspend the payment of their contribution if he did not dismiss American employees who refused to attend US Congress investigations. After long hesitation Evans, unlike Morse, decided to accept political reality and dismiss them, much to the chagrin of UNESCO staff and the Executive Council. Political relations did not allow another term in office.

Gardiner was the second Executive Secretary of the UN ECA (1962-75), who arrived in a time of scarcity of highly qualified African economists and bureaucrats. He finished the frontierwork of his predecessor by creating a well-run body that not only Africanized its staff but also the knowledge base of its economic work. Although he put together a secretariat of dedicated and engaged professionals, not all staff liked him, mainly due to his controversial character. The main issue undermining the UN ECA’s position and Gardiner’s external leadership was the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, which claimed to be a ‘genuine’ African IO. This issue created rivalry between the two institutions and their executive heads and restricted Gardiner’s room for manoeuvre. Gardiner’s reform proposals to enhance UN ECA’s role in development aid by the end of the 1960s met with resistance by the UNDP and other UN agencies, who feared interference in their own activities. Although some reforms were realized, they did not increase UN ECA’s influence.

Reformers

The group of Reformers includes five Combiners (Brundtland, Mahler, McNamara, Ricupero and Woods) and two Non-Combiners (Hansenne and Saouma). They help to demonstrate what Reformers do when they run IOs.

Upon assuming office WHO Director-General Mahler (1973-88) announced a sweeping policy and managerial reform, if not moral revolution, which resulted in the Primary Health Care movement. Mahler knew how to take decisions, invested in convincing directors and gave flamboyant speeches. His radicalism won him passionate admirers but also detractors and not all regions assumed the roles he envisaged for them. He also met with rivalry with Jim Grant of UNICEF. Nonetheless he promoted his Primary Health Care strategy, engaged American HIV specialist Jonathan Mann to establish a special programme on AIDS and defined public health standards to curb aggressive marketing by medical companies. When Brundtland, who headed the WHO between 1998 and 2003, entered the organization, it had a frozen budget and had lost leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS to the UN. Her ambition was to give health a higher visibility on the global agenda and she used all of her political capital and networks to do so, among them addressing the G8 summit, given the G8 concern with public health at the time. To become an international leader the WHO had to provide factual prove of its efficiency. Brundtland recruited staff from the World Bank and engaged Harvard Professor Jeffrey Sachs to propose quantifiable and budgeted solutions. Her major achievements were the fights against malaria (through a public-private
partnership) and against tobacco (through a framework convention, including a conflict with the tobacco industry). She did not go for a second term in office.

When Woods began at the IBRD (1963-68), the time seemed ripe for an active president. Within six months he defined the agenda that guided his financial, operational and lending initiatives. He expanded the range of activities for which the Bank could loan. When taking a broader approach to lending, he made clear that he was not trying to replace the work of other UN specialized agencies and worked out cooperation agreements with them (e.g. FAO and UNESCO). Diversification of lending helped the Bank at times when it had excess reserves. His agenda required riskier lending, a larger staff, more control of development assistance and an increase in non-financial activities. Although intelligent and perceptive, Woods criticized staff harshly and publicly argued with the Executive Board. Whereas his first years in office marked a period of growth and innovation, the last years were characterized by frustration, particularly by being unable to transform the Bank into a developing agency. Part of his funding frustrations depended on his poor relations with the US Secretary of the Treasury. Wood’s successor McNamara (1968-81) was more successful in the proposed transformation. He brought a strong moral mission to the Bank and during field visits verbalized quality-of-life concerns such as education, nutrition and population, with poverty and economic growth becoming his overriding concerns. The scale of expansion (staff, countries engaged in, borrowing and lending) as well as global impact was huge. However, this also resulted in an expansion for expansion’s sake, with many of the projects failing to achieve their stated goals. With Conservatism under Reagan and Thatcher on the rise, funding for the World Bank and McNamara’s poverty alleviation became more difficult and McNamara left the Bank before completing his third period.

When Ricupero joined UNCTAD (1995-2004), the organization faced a deep existential crisis, because the industrialized world saw this as a redundant institution next to the newly established WTO. Ricupero proposed dramatic reforms to UNCTAD’s operating structure and began mobilizing support among developing countries. Despite negative reactions he succeeded in carrying out the reforms, taking care that he lived up to the standards set by the UN Secretariat. He reduced UNCTAD’s functional divisions and enhanced its ethical imperative, given the imbalanced and unfair multilateral trade system. He managed to re-establish Southern confidence in the multilateral trade system (not an easy undertaking) and made a conceptual contribution to the post-Seattle scenario, which helped pave the way for launching a new round of WTO negotiations, including a development agenda for trade negotiations. Ricupero continued to elaborate UNCTAD’s development-friendly policies. When he handed over the organization it was in a much better shape than when he started.

The two Non-Combiners among the Reformers are Saouma of the FAO and Hansenne of the ILO. Saouma (1976-1993) began as an internally strong leader, who inherited a sickly organization and focused on objectives such as food security, rural development and environmental concerns and reasserted FAO’s presence in developing countries. He also succeeded in increasing funding, but during his second term saw a tightening of budget resources. In spite of successes with regard to food production in Africa, fisheries management and statistical support for agriculture, donor countries resisted his re-election. They did not appreciate his style and his conflict with Ingram of the WFP, but did not get enough support for their candidate. Saouma’s third term reflected tiredness with his person, further budget tightening and a management style that became dictatorial in combination of offering posts to political supporters. When Saouma left the organization, the FAO was in a worse state than when he took over.

Hansenne of the ILO (1989-99) understood the necessity to reform the institution after the end of the Cold War, but he needed time to build his knowledge of the organization (he
had little idea how to steer the institution) and to analyze the geopolitical context in which it operated. It took him his first term to know where he was going. His relative absence from the international front made him unpopular with the employers group and his reforms of the secretariat (decentralization, greater mobility and zero growth) resulted in a difficult relation with the staff union. His lack of capacity to establish consensus among the constituents resulted in weak internal and weak external leadership. The ILO was further restricted by the dominant position of the WTO, particularly in the debate about social clauses, and the WTO decision to declare Hansenne *persona non grata* at its 1996 summit. When Hansenne left more room for his advisers, the ILO succeeded in responding effectively to the WTO’s complaint about too many ILO standards by compiling a set of core standards.

**Conclusion about the Three Subgroups**

Starting with the core of human rights in this section, it is striking that Robinson, a Regular, was an outspoken High Commissioner. She, however, met the border of what major powers accepted as tolerable in the field of security, given her remarks on Chechnya and Guantánamo Bay. This parallels the situation of Bustani in the security section.

The group of *Frontierpersons* in this section shows the relevance of selecting and hiring competent and talented experts when setting up an international secretariat, as Chisholm, Huxley, Myrdal and Prebisch, but also other executive heads, illustrate. Inspiration by the executive heads also matters, in particular for establishing teamwork and coherence in policy making. All demonstrate this, with Hoffman showing a situation where coherence eventually is lacking and thus problematic. Being an internal leader is one thing, but the executive head also needs to be an external leader. In this group of eight, six are Non-Combiners and only two are Combiners: Myrdal and Wyndham White. Wyndham White illustrates the combination well, given the fact that he succeeded in setting up an organization where this was lacking entirely, but he also played the role of negotiator himself. This required not only that parties accepted him in this role, but he also needed a broad range of skills to resolve conflicts between the parties. Prebisch represents another type of leader, as he was most prominent with regard to provoking and well-argued economic ideas, but as an executive head he, unlike Wyndham White, lacked concrete organizational successes. Furthermore, it may be concluded that if an organization is set up by Non-Combiners the successors need to continue institution building, which may make the second executive head not a normal Regular but rather one with Frontier expectations.

The group of *Regulars* also shows that expertise matters, whether this refers to banking or understanding the weather. Other qualities that are relevant are political instinct (e.g. Morse of the ILO) and understanding of the organization’s character (e.g. Goad of the IMCO). Internal relations, either within the secretariat or between bodies of the organization, require attention and engagement. Morse shows the relevance of a broker role and balancing skills for internal controversies and Black of the IBRD the relevance of timely consultation with the board. An authoritarian style (e.g. of Maheu in UNESCO) can be accepted if external success by the organization is clear. The organizational culture can have an impact, given Evans’ problems with the French culture dominant in Paris-based UNESCO. Gardiner of UN ECA shows that his sometimes-controversial character influenced relations within the secretariat.

Various executive heads cherish good relations within the UN System, with Davies, Goad and Morse being aware of the necessity to keep personal and friendly contacts, which is relevant for both collaboration and the settlement of boundary conflicts in cases where mandates overlap or the relation between larger and smaller organizations becomes unbalanced. An example of bad relations within the UN System is the fight between Ingram
(WFP) and Saouma (FAO). Apart from the stubbornness of the two personalities over a long time period, it is also apparent that this went on without much intervention by the UN. Relations with the hegemon (the US; a factor that probably is not restricted to one of the subgroups, but definitely playing a role in the examples of this subgroup) are shown in the political form of McCarthyism (solved differently by Morse than by Evans) and in the room for manoeuvre of the IBRD president, as Clausen found out when criticizing US fiscal policies and representing a policy direction that was no longer accepted by a new US administration. Maheu is interesting in this case, as his power base in UNESCO (supported by both the Eastern bloc and the global South) was too strong for Western powers to remove him. That inter-organizational relations matter is shown in the case of UN ECA and the continental OAU, where rivalry over its ‘African’ character weakened the UN ECA’s position and the external leadership of Gardiner.

The group of Reformers in the Justice Cluster shows strong initiatives based on ideas on what the organization should do. The IBRD shows this, with Woods expanding the range of activities and heading toward a transformation of the Bank into a development agency. He did not succeed in the envisaged transformation, but his successor McNamara did. However, it can be questioned how useful this was. Part of the expansion set in motion by McNamara was expansion for expansion’s sake and the central policy of poverty alleviation was set up but disappeared when McNamara left. The WHO is an example where two executive heads found a problematic organization and brought their solutions. Mahler, who would be in office for 15 years, had his own health strategy that he implemented (primary health care and AIDS) over a longer time period, including organizational changes. Brundtland managed to have health on the global agenda again, also by reaching out to the private sector. However, she also teased the private sector and served only one term. Hansenne of the ILO is an example of an executive head who understood the need to adapt, but who was unfamiliar with the working of his organization and needed a long time to understand how he could steer the institution in the right direction. Saouma of the FAO is an example of someone with not very strong ideas, but enough to start a reform. He however became isolated, met with strong conflicts (Ingram of the WFP) and developed a dictatorial style. Like in Maheu’s UNESCO the Western states were unable to change the situation. The most impressive reformer seems Ricupero, who understood the situation of both UNCTAD and WTO very well and managed to reform UNCTAD with the support of the global South and to let it play a role in the situation where the WTO was in trouble itself.

Relations within the UN System seem to develop as such. Woods was aware of the impact of a stronger IBRD on specialized UN agencies, which in fact saw the IBRD intruding in their fields. He therefore worked out cooperation agreements to control the situation. The IBRD under McNamara, however, simply became a very strong player. When the WTO became a very strong player in the 1990s, both the ILO and UNCTAD had to cope with this, with Hansenne a weaker leader than Ricupero. It can be questioned to what extent the UN System, a rather amorphous entity, or the UN Secretariat is playing a coordinating role in such developments, to which the competition between FAO and WFP can be added. Relations with the hegemon also matter in relation to reform of IOs. While Woods’ frustrations over transformation of the IBRD were related to his poor connections with the US Treasury, McNamara was aware that the new policies of the Reagan administration did not allow anymore a wide support of his IBRD policies.

5. IO BIO Project Database and the Subgroup of Security Organizations

An analysis across all of the positions listed in the IO BIO Project executive head database (totalling just over 900) was undertaken for the 2013 ACUNS annual meeting (Kille and
Reinalda 2013) and the same database (which has the current executive heads entered as of August 2011, although this is in the process of being updated) was employed for this paper. Given the theme for the 2015 meeting, this section of the paper seeks to build upon and extend that analysis by selecting out a segment of the executive heads working for IOs connected to the issue of security in order to compare and contrast this group to explore what dimensions of leadership this might reveal. The selection of organizations in this area represented in the database, totalling 26 IOs and 165 executive head positions, is listed in Appendix 2, which provides the founding date (and dissolved date when appropriate) of the organization, title of executive head, and brief description and support for IO security mission. The listing of individual executive heads, including in order by organization, is provided at the IO BIO Project website (www.ru.nl/fm/iobio).

*Security Organizations and their Executive Heads from Database*

The analysis does not claim to examine all security-related organizations operating in the world, only those that can be derived from the list currently encompassed in the IO BIO Project database set of organizations. Note that, unlike the previous sections analysing IO BIO entries, we maintained a more limited, focused understanding of ‘security’ organizations for this analysis that does not include refugee organizations. Similarly, although Kirchner himself ended up engaging with security dimensions, UNASUR is not generally regarded as a security organization (although the actual activities undertaken by an executive head versus the mission of an organization that this example demonstrates does indicate the potential need for a more fine-tuned sorting mechanism for placing organizational heads into such categories). In addition, with the conference focus of ‘The UN at 70’, only organizations in operation during the past 70 years were included in the analysis, thereby excluding, for example, the League of Nations. Thus, the set of IOs includes the UN itself and the organization’s SG, and 25 other peer institutions that have operated within an overlapping time frame, with most of these IOs (22) being regional institutions created after the UN began operations. The universal IOs are the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), IAEA, OPCW and UN. Seventeen IOs were created during the Cold War, i.e. between 1945 and 1981; 10 (including the African Union (AU); see below) were created between 1991 and 2002. Four IOs were dissolved (Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), Warsaw Pact and Western European Union (WEU)).

While there are 26 organizations analysed, there are actually 27 IO names to consider. This is due to the fact that some IOs have changed names over time, and doing so often indicates a shift in organizational mission or focus of some form. Both the current African Union (AU), and the preceding named Organization for African Unity (OAU) are included. While it can be argued that the OAU had a weaker security dimension compared to the activities of the AU, the OAU Charter does clearly specify a focus on ‘peace and security’, an objective which was strengthened and deepened in the shift to AU. However, in other cases, only the most recent version of the IO was incorporated into the analysis. Thus, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was included due to a direct mission mandate of ‘promotion and maintenance of peace and security’, but the preceding Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which did not have security as an objective, was excluded from the analysis. The same logic holds for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), but not the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and European Union (EU) over European Community (EC).

Not only did the organization name change from OAU to AU, the executive head title also shifted from SG to Chairman of the Commission. A range of other IOs have kept the
same name, but still changed the leadership title at some point in their history. For the security organizations, the only case of this occurring is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) shifting from Executive Secretary to President of the Commission in 2007 in conjunction with the move from having an ECOWAS Secretariat to a Commission. ECOWAS claims that the ‘difference goes beyond a name change’ since the Commission has ‘enhanced powers’ (http://www.ecowas.us/Commission.html) with ‘an empowered President of the Commission with a Vice President and Fifteen Commissioners’ instead of just an Executive Secretary running the Secretariat (http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/). Finally, although there are 165 positions analyzed, these positions were held by only 161 people. In two cases an individual transitioned from the leadership position in one organization to that of another in the same region: Javier Solana from SG of NATO (1995-1999) to SG of Western European Union (1999-2009) and Mohamed Ibn Chambas served from 2002-2010 as head of ECOWAS (where he was the individual to bridge the name change from Executive Secretary to President of the Commission, so he has held three different titles across two organizations) before moving in 2010 to take over as the SG of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). In two cases the individual returned to the same organization for a second stint: Ivan Korotchenya was Executive Secretary of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from 1993-1998, but then returned in an acting capacity March 1999-April 1999 and Sergio Balanzino was twice the acting NATO SG, August 1994-October 1994 and October 1995-December 1995.

Comparing Security Subgroup to Full Database of Executive Heads

The executive head positions come with a range of titles for the security organizations. As with the full database, the greatly predominant title is Secretary-General (with 121 out of the 165 positions held, across 16 organizations). However, there are also 22 Executive Secretaries (across 5 organizations), 12 Directors-General (3 IOs), 7 Presidents (2 IOs), and the 3 Chairman of the Commission from the AU (which is the only organization in the database using this title, although of course the EU has the President of the Commission and there are other forms of Chair). Yet, this is a more limited range of titles than we see across other organizations, which also includes: Administrator, Director, Executive Director, High Commissioner, Chair, Chief of the Secretariat, Commissioner-General, General Manager, Managing Director, and Permanent Secretary. As discussed by the authors in the 2013 paper, the significance of the different titles is an intriguing avenue to explore more closely. Although security organizations largely share the usual title of SG for their executive heads like most IOs, with the other security organizations focused on a more limited range of titles, is this due to the expected role of the leaders, structure of these organizations, or other considerations that distinguish between non-security organization leadership?

In terms of personal data, there is not a distinction between the security executive heads and the whole database in the area of age when taking office. Executive heads for security IOs take office on average at the age of 54.3 years, while for the set of all executive heads this is 53.97, so this age is essentially the same across both sets of IOs. While there is no compelling reason to expect that executive head ages should be different across IO issue area, an argument could be made that one should expect the time served in office to be lower for leaders of security organizations as their engagement with addressing on-going and pressing crisis situations could wear down the leaders. Yet, the average time in office for security IO executive heads is 67.35 months/5.61 years, which is actually marginally higher.
than the 66.64 months/5.55 years in office for all executive heads examined. Note that the average time in office for security IO executive heads is skewed by two of the longest serving leaders from the IAEA, Hans Blix (1981-1997) and Sigvard Eklund (1961-1981). Although the shortest serving executive head also comes from a security IO: Miguel Angel Rodriguez of the OAS, who resigned after only one month as SG in light of corruption allegations from his previous national-level service as President of Costa Rica, although such short terms in office is definitely not the norm for the OAS since three of their SGs fall in the top ten for length of time served for security IOs.

However, there are other distinctions across IOs to be drawn. For the database as a whole, the lack of women leadership in IO was stressed (with only 44 women holding 45 positions), but the gender gap for security organizations is even more extreme. Indeed, there is only one woman represented: Len Ishmael, the Director-General of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), who started in the position in 2003. Given the particularly male-centric realm of security, it will be important to continue to monitor the leaders being brought into security organizations to see if gender diversity improves or if this area remains an even greater impediment to women leadership in international affairs. Since there are only 13 women executive heads in the overall database who took office before 2000, the clear majority of which have gained leadership roles in the last 15 years, so when will this shift translate over to the security realm as well?

Finally, the security IO heads can be sorted by home country. Are there any patterns that can be noted regarding member-states intentionally selecting executive heads from certain countries, or types of countries, to handle security issues? As with the general database, some security organizations, even from the relatively same region, seek to draw their leaders from a different country each time (for example, Gulf Cooperation Council with heads from Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) while others are dominated by a particular country (for example, the Arab League, with Egypt 5 of the 7 times). In the 2013 paper, it was suggested that further analysis could explore the degree to which small countries are given executive head positions in order to balance the stronger states. In terms of security, does this pattern hold or do the powerful states also seek to dictate the running of security organizations by installing their nationals into the leadership position? One way to measure this is to consider the number of executive head positions held by the permanent five Security Council members, who do not overall extend their great power Security Council privileges into pressing for leadership posts in other security organization dimensions. Instead, we see a relatively limited number of executive heads from most of these countries. As the results from the database analysis indicate, the British have had a strong presence in NATO, with three SGs for that organization. France has not had a NATO leader, but has placed three individuals elsewhere (EU, OSCE, and WEU), while the US has had some success in its region (two OAS) and globally (one IAEA). However, Russia has generally dominated leadership positions for security organizations in its region. Otherwise, the most represented countries are: Egypt and Italy (7), Belgium (6), Netherlands and Thailand (5), and Germany, Ghana, and Turkey (4).

Strengths and Limitations of IO BIO Project Database Analysis of Executive Heads

As with any large N type of study, a clear strength of the database analysis lies in the ability to derive and track patterns across a great number of data points. With enough biographical

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4 Note that the average time in office for the database as a whole has been adjusted since the 2013 paper. The original results reported included acting executive heads, which inherently have a more limited time in office, so the updated results have removed the acting leaders.
entries in place, as demonstrated initially in this paper, it is possible to begin to manually review such material and draw out patterns based on certain leadership categories. Yet, this does require a certain degree of interpretation, results must be reported in extensive descriptive detail, and also as more entries get added the task gets increasingly onerous. With a sortable spreadsheet database, one can quickly determine comparative results across hundreds of leaders. As demonstrated in this paper, it is also a relatively easy task to select out a group of leaders from the database based on certain criteria (such as type of organization) to explore differences across categories of actors. At the same time, by focusing on the larger patterns the researcher is not able to explore the important nuance and details of particular organizations or executive heads. The database does not provide any context for the operations within an organization or the type of leadership being employed. Thus, the IO BIO entries provide a vital view into such issues. Yet, as the project continues to develop, using patterns derived from the database analysis can help to focus on prospective areas of context to draw from the entries. In the end, the hope is that both parts of the project do not simply stand alone, but are able to be used in conjunction to employ the relative strengths to create deeper and more detailed understanding of IO leadership overall.

Since the database places executive head information into a sortable spreadsheet instead of document format, this forces the researcher to ensure that the data is exact and comparable. One gap or glitch in the data disrupts an entire sort. Thus, the process ensures that any such data glitches, oversights, or issues are cleaned up, thereby making the executive head data more robust overall. At the same time, once the data is in place certain decisions must be made on how to sort and interpret this information. Drawing out a smaller segment from the database, in this case separating out the security organizations, is a useful exercise as this focuses attention on a smaller portion of the larger set. This allows the researcher to pay closer attention and helps to catch certain issues as the data is worked back through. For example, in this iteration of the analysis it was realized that the length of time in office was being artificially held down through the inclusion of acting executive heads (the security IO executive heads who were solely in office on an acting basis only averaged 7.7 months in office compared to the regular office holders who averaged, as reported above, 67.35 months, so the average of all of the office holders was dragged down to 57.83 months with the inclusion of the acting heads).

The sortable database makes it rapidly clear where there is full information available on an executive head and where there are data gaps that need additional detailed research to complete. This is an area where the two parts of the project can positively reinforce each other, since research from IO BIO entries can be used to bolster missing data that was not readily available through a basic search (for example, exact date for birth and/or death). Work on IO BIO has also pointed to the value of adding additional information to the database, such as education, general background, military experience, life experience living through war, and types of activities undertaken while in office. The database is also set up with a clear indication of which executive heads are ‘current’ versus out of office. However, along with filling in other data gaps, this requires close attention through updating and maintaining the database. Unlike historical figures whose time in office is done (although of course new details that shift or bolster historical analysis can always come to light), there is an ongoing need to update the database when new executive heads take office if the database is to remain fully relevant. As with all research, much of this is a question of time and commitment to a project. The database required a great deal of time and effort to establish. The database as it stands reflects years of data entry, sorting, testing, and fixing. However, once this database is in place then is easy to use to sort and employ in a range of ways in a very quick manner. Yet, since the data remains an ever moving target with new executive heads entering office every year, to maintain full relevance additional time commitment is always needed for
maintenance in the form of updating with new SGs and, if we seek to further expand, new organizations and their historical and current leaders.

Conclusion

The IO BIO Project started five years ago as an effort to set up a biographical dictionary with short biographies of SGs of IOs. The editors constructed a database in document form, a website, author instructions and, as of early May 2015, the project has resulted in the publication of 45 entries, covering a variety of 30 IOs, written by authors with expertise about both the organizations and the executive heads. In addition, the database has been translated into a sortable spreadsheet format and initial results from this endeavor have proved to be fruitful. Given these results, the IO BIO Project speaks well to the longstanding debate about the role of individuals in international relations and the process of international organization. The inventory in this paper shows that various theoretical approaches can be helpful to see where and when individuals matter. While certain approaches do not allow any room to study IO executive heads, others refer to the importance of international bureaucracies and leadership. An older generation of International Relations scholars, among them Ernst Haas, Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, already developed theoretical ideas to explain an IO’s agency as a result of leadership by the executive head and his or her staff. Younger generations followed with further analyses of international secretariats and the roles and leadership styles of SGs. We believe that this is a positive development, given the need to better understand both the workings of huge international bureaucracies and the influence an individual leader, or a group of top staff members, can have on what this bureaucracy can contribute to the assets of an executive head, respectively how the effort influences the role of IOs in international relations.

The collection of biographical entries, which continues to expand, allows for further analyses, such as looking into the ways in which executive heads choose their leadership roles, both by showing, or not showing, internal leadership (of the bureaucracy) and external leadership in the organization’s environment of other actors. The entries also allow the differentiation of subgroups and the examination of role expectations of executive heads with regard to setting up an organization (so-called Frontierspersons), to leading an existing organization (Regulars) and to adapting an existing organization (Reformers). In this paper we have some first conclusions about leadership roles chosen by executive heads and the role expectations in the three subgroups. We did this by creating a group of entries in the security field and one in the justice field, keeping close to the theme of the ACUNS 2015 Annual Meeting: ‘The UN at 70 – Guaranteeing Security and Justice’. IO BIO continues to look for experts to write more entries, so in this paper we also discussed some issues that are relevant when writing an entry such as availability and reliability of information and putting the pieces of a biographical puzzle together. A final analysis used the database to examine all security-related IOs and their executive heads, which allows a comparison between the security subgroup and an earlier full database analysis. This process reinforced the relative strengths and limitations of each approach to studying leadership, and provided much food for thought regarding the future path of bolstering such analysis – both separately and in conjunction – as the IO BIO Project continues to move forward.
References


Appendix 1: IO BIO Entries Published as of Early May 2015

Executive Heads of IOs A-Z

IOs A-Z, with Executive Heads
Commission of the European Community Sicco Leendert Mansholt (1972-73)
Food and Agricultural Organization Edouard Victor Saouma (1976-93)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Eric Wyndham White (1948-68)
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization Edward Colin Viner Goad (1968-73)
International Atomic Energy Organization William Sterling Cole (1957-61)
International Labour Organization Harold Beresford Butler (1932-38), Michel Hansenne (1989-99), David Abner Morse (1948-70)
League of Nations Joseph Avenol (1933-40), John (Séan) Ernest Lester (1940-46)
League of Nations Health Organization Ludwik Witold Rajchman (1921-39)
League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Fridtjof Nansen (1921-30)
League of Nations Social Affairs Section Rachel Eleanor Crowdy (1919-31)
Nordic Council of Ministers Per Unckel (2003-06)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Thorkil Kristensen (1960-61), Robert Ernest Marjolin (1948-55)
Union of South American Nations Néstor Kirchner (2010)
United Nations Development Programme Paul Gray Hoffman (1966-72)
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Gunnar Myrdal (1947-57)
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America Raúl Federico Prebisch (1950-63)


United Nations Special Fund Paul Gray Hoffman (1959-65)

World Food Programme James Charles Ingram (1982-92)


World Meteorological Organization David Arthur Davies (1955-79)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Security IO</th>
<th>Executive Head Title</th>
<th>IO Security Mission</th>
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<tr>
<td>2. African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) (June 6, 1975)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>An objective of the organization is the “establishment and consolidation of peace and stability in a free and democratic society” (<a href="http://www.acp.int/content/secretariat-acp">http://www.acp.int/content/secretariat-acp</a>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Antarctic Treaty (signed Dec. 1, 1959)/(in effect June 23, 1961)</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>The purpose of the Antarctic Treaty is to ensure “in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord” (<a href="http://www.ats.aq/index_e.htm">http://www.ats.aq/index_e.htm</a>).</td>
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<td>4. Arab League (March 22, 1945)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between States of the Arab League (1950) outlined, “the desire of their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter.” It was formulated the parameters of a Joint Defense body and strategy in order to &quot;repel the aggression and restore peace and security&quot; (<a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp">http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arabjoin.asp</a>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Aug. 8, 1967)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>Established an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) whose aim is “to ensure that countries in the region live in peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment” (<a href="http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community">http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community</a>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Central American Integration System (SICA) (Dec. 31, 1991)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>The purpose of SICA is to make the isthmus of Central America a “Region of Peace, Freedom, Democracy and Development.” An objective is to establish a new model of regional security that includes strengthening civilian authority and maintaining a reasonable balance of forces(<a href="http://www.sica.int/sica/propositos_en.aspx?IdEnt=401&amp;Idm=2&amp;IdmStyle=2">http://www.sica.int/sica/propositos_en.aspx?IdEnt=401&amp;Idm=2&amp;IdmStyle=2</a>).</td>
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<td>7. Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Aug. 19, 1959)/(dissolved Sept. 26, 1979)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>CENTO was created with a similar premise to NATO, to contain Soviet incursions. The organization was comprised of states in both the Middle East and Europe (<a href="http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm">http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm</a>).</td>
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<td>10. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) (Secretariat- March 17, 1997)</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>The CTBTO “bans all nuclear explosions on Earth whether for military or peaceful purposes.” The organization maintains verification measures such as the International Monitoring System (IMS) (<a href="http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/">http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/</a>).</td>
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<td>11. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (May 28, 1975)</td>
<td>Executive Secretary /President of the Commission (Jan. 1, 2007)</td>
<td>ECOWAS maintains the Directorate for Political Affairs and Peace and Security (PAPS), which exists for the sake of political and social stability. PAPS facilitates and promotes endeavors such as peace-keeping and conflict prevention (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework) (<a href="http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/political-affairs/">http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/political-affairs/</a>).</td>
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<td>12. European Union (EU) (Nov. 1, 1993)</td>
<td>President of the European Commission</td>
<td>The Common Security and Defense Policy is the arm through which the EU has become involved in roughly 30 operations for peace-keeping, which “enables the Union to take a lead role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention, and the strengthening of international security” by pooling resources and defense capabilities from member states (<a href="http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/">http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/</a>).</td>
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<td>13. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (May 25, 1981)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>While security is not a central focus of the GCC’s charter, the organization and its leaders have referenced security objectives. Former Secretary-General of the GCC Abdulla Bishara noted: “The world may laugh at us when we say that the Gulf countries alone are authorized to defend the region, but whatever our capabilities may be, we insist that this is the basic principle for achieving security and peace for our peoples” (<a href="http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21076-544-2-30.pdf?101110135754">http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21076-544-2-30.pdf?101110135754</a>).</td>
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<td>14. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1957)</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>The founding purpose of the IAEA is to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace.” The IAEA may report all instances of non-compliance to the Security Council (<a href="https://www.iaea.org/about/statute#a1-12">https://www.iaea.org/about/statute#a1-12</a>).</td>
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<td>15. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (1996)</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Precursor organization IGADD objectives did not outline security, however the IO became involved in the Sudan Civil War in 1993 as mediators. When the IO became IGAD in 1996, security was specified as an objective: “promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts through dialogue” (<a href="http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/igad-intergovernmental-authority-development-0">http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/igad-intergovernmental-authority-development-0</a>).</td>
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<td>17. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Sept. 14, 1960)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>The OPCW stands against all WMDs, and actively works to achieve “effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The OPCW provides assistance and protection to state-parties attacked or threatened with chemical weapons. Additionally, “deals with measures to ensure compliance,” such as sanctions (<a href="http://www.opcw.org">http://www.opcw.org</a>).</td>
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<td>19. Organization of American States (OAS) (1948)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>The Organization was established in order to achieve among its member states—as stipulated in Article 1 of the Charter—“an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity” (<a href="http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp">http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp</a>).</td>
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<td>Security IO</td>
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<td>20. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Security (OECS) (June 18, 1981)</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>OECS has in place a sub-regional security framework, which will be supported by the Regional Security System (RSS) (<a href="http://www.oecs.org/media-center/press-releases/secretariat/408-focus-on-oecs-security?highlight=WyJzZWN1cm10eSJd">http://www.oecs.org/media-center/press-releases/secretariat/408-focus-on-oecs-security?highlight=WyJzZWN1cm10eSJd</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (June 15, 2001)</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
<td>The organization’s activities include “increased military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism drills” (<a href="http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883">http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883</a>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Aug. 17, 1992)</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Within the SADC, the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security’s goal is to “promote and defend peace and security.” Two specific objectives are to “protect against instability,” and “develop a collective security capacity” (<a href="http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-executive-secretary/organ-politics-defense-and-security/">http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-executive-secretary/organ-politics-defense-and-security/</a>).</td>
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*Note: This Appendix only represents IOs included in the IO BIO Project Database as of May 2015; the security dimension may be weaker or stronger in specific time periods but this is not indicated in the table.*